THE AUTONOMY OF THINGS

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by

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ABSTRACT

Epistemology and metaphysics are two areas of philosophy between which many significant interconnections can be established-- traditionally, the former deals with relations obtaining between a 'knower' and 'what he may or may not know'; the latter, though its definition is controversial, typically deals with the structure and first principles through which the universe and its entities exist. In this thesis, I scrutinize one such epistemology-metaphysics interconnection, which occurred historically, in Hegel's response to the philosophy of Kant. Specifically, I shall be focusing upon Hegel's elaboration of an alternative metaphysical framework, within which Kant's epistemological restrictions upon the range of human knowledge could be confronted and 'neutralized'.

In Part I, I set up in general terms the basis for a clash between a typical epistemological standpoint, and a typical metaphysical standpoint, with regard to which of these two has the last word in conditioning and contributing to the other. In Part II, this clash works itself out: first, in Chapter 1, I introduce certain basic elements of Hegel's philosophy; then, in Chapter 2, I review Hegel's incorporation of the Kantian standpoint into his own Absolute Idealism. This 'incorporating'--gesture on Hegel's part involves a rejection of the well-known substance/attribute identification-and-distinction framework, in favor of a meta-logic within whose structure entities are specified as processes; it is a gesture which remains somewhat problematic for me.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an account of Hegel's response to the Kantian philosophy; specifically, it deals with Hegel's repudiation of Kant's noumenon-phenomenon dualism, the enclosure of all human knowledge within an inter-subjectively ordered realm of "possible experience." In Part I, I want to delineate the basic methodological shift which, I think, explains better than any other single factor the difference between the philosophies of Hegel and of Kant. This 'shift' or 'transition-in-emphasis' is especially important because it establishes a relation between two distinct, yet reciprocally relevant modes of philosophical approach: the epistemological and the metaphysical. For Kant as well as for Hegel, the question concerning the status of 'objectivity' is crucial in determining the nature of an entire theoretical system; Kant's approach to this question emphasizes the conceptual tools of 'epistemology,' whereas Hegel's approach emphasizes those of 'metaphysics.' This, in highly schematic form, is the divergence which sets Kant and Hegel apart; I shall devote Part I to its clarification.

First, I shall give a brief generalized picture of this Kant-Hegel divergence, using the terminology which they themselves adopted to express it. Then, in the two main sections of Part I, I will try to explicate the Kant-Hegel divergence in nontechnical language, using clear-cut

examples and the reasoning of everyday common sense. Only at that point, with a clear intuitive grasp of the basic shift at hand, will we be ready to undertake (in Part II) a direct analysis of Hegel's critique of Kant, and of the foundation underlying Hegel's counter-proposals.

* * *

The methodological distinction before us presents itself essentially in the following manner:

(a) Kant aims to explain the operation of all human knowing; from the characteristics of this active 'knowing,' he then deduces characteristics of all human knowledge.

(b) Hegel, on the other hand, intends to seek out the qualities intrinsic to facts in and of themselves--he repudiates as superficial those qualities imputed to knowledge merely by transitivity from the qualities or status of the knower.

Let us look first at Kant. In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, he says:

> The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to intuit, that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness. This union originates either merely relative to the subject and is accidental and subjective, or takes place absolutely and is necessary or objective. . . . Hence judgments are either merely subjective, when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject only and united in it, or objective, when they are united in consciousness in general, that is, necessarily (p. 52).[2]

Thus, for Kant, two kinds of judgments, the subjective and the 'objective,' result from two distinct ways in which

cognition occurs--"in one subject only," or for "consciousness in general." In other words, these two kinds of judgments receive their distinct status in accordance with the distinct modes of operation, the manners of mental activity, through which they each were made. Then, once this distinction between subjective and 'objective' judgments has been clarified, all judgments are placed by Kant into a wider sphere of subjectivity, stemming once again from an operational facet of human consciousness: all judgments, whether united "in one subject only" or for "consciousness in general," are nevertheless judgments made by a subject. They are, that is, always and necessarily operating at one remove from the 'noumenon,' or object as it is in itself. The final distinction, then, goes as follows:



> . . . judgments of experience take their objective validity, not from the immediate knowledge of the object (which is impossible), but from the condition of universal validity of empirical judgments, which, as already said, never rests upon empirical or, in short, sensuous conditions, but upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object in itself always remains unknown; but when by the concept of the understanding, the connection of the representations of the object, which it gives to our sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and the judgment is objective (pp. 46-47).[3]

What Kant is saying here is that we cannot have immediate knowledge of an object--such immediate knowledge would require an intuitive understanding by means of which the object itself could be 'present' directly for our understanding.

> An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition--an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist--would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. For the human understanding, however, which thinks only, and does not intuit, that act is necessary (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 157).[4]

This 'special act of synthesis of the manifold' is carried out by the understanding, through a category, or pure concept of the understanding. Our knowledge, in other words, is mediated by that category, which unifies for us the manifold to which we have access through the receptivity of our senses. Thus, the category must not mistakenly be attributed applicability to things-in-themselves; rather, the category subsumes under its rigorous unity only the manifold representations in space and time, which it receives from the intuitive functioning of the senses. In this way, the category has a specific and sovereign territory, within which its role is clear-cut. Outside this territory, however, it has no validity.

> The categories, therefore, . . . are merely functions of the understanding for concepts; and represent no object. This objective meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realizes the understanding in the very

> process of restricting it (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 187).[5]

Hegel reacts to this in the following way:

> The critical philosophy [of Kant] has one great negative merit. It has brought home the conviction that the categories of understanding are finite in their range, and that any cognitive process confined within their pale falls short of the truth. But Kant had only a sight of half the truth. He explained the finite nature of the categories to mean that they were subjective only, valid only for our thought, from which the thing-in-itself was divided by an impassable gulf. In fact, however, it is not because they are subjective that the categories are finite: they are finite by their very nature, and it is on their own selves that it is requisite to exhibit their finitude (Logic, pp. 93-94).[6]

Hegel, in other words, is abandoning a whole method which he termed "psychological"--instead, he takes an approach that could neatly be called "logical." The difference between these two words offers one more expression of the transition I am trying to describe. To use a close analogy: instead of paying attention to "who said it" or "how and why it was said" or "how it is possible that things are said at all," Hegel wishes to look at "what was said" in its own terms, and in isolation from all the circumstances that accompanied the 'saying.'

> Laying aside therefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: i.e. its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective (Logic, p. 71).[7]

This shift-of-emphasis was intended by Hegel to bring about a major revision--a spring cleaning--of the doctrines and beliefs that had come to encrust themselves around

philosophy, century upon century. When one thinks of Hegel in the perspective of the history of philosophy, the first things that tend to come to mind are such recurrent themes as "unity through opposition," "triadic dialectical development," and "teleological Spirit." But all of Hegel's recurrent themes partake of one common form--his method. Now, it is often hard to tell just how 'method' and 'that-thing-to-which-method-is-applied' are related in the work of a given philosopher; for each always seems to play an important role in the definition of the other. With Hegel, however, a few clear-cut observations can be made. The whole of his philosophy, from the main recurrent themes to the finer details, is dominated by the principle of self-determination; as we shall subsequently see, it is this principle which explicitly informs such key notions as 'necessity,' 'Aufhebung,' and 'objectivity'; it is this principle which justifies the unification of all Process in terms of three specific underlying moments. But the principle of self-determination is not just important within Hegel's philosophy; it also provides the basis for his method of philosophizing, and proves, in this sense, the initial possibility for the existence of the whole endeavor.

What, then, is the principle of self-determination in Hegel's method? It is captured fleetingly in the following statement: "For in philosophy, to prove means to show how

the subject by and from itself makes itself what it is" (Logic, p. 122).[8] But we don't have to 'speak for' Hegel or 'interpret his intentions' with regard to this issue; he himself is clear and emphatic as to what he means:

> Logic is usually said to be concerned with forms only and to derive the material for them from elsewhere. But this "only," which assumes that the logical thoughts are nothing in comparison with the rest of the contents, is not the word to use about forms which are the absolutely real ground of everything. Everything else rather is an "only" compared with these thoughts. To make such abstract forms a problem presupposes in the inquirer a higher level of culture than ordinary; and to study them in themselves and for their own sake signifies in addition that these thought-types must be deduced out of thought itself, and their truth or reality examined by the light of their own laws. We do not assume them as data from without, and then define them or exhibit their value and authority by comparing them with the shape they take in our minds. If we thus acted, we should proceed from observation and experience, and should, for instance, say we habitually employ the term "force" in such a case, and such a meaning. A definition like that would be called correct, if it agreed with the conception of its object present in our ordinary state of mind. The defect of this empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it is in and for itself, but in terms of something assumed, which is then used as a criterion and standard of correctness. No such test need be applied: we have merely to let the thought-forms follow the impulse of their own organic life (Logic, p. 40).[9]

To recapitulate: earlier on I aligned Kant with an 'epistemological' approach and Hegel with a 'metaphysical' one. What I intended by that distinction will perhaps be clearer now:

(a) Kant starts out with the act of knowledge in an experiencing human subject; Hegel starts out with a 'fact.'

(b) Kant tries to see what in-formation, or de-formation, is necessarily imposed on the 'given' by the operation of our knowledge upon it; Hegel tries to show the manner in which things, or facts, acquire determinate form of their own accord, without our intervention.

(c) Kant concludes his inquiry with the delimitation of a field of rigorous appearance, a field within which all cognizing subjects must impose and recognize an order of things ultimately dependent upon them; Hegel concludes his inquiry with a global set of principles governing the order of things--the order of things as they are, independently of our knowing or not-knowing about them.

Now that I have sketched out in preliminary fashion the distinction upon which this thesis pivots, I shall try to characterize it more fully, through the contrasting positions of the following two sections. In the first section, I shall take a rather provocative example from modern physics, and develop from this example a spectrum of paradigmatic 'attitudes to objectivity'; the function of this spectrum will be to classify various epistemological notions of reality in terms of their greater or lesser 'subjectivistic circumspection' or 'positivistic confidence' with regard to the status of human experience. In the second section, I shall try to point out a sense in which any particular epistemological analysis can merely reveal secondary factors in the determination of what man knows, and

is; the primary factor, it will be suggested, is the specific logical or metaphysical structure within which knowledge, the known, and even the unknown, are all necessarily housed.

Section I: The Concept of an 'Attitude to Objectivity'

Steven Weinburg's The First Three Minutes is "a modern view of the origin of the universe."[10] It describes, in the language of physics, a probable history of the world, projected into the past and into the future from the present as physical science knows it. In light of its status as the most recent construal of our 'cosmic position' by an eminent scientist, it deserves to be taken seriously. What picture does it present? I shall take three quotations, from near the end of the book, as my material.

> To me, the most satisfying thing that has come out of these speculations about the very early universe is the possible parallel between the history of the universe and its logical structure. Nature now exhibits a great diversity of types of particles and types of interactions. Yet we have learned to look beneath this diversity, to try to see the various particles and interactions as aspects of a simple unified gauge field theory. The present universe is so cold that the symmetries among the different particles and interactions have been obscured by a kind of freezing; they are not manifest in ordinary phenomena, but have to be expressed mathematically, in our gauge field theories. That which we do now by mathematics was done in the very early universe by heat--physical phenomena directly exhibited the essential simplicity of nature. But no one was there to see it.[11]

> However all these problems may be resolved, and whichever cosmological model proves correct, there is not much of comfort in any of this. It is almost

> irresistible for humans to believe that we have some special relation to the universe, that human life is not just a more-or-less farcical outcome of a chain of accidents reaching back to the first three minutes, but that we were somehow built in from the beginning. As I write this I happen to be in an airplane at 30,000 feet, flying over Wyoming en route home from San Francisco to Boston. Below, the earth looks very soft and comfortable--fluffy clouds here and there, snow turning pink as the sun sets, roads stretching straight across the country from one town to another. It is very hard to realize that this all is just a tiny part of an overwhelmingly hostile universe. It is even harder to realize that this present universe has evolved from an unspeakably unfamiliar early condition, and faces a future extinction of endless cold or intolerable heat. The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. . . . But if there is no solace in the fruits of our research, there is at least some consolation in the research itself. Men and women are not content to comfort themselves with tales of gods and giants, or to confine their thoughts to the daily affairs of life; they also build telescopes and satellites and accelerators, and sit at their desks for endless hours working out the meaning of the data they gather. The effort to understand the universe is one of the very few things that lifts human life a little above the level of farce, and gives it some of the grace of tragedy.[12]

> This is often the way it is in physics--our mistake is not that we take our theories too seriously, but that we do not take them seriously enough. It is always hard to realize that these numbers and equations we play with at our desks have something to do with the real world.[13]

What sort of philosophical stance is Weinburg taking in these paragraphs?--why do we find ourselves simultaneously attracted and repelled by his cosmology? The answer is that an important ambiguity or paradox infuses his perspective. On the one hand, human life is reduced to farce by the conclusions of this physicist. On the other, humanity is tragically elevated in that it can perceive the farce. Although the content of quantum cosmology is held to reduce

the overall importance of human life, the form through which it is given bestows upon us the power of certainty. Obviously, that certainty is so attractive to Weinburg that he will choose it even at the price of being certain that his existence is tragic.

Now, it is clear that Weinburg's drastic position here is in one sense only an unfortunate slipup on his part, and hence remains irrelevant to a scrutiny of physics in general. If Weinburg wishes to see himself tragically, let him; but quantum cosmology certainly implies no necessary belittling of human life, as many physicists would surely hasten to point out. What is really interesting in this case, rather, is the status accorded by Weinburg to the physical data themselves. Let us see what sort of general picture we can envision, with regard to this 'according to status' to empirical data.

In an essay on Hegel's philosophy of art, Albert Hofstadter offers the following portrayal of a typical scientific 'attitude to objectivity':

> The empirical scientist never tires of pointing out that he does not deal in truth, does not know truth, does not even know what truth is supposed to be; all he does is to make hypotheses, theories, models, by means of which he hopes to be able to predict the consequences of given conditions.[14]

We can put together a schematic spectrum of attitudes like the one expressed in this quotation; this spectrum will

allow us roughly to classify many scientists with regard to the way they see their work. It goes as follows:

*: Those who construe our models as constitutive of reality itself: by working out the implications of our models, we further and further determine what reality is to be;

**: Those who believe that our models approximate to reality; a model is the result of our gradual extraction of governing--laws and principles from the world as it exists independently of us;

***: Those who believe all models are ultimately circumscribed in their applicability to some putatively single 'reality,' because of the necessary subjectivity of the model-conceiver.

Needless to say, '**' is a form of belief that leads to increasingly confident conceptions about the nature of the 'objective' world. A researcher in this line of thought will tend to believe that reflection upon problems, in and of itself, enables a man to see things less and less subjectively, more and more the way they are independently of his particular perspective upon them. If we refine the lenses carefully enough, eventually we will not be looking through glasses at all.

This seems to be the way Weinburg thinks of physics.

> That which we do now by mathematics was done in the very early universe by heat--physical phenomena directly exhibited the essential simplicity of nature. But no one was there to see it.
>
> It is always hard to realize that these numbers and equations we play with at our desks have something to do with the real world.

> However all these problems may be resolved, and whichever cosmological model proves correct, there is not much of comfort in any of this.

Although Weinburg does not give explicit criteria for the 'correctness' of a model, it is pretty clear what he intends. That model is most correct which best represents for us humans the internal workings of the universe as it is whether or not anyone is "there to see it." This universe and its principles provide the fundamental conditions for our existence. Weinburg, therefore, falls somewhere quite close to '**' on the spectrum sketched out above.

What might be the reasons for subscribing to a philosophical position of this kind? Probably, a principal factor justifying adherence to position '**' is the strong predictive value of our scientific models; one is easily led to common sense judgments of the following sort: "Everything seems to be fitting in, even more than we could have hoped to expect--we must be on the right track!"

At this point, then, a Kantian rebuttal is relevant: in every problem, in every reflection, the irreducible factor is the presence of the cognizing subject. No matter how you try to filter your presence out of your experiments, there remains the fact: <u>you</u> thought them up, and you did so in the context of a scientific discipline and language and conceptual structure inherited from the collected thought of many other subjects. Any limitations in <u>man's</u> capacity to represent his experience are thus transferred

directly into all possible models he might create in his efforts to comprehend life. You cannot hope to represent to yourself the nature of the world as it exists independently of your perceiving it, quite simply because you have never perceived the world without also being present yourself. You know what things are like in a room after you've left that room, either because you accept the testimony of other persons like you, as to what happened after you left, or because you imagine to yourself the room as it was when you were there, except with you yourself missing. In both cases the presence of a cognizing subject is there to determine the structure of what is represented--either ostensibly as in the first case or by implication as in the second case. In no sense can we make statements about, or even conceive, what things would really be like if we weren't there: we always think of such situations as if we, or someone else like us, actually was or were.

One way of facing such a Kantian sort of criticism is to accept it completely--and this, I think, is a common philosophical stance among scientists. There are, however, two ways of doing so, the one corresponding to '*' above, the other corresponding to '***.' Both cases involve coming to grips with the radically subject-originated nature of human thought. In the first case, however, no 'world-beyond-our-experience' is posited at all, whereas in the

second instance (the neo-Kantian), such an independent world is held necessarily to exist.

The first approach ('*') can be very roughly portrayed like this: the limits of my language (and logic) are the limits of my world. Nothing can be real for me unless it falls within these limits, because everything that I can know falls somewhere upon or within the skeletal structure of logic that most fundamentally informs all human expe-rience. To be a thing at all, in any meaningful sense, is to be in virtue of certain basic structures or categories intrinsically bound up with all acts of our consciousness. The structure of our language pre-forms or pre-constitutes what we perceive as the world and mean by 'the world.' Therefore, our cognitive endeavor is directed towards dis-covering the characteristics of this basic structure, work-ing out the implications of the basic givens (as in mathe-matics), finding out the properties of this 'world,' once it has been so 'given' to us. In this context, the Platonic characterization of Logos as 'object of recollection' makes distinct modern sense. The world and man stand in comple-mentary relation to each other, within the embrace of a single logico-linguistic order: man seeks to know that ba-sic order through his reflection upon the world.

The second approach ('***') posits a radically objec-tive domain whose existence is logically required by the radical subjectivity of the human sphere. If we are

subjects, foci of consciousness, then all that is for us is strictly appearance--that is, our experience is the informed content of that which appears to us. But the nature of appearance is that something is appearing--what it is, we cannot tell until it has appeared. Once it has appeared, however, it is no longer necessarily the same as it was before it appeared. Thus, a separate world, a 'beyond,' is established, which is implicated in all our cognitions, but about which nothing can safely be asserted. It, however, is the truly objective world, existing independently of our experiencing it--all that we have access to is the inter-subjectively ordered world of our common discursive understandings. This 'inter-subjective realm' itself, translated into modern terms, bears much similarity to the language-constituted world just discussed as '*.' Nevertheless, the positing of it as existing in relation to an independent 'beyond' renders the 'inter-subjective realm' qualitatively distinct--and philosophers working within this latter framework tend to be interested in problems that arise within an equally distinct corresponding tradition, with methods and focal points of its own.

Three basic world-perspectives have thus been delineated--three ways of according epistemological status to the data of our experience; they are:

(1) the 'linguistic' ('*')

(2) the 'positivistic' ('**')

(3) the 'idealistic' ('***')

I realize these are 'loaded' descriptions; nevertheless, if we remember to de-emphasize their 'loadedness,' we shall find them useful as 'tags' for quick, though sketchy, reference. My purpose in introducing them here is a simple one, although I shall be confronting them again in more complicated contexts during the course of this thesis. What I wish to point out now is the common level at which all three of the designated world-perspectives overlap. With regard to our scrutiny of the example at hand (quantum cosmology in Weinburg's view), we are therefore making the following transition: from the status which a scientist accords his data, to the general underlying nature itself of those data (regardless of the scientist's attitude towards them).

Section II: The Notion of a "Structure Underlying All Possible Attitudes"

Common to the 'positivistic,' the 'linguistic,' and the 'idealistic' world-perspectives is the primacy of the distinction between knower and known. For these perspectives, then, the question immediately arises, "How can we be sure that a basic correspondence obtains between things as we know them, 'over here in consciousness,' and things as they are, 'out there in the world'?" In response to this question, each world-perspective must find its own answer, or resolution:

(a) The 'linguistic' approach holds that we cannot, from 'here,' self-consistently refer to a 'there' lying radically beyond our world--I may be able intuitively to grasp what you are gesturing towards when you refer to the independent 'there,' but neither you nor I can really make any sense of such a notion. The meaningfulness of things is intrinsically restricted to the world which is 'here.'

(b) The 'positivistic' approach holds that we are gradually building a bridge from the 'here' to the 'there.'

(c) The 'idealistic' approach holds that you simply can't get 'there' from 'here'--but there's a lot of interesting stuff 'here' to deal with anyway.

Now I would like to describe a fourth world-perspective which, however, immediately sets itself apart from the first three, by denying the primacy of the distinction between knower and known. In terms of the 'here-there' distinction I have just been employing, this fourth perspective, the 'structural' approach, goes roughly as follows:

(d) Things as we know them are merely a particularly relevant 'special case' of the nature of things as they are. The 'here' is merely that specific part of the infinite 'there' which most immediately applies to us--but, ultimately speaking, this relative 'here-there' opposition is superseded by a vision of the unified whole in which certain definite principles obtain--'here,' 'there,' and everywhere.

Immediately, it becomes necessary to differentiate (d) from the previous perspectives, especially (b) and (a), for it is easily confounded with them.

Unlike the 'positivistic' approach (b), the 'structural' perspective (d) finds no need to bridge or connect 'things as they are' and 'things as we know them.' Deeply rooted in the 'positivistic' approach is a dualism between 'how things stand' and 'our picture of how things stand.' Thus, the 'positivistic' approach bears within itself the seeds of 'idealism' (c). The difference between the two is this: 'positivism' holds that 'picture' and 'pictured' are ever converging in terms of correspondence and characteristics; 'idealism' holds that we can never know whether, or to what extent, our 'picture' corresponds to the characteristics of 'what is pictured'--we can only establish mutually coherent relations of elements <u>within</u> the picture itself. The 'structural' approach (d), on the other hand, regards 'pictures' and 'pictured things' as two sub-genera within a greater kingdom populated by entities characterizable at a deeper level of generality. The basic epistemological questions--the distinction between knower and known, the relation between things as they are and things as we know them--are still regarded by the 'structural' attitude as real, and relevant; nevertheless, their relevance is diminished. We are starting out with misplaced emphasis, according to the 'structural' thinker, if we take consciousness as the first

unquestionable given in our metaphysical cosmology; such a presupposition will have necessary consequences which we will neither be able to explain, nor explain away. Looking back to the 'Kantian rebuttal' of page 15, we find the statement: "In both cases, the presence of a cognizing subject is there to determine the structure of what is represented--either ostensibly or by implication." The question of the 'structural' thinker in response to this statement is: how can you be sure that, if there is structure in what is represented, it necessarily comes from the subject alone?

The positive import of the 'structural' approach begins to come to light through comparison with the 'linguistic' perspective (a). I shall place a portrayal of the 'structural' approach alongside a section of the 'linguistic' approach as it was set forth on page 16:

'Linguistic' Approach	'Structural' Approach
The limits of my language (and logic) are the limits of my world. Nothing can be real for me unless it falls within these limits, because everything that I can know falls somewhere upon the skeletal structure of logic that most fundamentally informs all human experience. To be a thing at all, in any meaningful sense, is to be in virtue of certain structures or categories intrinsically bound up with all acts	The character of logic is the character of the world. Nothing can be real unless it is so characterized, because everything that is necessarily falls somewhere upon the skeletal structure of logic. To be a thing at all, in any meaningful sense, is to be in virtue of certain basic structures or categories. The structure of our language in certain senses reflects this deeper metaphysical logic-structure.

of our consciousness. *
The structure of our *
language pre-forms or *
pre-constitutes what we *
perceive as the world *
and mean by 'the world.' *

The 'linguistic' perspective, although interested in structure, conceives this structure as radically ours: it is through the logico-linguistic structure that reality is for us. We cannot, according to this perspective, meaningfully refer to 'things' outside this structure--still, this fact does not make the structure any less specifically human, 'subjective,' limiting. Typically, then, proponents of this perspective--the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, for example --naturally find themselves involved in precisely that gesture towards the 'beyond' which their philosophical position renders impossible or senseless. Such yearning for a mystical 'beyond,' which only silence does not profane, is indicative of the particularly limiting, semi-deterministic implications of positing an all-encompassing and subjective 'logical space.' Sealed within the confines of the humanly speakable, one's first impulse is to rebel, to seek a way out; one goes against the 'boundary which is no boundary,' finding faith in a 'something' indeterminate, 'something' real and objective, 'something' truly independent of us, our thinking, our perceiving, our speaking. Like Wittgenstein, one comes to believe that the highest things in life are always unspoken, 'beyond.' The 'structural' approach (d), on

the other hand, does not bring into play the structure of language except as another tool in research; for the logical structure which it aims at uncovering is not only the structure of our language, or of things-as-expressible-in-our-language--but of things in the world in general: words, acts, subatomic particles, objects, characteristics, Gods, light waves, emotions. The crucial shift-of-emphasis between the two perspectives is this:

(a) the 'linguistic' perspective builds the world with all its entities out of the necessary internal structure of discursive human experience; whereas,

(b) the 'structural' approach builds human experience with all its entities out of the necessary structure of the world.

In the end, of course, the specific 'structures' which each of these modes-of-approach uncovers are all very similar to each other. Thus, the Kantian and Aristotelian systems of categories are not, perhaps, as far removed as one might expect from the alternative metaphysical systems put forward by Hume, Wittgenstein, or Whitehead. True, some crucial differences between them are readily discernible--but often, I think, these apparent differences in systemic structure are more penetratingly explained as divergencies in <u>emphasis</u>. By this, I mean that the questions, the types of facts, the difficulties, which philosophers have historically confronted, are <u>convergent</u> in nature simply because

they all spring from the common source of earthly human experience. Thus, it is not so much the proposed metaphysical structure itself, and the inclusion of certain elements at the expense of others, which varies from one philosophical system to the next--the things-to-be-accounted-for remain fairly constant. Rather, it is the emphasized relevance of one factor as opposed to that of another which typically divides philosophical opinion, and provides matter for debate. Time, Necessity, Substantiality, Universality, Consciousness --such notions as these are immediately the 'givens' to be articulated in any metaphysical picture seeking comprehensiveness and inner coherence; once a unified scheme begins to emerge, however, certain elements and relations 'naturally' become secondary and derivative, while others stand out as the generalized bases for the specific whole; the result is a hierarchy of metaphysical relevance, a determinate world-picture that instantly transmits its repercussions into all the other philosophical spheres. The specification of a metaphysical system, then, depends less on <u>what</u> it is trying to explain, than on <u>how</u> it sets about arranging the relations between basic 'given' factors--factors accessible to, or at least implicit within, our everyday common sense experience. It is this 'how,' this divergent emphasis in generating a hierarchy of relevance, which especially sets apart the 'structural' approach (d), from the three other positions described ('a,' 'b,' and 'c').

I shall try to make this divergence more explicit, now, by comparing the 'structural' approach with the 'idealist' one. The first objection with which an 'idealist' thinker might confront a 'structuralist' is the following: "You say you intend to 'build human experience with all its entities out of the necessary structure of the world.' Do you think that you can have access to the 'necessary structure of the world' as it exists separately from, or somehow prior to, human experience? How can one hope to characterize in any coherent way the world of things as they are outside our knowing them?--and why isn't it obvious that any such endeavor is instantly self-contradictory?"

The answer of the 'structuralist' thinker to this objection is a lengthy one. He might begin by differentiating three realms, in the following relation to each other:



The notion underlying the 'structural' position is that, because we humans have access to all three of these realms, we are artificially limited when enclosed within the mere domain of 'what we could <u>experience</u> ourselves and the world

to be.' We can, in other words, make general statements about the ultimate nature of things as they are; such statements, as all other things human, will be subject to error and possible revision; but they nevertheless involve us directly in describing the world itself. Our theories, though necessarily tentative, are integrally a part of the reality they describe, which is the only reality.

How can this be so? The answer lies in a qualitative threshold that is crossed in passing from the (humanly) conceivable to the logically possible. Because of this threshold, we are able to say of <u>any</u> 'thing,' whether we can experience it or not, whether we can conceive of it or not, that it will have certain very general characteristics--characteristics without which it would not merely be indescribable, but also, and principally, non-entity or nothing. We can become conscious of elements or principles <u>within</u> our experience, which, by their generality, must apply to <u>all</u> things, whether or not those things be experienced or conceived of by us. This qualitative extension of our capacity to characterize the world constitutes the first step in determining a 'structural' position; the second step then follows of its own accord: the directionality is annulled between 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity,' with regard to which 'side' is responsible for the in-formation of things. The world of subjective experience and conception becomes one particular cluster in the <u>more general</u> pattern

characterizing the 'objective' whole. Clearly, of course, the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' at this point become misleading, for human consciousness is now taken as qualitatively equivalent with the world's process. It is of fundamental importance to interpret this last sentence properly, lest we fall back into an implicit knower-known dualism; we are not here witnessing the 'reduction' of 'known being' to the conditions of 'mere being,' nor are we witnessing the converse (some sort of construal of all things as 'thought-objects'). Rather, we are removing our primary emphasis from the level at which 'mere being' and 'known being' stand coherently opposed, and transferring it to a deeper level at which opposition lies merely implicit. At this deeper level, the generality of characterization is such that these two traditional opposites are still undifferentiated. Their qualitative unity consists in the fact that, like all 'things' in the world when regarded under sufficient generality-of-scope, they have an underlying structure homologous with that of everything else. They obey the basic rules required of all things, be they 'mental' or 'physical,' known or unknown, present or non-present--the 'structural' notion of a 'thing' deliberately avoids commitment to either side in such pairs of alternatives: a 'thing' is simply a determination of the world.

Now it is time to stop for a moment, and fill in some of the gaps left behind by this brief survey. (It should

be kept in mind, however, that Part I is merely presenting an introductory sketch--the substantive discussion of these issues still lies ahead in Part II.)

The first question we need to ask is: just what is this 'structure' to which we have been repeatedly referring? Roughly speaking, we can see it as the set of logical properties or relations which constitutes the general possibility for the identity and distinctness of things. If it is true that 'to be at all, is to be somehow defined,' then the 'structure' under discussion is that which allows definition to occur--in some sense, this structure is the notion of definition itself, fully analyzed and articulated. What is implicit in the notion of definition? Principally, we find two basic components: unity and multifariousness, along with all their respective correlates, like isolation and relation, 'inner' and 'outer,' boundedness and openness (in Hegel's terminology, 'self' and 'other'). The claim of the 'structural' position is that everything in the world must meet at least these formal requirements: all things, whether we could know them or not, stand upon the relation between 'one' and 'many.'

Now, let us leave the fuller discussion of this logico-numerical relation for later; in the present context we are faced by a more immediate problem. Suppose the 'structural' thinkers are making sense in their description of the basic formal existence-conditions of all entities--

suppose, in other words, that their 'logico-numerical structure' really is a coherently constructed metaphysical notion. Then why don't the epistemological limitations, which immediately attach to all human knowledge, also attach to the 'structural' thinkers' construal of the metaphysical existence-conditions of all things? This question, which challenges the claim to human cognitive access beyond the humanly experiencable and conceivable, sets up the dialectic here schematically rendered:

--On the one hand: epistemology presupposes metaphysics, in that any act of knowledge presupposes the metaphysical possibility for the existence of acts in general. Therefore, we can only study epistemology within, and as a derivative part of, a wider-embracing metaphysical scheme. The structure of the world, as construed through epistemology, is a superposition upon the world's metaphysical structure.

--On the other hand: our knowledge of metaphysics is not the same as 'metaphysics itself.' All that we humans have access to is metaphysics-as-we-know-it; we can make no statements about the metaphysical properties of the world as it is in itself.

It might be clear that there lies implicit in this dialectic the material for a real impasse; we have set-up 'epistemology' and 'metaphysics' like this:

(γ) 'epistemology': determines relation(s) between 'how things stand,' a knower, and his picture of how things stand

(β) 'metaphysics': determines characteristics necessary to all things, and relations necessarily holding between them

Now, the impasse goes like this:

'α' says to 'β': "The supposedly 'necessary' characteristics you impute to all things are characteristics discovered by you, formulated by you--they partake of the basic tentativeness of all your assertions, just like anything else you might believe."

'β' says to 'α': "No! These characteristics I am talking about are absolutely essential to all things, including your objection itself. You say that my assertions are intrinsically tentative; but this statement of yours would be meaningless if the characteristics I am describing did not apply to the words you use, the ideas you express, the objects to which you refer. Indeed, none of these things could exist, in any sense of the word, without the characteristics I am describing."

'α' says to 'β': "That doesn't make the sense of what I am saying any less rigorous. Just because you are able to see the logical framework underlying my position, that doesn't in the least exempt you from the consequences of my position. You are a conscious human

subject, and your knowledge must undergo the appropriate circumscriptions."

'$\mathcal{B}$' says to '$\mathcal{A}$': "True. I am a conscious human subject. But I can know certain specific things about myself, my knowledge, and the world I am a part of; these things do not depend upon the fact of my knowing them--they are the necessary characteristics of all things, including 'conscious human subject.' Without these characteristics, quite simply, there can be no things at all."

'$\mathcal{A}$' says to '$\mathcal{B}$': "What do you mean when you say, 'these things do not depend upon the fact of my knowing them'? How can you claim to characterize them as they are whether you know them or not--when it is obvious that you only deal with them insofar as you do know them? Furthermore, since it is you who are doing the characterizing, how can you be sure you're not making mistakes?" ...

Now, as is often the case with an impasse, the seeds of eventual resolution are unwittingly uncovered as each side further and further defines its position. In this case, the search for resolution brings us back to our initial, and principal, topic of discussion: Hegel's response to the Kantian philosophy. Needless to say, we should align Kant with '$\mathcal{A}$,' and Hegel with '$\mathcal{B}$,' in the above dialogue.

By way of general anticipation, what will lie at the heart of Hegel's final position? We shall find distinguished two whole sets of parallel factors, based upon the schema of two qualitatively separate worlds: that of the understanding, and that of speculative reason.

> The observations made on the various stages of consciousness culminate in the summary statement that the content of all we are acquainted with is only an appearance. And as it is true at least that all finite thinking is concerned with appearances, so far the conclusion is justified. This stage of "appearance" however--the phenomenal world--is not the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But that region was to the Kantian philosophy an inaccessible "other world" (Logic, p. 94).[15]

The 'resolution' referred to above, then, relies upon a distinction between two kinds of knowledge--a distinction which easily corresponds to two 'kinds of world,' and two methodologies. We can lay them out roughly as follows:

Understanding	Speculative Reason
Constitution of the object as heteronomy: the given sensory manifold is subsumed under our inter-subjective 'rule' or category, and 'objectified.' This means: empirical truths and logical truths are both ultimately derived through, or from, the human a priori conceptual structure. Empirical truths are either synthetic a priori, or synthetic a posteriori (contingent, but objectively determined by a priori rules). Logical truths are analytic a	* Constitution of the object as autonomy: the * thing develops itself * through intrinsically * determined phases, until * it stands complete on * its own, per se, 'objective.' This means: em- * pirical truths and logi- * cal truths divide the * world into two realms: * that of the former is * dependent upon human con- * sciousness and judgment, * while that of the latter * is independent and self- * sufficient. "It is not * we who frame the notions. * The notion is not some- * thing which is originated

priori. Both the synthetic and the analytic truths are subjective, though necessary for us. "If we omit a restricting condition, we would seem to extend the scope of the concept that was previously limited. Arguing from this assumed fact, we conclude that the categories in their pure significance, apart from all conditions of sensibility, ought to apply to things in general, as they are, and not, like the schemata, represent them only as they appear. They ought, we conclude, to possess a meaning independent of all schemata, and of much wider application. Now there certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding, even after elimination of every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of the representations. The pure concepts can find no object, and so can acquire no meaning which might yield a concept of some object. . . . The categories, therefore, without schemata, are merely functions of the understanding for concepts; and represent no object. This (objective) meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realizes the understanding in the very

at all. No doubt the notion is not mere Being, or the immediate: it involves mediation, but the mediation lies in itself. In other words, the notion is what is mediated through itself and with itself. It is a mistake to imagine that the objects which form the content of our mental ideas come first and that our subjective agency then supervenes, and by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and by colligating the points possessed in common by the objects, frames notions of them. Rather the notion is the genuine first; and things are what they are through the action of the notion, immanent in them, and revealing itself in them"(Logic, p. 228).[16]

process of restricting it" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 186-87).[17]

Let's see how this fits in with our dialogue, at the point where we had left off:

. . . 'α' says to 'β': " . . . How do you know you're not making a mistake? Isn't the fact itself that you can't know whether or not you're making a mistake the final proof of your necessary limitation?"

'β' says to 'α': "That's just it. The characteristics I'm talking about hold equally for my so-called 'truths,' as well as for my 'mistakes.' Truth and error, as you understand these terms, are like superficial color-patterns in the basic fabric of properties I am trying to describe. These properties are objective precisely because they inform things intrinsically, whether those things be 'ours' or not. In this sense, things can also be contingent and limited--subjective, as you put it--whether they be 'ours' or not. It is the internal formal determination of things that makes them what they really are. In this way, we humans can know things which are 'objective,' and others which are 'subjective' --which of these two applies depends on the thing scrutinized, and not on the mere fact itself of our scrutiny. Now, it's true that to see things in your way

will repeatedly influence the cognition, and lead to an artificial state of self-limitation. But it is equally true that another way of knowing lies open to us: this mode is truly 'objective' precisely because it does not, properly speaking, act upon or create or pre-constitute its object. Rather, it lets that object determine itself, uncover itself, make explicit its own inner qualities."

It is Hegel himself, however, who offers the best survey of the impasse we have just run up against, and of the direction he chose in seeking to resolve it:

> Kant undertook to examine how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth. In particular he demanded a criticism of the faculty of cognition as preliminary to its exercise. That is a fair demand, if it mean that even the forms of thought must be made an object of investigation. Unfortunately there soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before you know--the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim. True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a scrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a cognition? So that what we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research and the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially considered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear on the categories from without, it is immanent in their own action" (Logic, p. 66).[18]

Summary/Outline: Part I

Here is a brief reiteration of the points raised in the two main sections of Part I.

Section I

(a) Weinburg and quantum cosmology: one 'attitude towards objectivity.'

(b) Spectrum of epistemological 'attitudes towards objectivity': we began with Weinburg's 'positivism,' and subjected it to a Kantian criticism. This criticism yielded two more attitudes, the 'idealistic' and the 'linguistic.'

Section II

(a) We began by looking for the distinctions and presuppositions common to all three 'attitudes' of Section I. In contraposition to this common ground, we set up a fourth attitude, the 'structural' approach.

(b) We contrasted the 'structural' with the 'positivistic' approach. The 'knower-known' distinction was especially focused upon.

(c) We contrasted the 'structural' with the 'linguistic' approach. The 'here-beyond' distinction was focused upon.

(d) We contrasted the 'structural' with the 'idealistic' approach. The 'things-in-themselves vs. things-as-we-know-them' distinction was focused upon.

(e) We described the specific logical framework which a 'structuralist' thinker would typically regard as fundamental.

(f) An impasse was pointed out, between two positions, 'α' vs. 'β,' standing respectively for 'epistemology' vs. 'metaphysics,' Kant vs. Hegel, 'positivism,' 'idealism,' and the 'linguistic' attitude vs. the 'structural' approach.

(g) The themes and key notions of a possible resolution to the impasse were described; the Hegelian position of Part II was suggested in anticipatory fashion.

PART II

THE AUTONOMY OF THINGS

In Part I, I described the general shift-in-emphasis that fundamentally underlies Hegel's position with regard to Kant. Now, we can undertake a more direct and fully articulated inquiry into the nature of that shift, considering it in its fuller problematic import. The first task ahead is to introduce some basic notions in Hegelian philosphy, without which it would be difficult to carry out any focused analysis. Then, in the following chapter, I will return to the problem of the impasse which was just delineated, and try to show how Hegel's 'resolution' of it took shape.

Part I. The principal meaning yet to be characterized is Hegel's--the third usage of the word 'objective.'

For Hegel, 'objective' means 'standing on its own, self-sufficient.' Now, immediately the questions spring up, what kinds of things are self-sufficient? And how do we stand with regard to them? This brings up two parallel problems, namely, how a thing can be 'objective,' and how our mode of representing such a thing can avoid altering it.

> We must however in the first place understand clearly what we mean by Truth. In common life truth means the agreement of an object with our conception of it. We thus presuppose an object to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. . . . Untrue in this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion and the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form a correct representation, but the import of such representation is inherently false (Logic, p. 41).[20]

The idea expressed here is that there are four qualitative directions involved in any cognition of an object. The first two pertain to the thing, on its own, and generate the question: is this a 'good' or a 'bad,' a 'true' or an 'untrue,' object? The second two pertain to our act of cognition, and generate the question: is this a correct or an incorrect, an accurate or an inaccurate, representation? Thus, an 'objective' thing cognized 'objectively' by us will be a self-concordant entity represented so that the self-concordance is preserved. What does this mean?

Let's begin with the 'objectivity' of the thing, 'bracketing' until later the phase of cognition. So far, we have encountered two distinct factors correlated with Hegelian 'objectivity': self-sufficiency and self-concordance. It is by exploring just how these two factors go together, that we will be able to approach Hegel's meaning most closely. Any actual object, according to Hegel, has two basic facets: its being or existence and its essence or 'notion.'* The existence and the 'notion' of a thing may be in accord with each other, or they may not be. In the first case, the object is self-concordant; in the second case, it isn't. If it is self-discordant in the sense just explained, two possibilities open up: either the object is terminally self-discordant, and is doomed to go out of existence with its being and 'notion' contradicting each other, or it is only temporarily self-discordant, and is in the process of bringing its being into harmony with its 'notion.'

Let's take a tangible example: a state. Without going into detail, let's suppose that the 'notion' of a state is what Hegel says it is:

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*The word, 'notion,' has a specific place in Hegelian terminology: it should not automatically be understood as designating an object of mental representation, for Hegel explicitly denies that the 'notion' need have existence 'in our minds.' Whenever I use the word as a specifically Hegelian term, I will place it in apostrophes--this will hold for other possibly ambiguous coinages, like 'idea,' 'thought,' ' concrete,' 'immediate,' and so on.

> The state [is] freedom, freedom universal and objective even in the free self-subsistence of the particular will. This actual and organic mind (α) of a single nation (β) reveals and actualizes itself through the inter-relation of the particular national minds until (γ) in the process of world-history it reveals and actualizes itself as the universal world-mind whose right is supreme (Phil. of Right, p. 36).[21]

Now if this is the 'notion' of a state, all we need to do is compare it with this-state-here-and-now, and see if the two correspond. If they do, we here and now have before us an 'objective' thing.

Immediately, an important clarification becomes necessary: the distinction between the existence and the 'notion' of an object has very little to do with the distinction between our idea of what it is and our idea of what it ought to be. This latter distinction is subjectively determined; it depends upon our upbringing and customs, or, at best, upon our capacity to reason things out. For Hegel, the existence and the 'notion' of an actual object are properly its own. In fact, the process of relation between these two inherent factors within the object is precisely that which makes it what it is. This will hopefully be understandable as more than a mere assertion, once our scrutiny of Hegel reaches a fuller, more organic stage.

At present, there remains to be explained the factor of self-sufficiency in the 'objectivity' proper to a thing. Let us return to our recent example, the self-concordant state. Taken merely as it stands before us, with its

'notion' and existence in harmony, it is still not fully 'objective'; for, taken as such, it is merely the result, the isolated end-product, of a long process leading from the most rudimentary imperfection up to the present moment. The truly 'objective' actual entity, rather, is identical with that process as a whole; its 'objective being' is the history of its self-realization. Hegel's idea here is that an object is not an unchanging substance which loses or acquires attributes here and there, as the environment dictates. This whole perspective is radically altered by Hegel: for him, an object is constantly becoming, through and through. This becoming is simply the transformation of what is implicit or potential, in that object, into what is explicit or actualized. In this sense, the process of becoming is governed or directed teleologically by the object's 'notion'; since the 'notion' is inherent in the object--since it is the object's own 'notion'--the process constitutes the object's self-sufficiency. To put it differently, the object is the whole process of its own self-determination--an internally directed transmutation of implicit self-concordance into explicit self-concordance, where neither of these two would make sense in isolation from the other. (This last aspect, concerning the necessary interdependence of the two stages, implicit beginning and explicit result, is of sufficient importance that a separate section will be devoted to its explication, immediately

following this one.) To make this highly general description clearer, let's return again, briefly, to our example. Something is lacking, according to Hegel, in the self-concordance of this state before us here-and-now, if that self-concordance is not regarded historically. Self-concordance is not something that just happens to be there, or just happens to occur at random; true self-concordance must be generated necessarily. If it is to have any capacity to maintain itself, to be more than just passing show, it must not have arisen simply as a by-product of events occurring outside it--for, if it had so arisen, it could just as easily, at the whim of its environment, be destroyed or radically altered. It is fundamental to true self-concordance, then, to be stable; and the essence of stability is self-reliance. A self-reliant actual object (in this case, the state) only changes insofar as it itself, by its own nature, so determines; and if it partakes of this kind of change, it is truly stable, for self-directing flexibility is far more permanent than simple staticity. This, then, is the element of necessary self-development--of self-sufficiency--without which the mere self-concordant 'objectivity' would be incomplete. It's one thing to see an object whose being and 'notion' are in agreement--it's entirely a different matter to know whether that agreement occurred at random, or whether it is the final testimonial of

an arduous amelioration process carried through by that object in the realization of its own nature.

Now, it's clear that the subject-predicate expression of everyday language will lead us to all kinds of contradictions in describing such an entity as the Hegelian 'objective thing.' For the subject-predicate expression reflects (and/or is reflected by) the substance-attribute mode of conceiving and structuring entities in general. Both these modes place unity and unchangeableness on one side, and multifarious alteration on the other, setting the two into a relation which then accounts for the histories of the various actual entities. But, as was noted before, Hegel rejected this schema, realigning his metaphysical picture of the world, and repudiating a tradition that stretched from Aristotle, through Descartes, Locke, and Hume, to Kant. Instead, he opted for a sort of process-logic, which has him talking about phases or 'moments,' ensembles of phases or 'moments,' and the relations between such ensembles. Unity and unchangeableness, multifariousness and alteration, are no longer related as substrate and superstrate, respectively. Rather, it is intrinsic to an ensemble of phases to alternate radical disjunction with radical conjunction: one moment, the 'thing' is determinate, unified, crystallized--the next moment, it has lost is boundaries and 'runs stray.'

> But the life of the mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth

> when it finds itself utterly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything it is nothing or it is false, and, being then done with it, pass off to something else: on the contrary, mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being. That power is just what we spoke of above as subject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance, cancels abstract immediacy, i.e. immediacy which merely is, and, by so doing, becomes the true substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not have mediation outside it, but is this mediation itself (Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 93-94).[22]

We cannot, by means of the subject-predicate expression, make sense of a 'thing' that "in death maintains its being." For death, according to a normal subject-predicate interpretation, is precisely the moment in which underlying unity is lost; the predicated alterations have eroded the solidity of the substrate in which they inhered, until finally a qualitative boundary is reached and surpassed; then the substrate is no longer itself, and the alterations are no longer themselves, unless a new substrate be defined to which they can attach. In Hegel's process-metaphysics, on the other hand, the 'thing' is identical with its own becoming: substrate and superstrate are the same. Conditions of identity and distinctness attach to entire processes, and determine not how the unchanging elements in a 'thing' are related to the transient ones, but rather how change itself follows certain comprehensible patterns. In this way, an 'object' can involve moments of total dissolution, moments of regeneration in radically novel form; we must not say of such an 'object,'

that it is remaining self-identical through these changes, but rather that an identity is being progressively determined as the specific succession takes shape. (We will begin our scrutiny of this process-logic in the immediately following sections.)

At this point, then, having sketchily discussed the 'objectivity' of the thing, it is necessary to review the parallel factor, which is the 'objectivity' of cognition. We find this factor well-introduced in the Philosophy of Right:

> The truth is that in philosophical knowledge the necessity of a concept is the principal thing; and the process of its production as a result is its proof and deduction. Then, once its content has been shown in this way to be necessary on its own account, the second step is to look round for what corresponds to it in our ideas and language. But this concept as it actually is in its truth not only may be different from our common idea of it, but in fact must be different from it in form and outline. If, however, the common idea of it is not false in content also, the concept may be exhibited as implied in it and as essentially present in it. In other words, the common idea may be raised to assume the form of the concept. But the common idea is so far from being the standard or criterion of the concept (which is necessary and true on its own account) that it must rather derive its truth from the latter, adjust itself to it, and recognize its own nature by its aid (p. 15).[23] (This translation of the Philosophy of Right employs the word 'concept' where I have been using the word 'notion.')

The picture presented here goes something like this: there is a range of self-subsistent order which fundamentally informs everything; although our cognitions are ultimately dependent upon, or part of, this self-subsistent order, still they may or may not be in agreement with it--they may, that

is, represent parts of it, or even the whole nature of it, inaccurately. The means cognition possesses of testing itself, so as to see whether its representation is accurate or not, is to change its approach so that it is no longer the determining agency for the object, but merely 'watches' while the object determines itself. In this way, it is able to 'see' directly what the 'objective being' of the entity-in-question is.

> The science of right is a section of philosophy. Consequently, its task is to develop the idea--the idea being the rational factor in any object of study--out of the concept, or, what is the same thing, to look on at the proper immanent development of the thing itself (Philosophy of Right, p. 14).[24]

Two questions immediately arise, in the light of these statements:

(a) How can we be sure we're 'seeing' the object's self-determination accurately? Why doesn't the epistemological limitation so readily imposed on our determination of the object's characteristics, also apply to our 'seeing' it determine its own characteristics?

(b) Since it's clear that a rock, a state, and the concept 'red,' do not have consciousness, will, or the capacity to 'act' in any human sense, just what does Hegel mean when he refers to an "immanent development of the thing itself"? How can such a thing be self-determining?

We shall begin to confront question (b) in the two following sections. Question (a) must wait until Chapter

II before we can deal with it once again. (Note that question (a) resumes the problem of the impasse encountered at the end of Part I.)

Section II: Aufhebung

In order to understand Hegel's concept of self-determination, we need first to see what he means by 'determination' itself. This can best be done, to begin with, by looking at the overall structure of his Logic, which he outlines for us in three basic phases, Being, Essence, and Notion.* The most general statements we can make about this structure are:

(a) the determination of successive phases constitutes a process; in no way is this determination comprehensible if we 'freeze' it and examine its characteristics in staticity;

(b) each phase of the process generates its own successor out of itself; starting at the beginning we are inexorably pulled on towards the end or 'result';

(c) the successor generated by the 'end' is the beginning; thus, the process is circular, and constitutes a single all-inclusive whole.

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*Concerning the distinction between the common philosophical conception of logic, and Hegel's conception of it, please see Hegel's explicit statement-of-position, quoted on pages 8-9.

Corresponding to the stages of 'Being,' 'Essence,' and 'Notion,' Hegel gives us the following explications:

> ['Being':] (α) Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own.
> ['Essence':] (β) In the dialectical stage these finite characterizations or formulae supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites.
> ['Notion':] (γ) The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition--the affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition (Logic, pp. 113, 115, 119).[25]

The gist of what Hegel is expressing, in phases (α) and (β) of the above succession, is this: at first, we take the things of the world ('physical' as well as 'mental') to be unchanging isolated 'substantial entities,' able to stand on their own, unaffected by most of the other similar things surrounding them. Gradually, however, we begin to learn that nothing really does subsist in such static isolation: things exist by standing in relation to other things, and things constantly go through changes that 'un-do' them and make them into something else. Thus, a rock is not just what it is, for ever and ever, but arises out of what is other-than-itself, and eventually breaks down again into something other-than-itself--it becomes, first in the positive sense, and then in the negative. Similarly, a concept is not just what it is, existing in isolation from other concepts, but only exists positively by excluding from itself certain specific characteristics; thus, its

determination is a relation between that positive part of itself which it includes, and that negative part of itself, which it excludes.

> Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite (Logic, p. 118).[26]

This, then, is the first portion of Hegel's basic message:

> All things, we say--that is, the finite world as such--are doomed; and in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself (Logic, p. 118).[27]

Everything 'passes,' in one sense or another: nothing can subsist in simple isolation. Finite objects become other than they are; finite notions intrinsically depend upon other notions in order to exist, and this is their non-temporal 'becoming.'

The second portion of Hegel's message, corresponding to phase (ɣ) of the above succession, is this:

> The result of Dialectic is positive, because it has a definite content, or because its result is not empty and abstract nothing, but the negation of certain specific propositions which are contained in the result--for the very reason that it is a resultant and not an immediate nothing (Logic, p. 119).[28]

Everything that 'passes' is retained, as part of the whole process of transition which is the thing itself. The stability or true permanence of things, as was mentioned in the preceding section, does not arise as staticity, or as the

avoidance of all relation outside certain boundaries; rather, the truly permanent being of things lies in the greater whole which includes both the 'thing' as narrowly defined, and the 'other' of that thing, which has been artificially separated from it, and 'frozen' in its separation. Intuitively understood, this principle of Hegel's rests on the fact that a boundary or definition, or determination, always acts in two simultaneous ways: 'something' is specified on both sides of the limit. We are missing the essence of the act of determination, then, if we 'put ourselves' (so to speak) on one side of the boundary, differentiating once and for all between an 'inner' and an 'outer,' a supposedly meaningful 'this' and a supposedly irrelevant 'other.' According to Hegel, we should grasp the whole in one act of cognition, perceiving a 'thing' as the relation between two reciprocally conditioning elements or 'moments,' the positively present 'this' and the negatively present 'other.' It is only this relation itself, recognized as such, which is able to embrace all that has actually proceeded from the establishment of a limit.

Two kinds of examples are immediately available to us so that we may clarify this principle--the historical and the logical. Both of these examples, which here follow, are summed up by the general Hegelian coinage 'Aufhebung,' which has received much attention. It is translated differently by various scholars, but even in German, it deliberately

reflects an ambiguity of common usage. Hegel sets it forth like this:

> Apropos of this, we should note the double meaning of the German word aufheben (to put by, or set aside). We mean by it (I) to clear away or annul: thus, we say, a law or a regulation is set aside; (2) to keep or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is well put by. This double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognize in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere "either--or" of understanding (Logic, p. 142).[29]

Let us proceed right away to examples:

(1) History. In history we have the most obvious and clear-cut example of Aufhebung at work. For anyone can see that a given moment in history, say, the French Revolution, does not simply exist as itself in isolation from all that temporally surrounds it; the study itself of history, rather, involves the seeking of precisely those factors which, though not strictly present as themselves in a given event, nevertheless served to determine the nature of that event, to bring it about and to make it what it positively is. Thus, the publication of Diderot's Encyclopedia, the successive economic crises of eighteenth century France, the gradual rise of the bourgeois class--all these are factors which, though clearly not present as such in the French Revolution itself, nevertheless prepared for, and hence were indirectly involved in, its eventual existence: to use a Hegelian technical term, they mediated its eventual

existence, or constituted its coming-into-being. Our identification of the French Revolution, then, must reflect this extension of 'mediation' beyond its stricter confines, this negative presence of the 'other' within the definite 'thing'; we must begin to think of the French Revolution as a 'moment' specified within the context of a wider-embracing process. And since this is in fact what is commonly done by historians, our first example of Aufhebung ought to make a good deal of sense to us.

(2) Logic. The second example, however, requires more imagination on our part, for it deals with the relations between concepts in an uncustomary manner.

> Usually we regard different things as unaffected by each other. Thus we say: I am a human being, and around me are air, water, animals, and all sorts of things. Everything is thus put outside of every other. But the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the necessity of things. By that means the other is seen to stand over against its other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature is not to be considered merely something else than organic nature, but the necessary antithesis of it. Both are in essential relation to one another; and the one of the two is, only insofar as it excludes the other from it, and thus relates itself thereto (Logic, pp. 173-74).[30]

Here, under 'Logic,' Aufhebung takes on a slightly different nuance of meaning than that which it had as a fundamental historical concept. In history, the 'other' has spatio-temporal existence, and it is easy in this case to understand how 'a determinate thing passes into its other'; we simply imagine time going by, and the transition occurs. Under 'Logic,' however, the relation between a given 'thing'

and its 'other' is all that there is connecting them; it becomes more difficult to see how, or why, a certain concept "veers round into its opposite" and passes into its 'other.' What kind of transition is being referred to, here?

Let's take a simple instance of such transition, and try to bring out its most important features:

> Whenever we speak of the One, the Many usually come into our mind at the same time. Whence, then, we are forced to ask, do the Many come? The question is unanswerable by the consciousness which pictures the Many as a primary datum, and treats the One as only one among the Many. But the philosophic notion teaches, contrariwise, that the One forms the presupposition of the Many: and in the thought of the One is implied that it explicitly makes itself Many. The self-existing unit is not, like Being, void of all connective reference: it is a reference, as well as Being-there-and-then was, not however a reference connecting somewhat with another, but, as unity of the some and the other, it is a connection with itself, and this connection, be it noted, is a negative connection. Hereby the One manifests an utter incompatibility with itself, a self-repulsion: and what it makes itself explicitly be, is the Many (Logic, p. 142).[31]

The general idea here is that, in discussing the notions 'one' and 'many,' we are not establishing a relation between two distinct concepts which previously existed as such, in dissociation from each other; rather, we are approaching a determination of that single articulated entity which is the relation between 'one' and 'many.' We are, in other words, getting to know the nature of a unified whole which exists as two subordinate elements, 'one' and 'many,' reciprocally conditioning each other. We have no standard word to designate such a whole, so we must be content with a mere

description of the 'process' which constitutes it. This 'process' or 'transition' is not, as in the case of historical Aufhebung, the annulling of one present moment and its subsequent retention as 'other' in the newly present successor; rather, we are here speaking of transition in an extra-temporal sense, meaning that one concept is intrinsically bound up with another concept, so that either one of the two, when scrutinized, immediately gives rise to the other. You can only have neither, or both, for each is presupposed by the other, and to take them as isolated notions is self-contradictory. Thus, the notion 'one' involves a simple delimitation; this delimitation is intrinsically a separation of 'one' from everything else; now, therefore, you have at least two: 'one' and 'everything else.' In this sense, the 'one' has repelled itself, and passed into its opposite. It started out as a pretended isolation, pure and simple, of 'one' entity; it ended up becoming what it could not avoid, namely, 'one-in-many.' The converse, of course, can be seen to hold when we try to start with the 'many' in isolation; 'many' is in fact 'many ones.'

Transition, therefore, has here taken the meaning of a logical dependence-relation: that which cannot stand on its own must pass into its 'other.' Such a thing makes explicit its initially implicit dependence upon the 'other.' At first, in other words, it subsists on its own in static isolation; however, it is unable to maintain such a state of

existing on its own account, because it really has its being through conditioning, and being conditioned by, its 'other.' It depends on its 'other,' and its 'other' depends upon it. We say transition has occurred when the initial stage of mere seeming-to-exist-in-isolation is surpassed; this first stage must give way to a stage in which the implicit inter-dependency surfaces, and the thing shows itself as what it really is, namely, relation-to-its-other. Transition, then, is explicable in the present context as the intrinsically necessary fluidity of those things which are not self-complete; they fail to maintain themselves as they are--through this failure, their implicit characteristics become explicit, and transition occurs.

The first crucial point to notice here is that this transition is not something we are adding to the thing: it is the 'thing' (in this case, the concept 'one') which bears within itself the seeds of transition into its 'other.' Indeed, the thing demonstrates that it is only insofar as it 'proceeds' into its 'other' and 'returns' to itself from its 'other.' This is because the true entity-in-question is identical with neither 'side' of this reciprocal dependence-relation, but only with that relation itself, taken as a whole. We do not 'carry' the thing to its 'other' in our minds, saying, "This notion cannot be understood by us unless we place it in relation to this other notion." Although this last statement is true, it nevertheless misses

the basic point, namely, that 'this concept' simply could not be without its 'other,' and exists as a concept only insofar as it 'passes into' its 'other.' We may look on; but the 'process' here described is intrinsic to the thing as it stands on its own. Hegel sums this up in the Doctrine of the Notion (Logic), where he says:

> Thus, for example, as we remarked before, the germ of a plant contains its particular, such as root, branches, leaves, etc.: but these details are at first present only potentially, and are not realized till the germ uncloses. This unclosing is, as it were, the judgment of the plant. The illustration may also serve to show how neither the notion nor the judgment are merely found in our head, or merely framed by us. The notion is the very heart of things, and makes them what they are. To form a notion of an object means therefore to become aware of its notion: and when we proceed to a criticism or judgment of the object, we are not performing a subjective act, and merely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the contrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its notion (Logic, p. 232).[32]

This last quotation brings us to a second important point to be made in the present context, which is that the 'logical' exemplification of Aufhebung instantly takes priority over the 'historical.' In fact, according to Hegel, the latter is ultimately absorbed by a more generalized version of the former. What is it that drives one moment of time into the next, what drives the rock into its otherness as dust, what drives the events of the French eighteeenth century to culminate in Revolution?

> If the logical forms of the notion were really dead and inert receptacles of conceptions and thoughts, careless of what they contained, knowledge about them would be an idle curiosity which the truth might dispense with.

> On the contrary they really are, as forms of the notion, the vital spirit of the actual world. That only is true of the actual which is true in virtue of these forms, through them and in them (Logic, p. 226).[33]

In these statements, we begin to broach Hegel's major reversal of the relation between logic and reality, reason and actuality, as it is commonly construed. At first, it seems intuitively sound to believe that the events of the world follow each other in an underlying medium of passing time; time is held to be that aspect of the world which allows for, or generates, change. Reason or logic, in this picture, are the system of relations obtaining between things which change and others which do not, in the 'real' or actual world. The 'rational,' in other words, is the pattern displayed by the temporal process of the actual world. Hegel neatly reverses this: for him, the 'actual' is the temporal pattern constituted by the process of reason. For him, then, it is the logical incompleteness of things in the world which, in transition from implicit to explicit, generates those changes which we perceive as a neutral or independent temporal succession. To put it differently: the dialectical determination of the entities of our world is intrinsically manifested as a temporal process.

Our traditional mistake, according to Hegel, lies in taking the objects we perceive as relatively stable, autonomous substances; once we do so, we are led to explain the flux of such substances by means of externally impinging

circumstances within an indifferent medium, time, which allows for interactions between the substances, for their alterations of attributes and/or existence-changes. In this picture, a basic dualism has already arisen, between permanence conceived as total staticity, and alteration conceived as total flux. Either the substances are defined as static in time, and the attributes as fluid in time (substituting one another through time); or, conversely, the substances are regarded as changeable elements, fleeting instances of unchanging attributes. (We shall be confronting this issue at greater length in Chapter II; for the present, it is only a general scheme that is being outlined.)

> But if the opposites, static and fluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverse actualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation. Such philosophies must include the notion of "illusion" as a fundamental principle--the notion of "mere appearance." This is the final Platonic problem (Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 408-9).[34]

Hegel, on the other hand, branches off from this perspective at the very start. According to him, the objects we perceive and the concepts we habitually use are finite, because their intrinsic dependence-upon-another is not yet explicit. They are finite because they are static, and cut off from everything else. The proof of their finitude is that they all pass over dialectically, in the transition described above. Thus, if the roughness of expression be permitted, one moment of time is driven into the next

because, qua 'moment,' its dependence upon its predecessor and its successor--its passage out of the former and into the latter--was intrinsic to its definiteness. Similarly, the rock becomes dust, not just because time allowed other things to rub against it and eat it away (although that's one way of looking at it), but principally because the rock's identity as such was incomplete--it came to be through the efficacy of 'others,' and hence was unable to maintain its integrity as a stable thing. The 'rock' as we perceived it was only a 'moment' of the determining-process which gave rise to it and subsequently absorbed it. The primary metaphysical entity in this case is not the rock itself, then, but the whole series of 'others' in which the 'rock' is one stage. It is not clear-cut how such a series-entity in turn obtains an identity and distinctness of its own; it will be interesting, further on, to see how Hegel deals with this problem.

Returning, then, to the relation between 'historical' and 'logical' Aufhebung, we see that in Hegel the conventional conception of order has been capsized: things do not have order; rather, order necessarily constitutes things. In light of this, the famous Hegelian dictum, "What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational" (Philosophy of Right, p. 10),[35] takes on clearer sense. Hegel is not identifying actuality and rationality by ignoring the distinctions between them, or reducing the one to the other;

rather, he is saying that they express a common formal determination. The process of the world is the transition of the finite, the 'restlessness' of what is not self-complete --'historical' Aufhebung is one aspect of this, 'logical' Aufhebung another.

> Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in the range of Essence (Logic, p. 224).[36]

In the context of the present discussion, "transition into something else" corresponds specifically to our example of a rock becoming dust, and correlates the Doctrine of Being with the spatio-temporal, physical world. Similarly, "reflection (bringing something else into light)" corresponds to the dialectical interdependence we found obtaining between such concepts as 'one' and 'many,' and correlates the Doctrine of Essence with the 'world' of concepts--especially those concepts which arise as relations between, or properties of, the elements in the Doctrine of Being. So far in this section, then, we have reviewed the concept of Aufhebung principally as it arises in the first two phases of the Logic, 'Being' and 'Essence.' We have characterized Aufhebung as the 'passing-into-another' of two types of entities, exemplified respectively by certain physical objects or events, and certain specific concepts.

There remains before us, therefore, that specific meaning which Aufhebung takes on in the Doctrine of the

Notion. This meaning, we shall find, is what transforms 'determination' pure and simple into the central Hegelian notion of self-determination. If 'Being' was aligned with physical phenomena, and 'Essence' with conceptual forms appertaining to the physical world, 'Notion,' we shall find, represents the dialectic of Spirit. It will be easier to understand what has been said so far after this final dimension is added to our discussion. What awaits us, in Hegel's own words, is this:

> The onward movement of the notion is no longer either a transition into, or a reflection on something else, but Development. For in the notion, the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole notion. . . . The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as play: the other which it sets up is in reality not another. Or, as it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity: not merely has God created a world which confronts him as an other; he has also from all eternity begotten a Son in whom he, a Spirit, is at home with himself (Logic, pp. 224-25).[37]

Section III: Self-activity; Two Hegelian Models of Autonomy

Hegel puts forward his concept of 'development,' or self-activity, by means of two commonly dissociated models: that of an abstract logical argument, on the one hand, and that of a tangible ethical situation on the other. As it was just intimated in Section II, Hegel does not accept the usual conception of 'strictly logical' and 'strictly temporal' phenomena as radically indifferent to each other. His treatment of self-activity or autonomy is an especially

strong case-in-point: for him, the social reality of a relation between master and slave should be regarded in basically the same light as the logical reality of a relation between ground and consequent. In both these 'realities,' for Hegel, the same dialectical principle is the 'prime mover'; because of this, they eventually reveal qualitatively convergent contents, and their respective 'transitions' come to 'rest' in the same result. It is not by chance, then, that Hegel alternates between a social model and a logical model in explicating what autonomy means. 'Autonomy' can only be approached by both models, playing off each other from two complementary directions; as we shall discover, these models stand related in a manner very similar to that in which 'one' and 'many' stood, when we discussed them earlier on. Autonomy is another one of those complex process-entities we have been referring to and attempting gradually to characterize. Or, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say that autonomy is the fully articulated general schema for all such process-entities--it is the formal quality of self-determination that they have in common. In the language of the preceding section, we can say that autonomy is the final and fullest meaning of Aufhebung, the result into which the 'restlessness' of the early phases resolves. If, in the examples which have so far arisen, it was 'relation-to-another' which came to the fore, now we must elicit examples in which that 'otherness' is openly

transformed, so that the 'thing' and its 'other' are embraced in a single identity, and completely acknowledged as such. Let us begin with the example of a logical argument.

There are two types of logical arguments which we can describe, like the extremes in a color spectrum, so as to better characterize the 'happy median' position of the Hegelian logical argument with regard to them. These two extremes are depicted with great clarity in an essay by Richard Rorty who, however, identifies one of the extremes with Hegel's position. I think it will be useful in the present exposition for me to show why I disagree with Professor Rorty, and place Hegel in between the two positions which Rorty distinguishes.

> There, then, are two ways of thinking about various things. I have drawn them up as reminders of the differences between the philosophical tradition which began, more or less, with Kant, and that which began, more or less, with Hegel. The first tradition thinks of truth as a vertical relationship between representations and what is represented. The second tradition thinks of truth horizontally--as the culminating reinterpretation of our predecessors' reinterpretation of their predecessors' reinterpretation. . . . This tradition does not ask how representations are related to non-representations, but how representations can be seen as hanging together. The difference is not one between "correspondence" and "coherence" theories of truth--though these so-called theories are partial expressions of this contrast. Rather, it is the difference between regarding truth, goodness, and beauty as eternal objects which we try to locate and reveal, and regarding them as artifacts whose fundamental design we often have to alter. This difference reflects two attitudes to language. The first attitude takes language to be a means to represent something (the way things are, the way the mind puts things together, the underlying realities, the underlying values); thus when fundamental shifts of vocabulary occur they are viewed as expressing our new and

> better knowledge of how things are. The second attitude takes a shift in vocabulary to be a shift which cannot usefully be explained as an attempt at "a better representation"--rather, it is a shift which goes all the way down, right to the heart of how things are. . . . Kantian philosophers like Putnam, Strawson, and Rawls have arguments and theses which are connected to Kant's by a fairly straightforward series of "purifying" transformations, transformations which are thought to give clearer and clearer views of the persistent problems. For the Hegelians, there are no persistent problems--save perhaps the existence of the Kantians. Philosophers like Heidegger and Derrida are emblematic figures who not only do not solve problems, they do not have arguments or theses. They are connected with Hegel not by common subjects or methods but in the "family resemblance" way in which late-comers in a sequence of commentators on commentators are connected with older members of the same sequence. Or, to vary the image, they are connected by routes which are like the paths of light rays bounding about a room of distorting mirrors in a fun house (Richard Rorty, Philosophy as a Kind of Writing, pp. 4-5).[38]

In the discussion which follows, I shall refer to the 'Kantian' tradition mentioned here as the 'vertical' one, and to the second, putatively 'Hegelian' tradition as the 'horizontal' one. The crux of my point will be that it is essential to a truly Hegelian tradition to operate simultaneously in both the 'horizontal' and the 'vertical' directions. By construing the Hegelian position as purely 'horizontal,' I shall argue, Professor Rorty is neglecting the vital teleological factor in Hegel's thought. (This issue will also have direct repercussions in Chapter III, when I take up the identity-and-distinctness criteria for Hegelian process-entities; these criteria, I shall claim are essentially teleological, or 'vertical-horizontal.')

The types of logical arguments involved in the 'vertical' and the 'horizontal' traditions are, respectively:

(a) for the 'vertical,' a relation between any given proposition and the real state-of-affairs it intends to describe; and

(b) for the 'horizontal,' a relation between successive 'points' raised in sequential accumulation, and the properties of cross-reference they bear to each other.

For the logical arguments of the 'vertical' form, 'proof' will entail such phases as the following: hypothetical description, verification by experiment, and formulation of a principle. For the logical arguments of the 'horizontal' form, 'proof' is not a very relevant concept; rather, what is interesting for a thinker in this vein is the (indefinitely protracted) self-enrichment of historical human experience, the ever-renewed nuance which can be read into the experiences of those who have come before. For these 'horizontal' thinkers, 'truth' is not an evaluative term, but only the evolving configuration of communicable facts. The 'logic' of these 'horizontal' arguments is, as Professor Rorty points out, a set of rules for the inter-relation of our experiences; whereas the 'logic' of the 'vertical' arguments is a set of rules for the correlation of our experiences with the structured world out of which they arise.

Now, how is it that Hegel falls between these two approaches? How is it possible to be 'vertical-horizontal'? The first part of our answer takes the form of a rebounding question: how is it possible not to? The point here is that the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' approaches are like the famous example of honor-among-thieves: they only exist as such by partaking of the qualities of their opposite. For it should be clear that the 'vertical' tradition contains a strong 'horizontal' vector: scientific truths, which are the paradigms of 'vertical' argument, evolve through time by leaps and bounds which involve much commentary-upon-commentary and reinterpretation of reinterpretations. For example: the study of microorganisms has a history which leads, roughly speaking, from an original belief in 'humours' and magic, through the development of the microscope, through the work of Pasteur, into the era of modern microbiological models. These successive models did not each arise 'out of the blue,' but came to be largely as commentaries upon, and reinterpretations of, the models which already existed. Conversely, the 'horizontal' tradition requires a 'vertical' element within it to provide it with integrity, a certain loose set of parameters within which to operate. The commentaries and reinterpretations are, after all, more than mere reference-among-each-other; their interaction is more than a formal "bounding about," and creates a determinate subject matter, a specific content or

context around which the traditions of commentary revolve, however obliquely. Returning to Professor Rorty's image, we have to admit that the light rays do bound about in (or as) a determinate fun house. For example: the 'family-resemblance' tradition to which Rorty referred, which stretched from Hegel, through Heidegger, to Derrida, does in fact have a certain corresponding 'family-territory' all its own. Philosophers in this tradition are recurringly interested, for instance, in the problem of the limit. This problem encompasses all those complications which result from the necessarily structural nature of knowledge--once a structure is determined, how do we account for novelty, and openness? This 'problem of the limit,' then, is part of the specific 'fun house' which all those Hegelian, Heideggerian, and Derridean 'light waves' have gradually constituted.

If the foregoing is true, then Hegel's middle-road conception of logical argument is perhaps not so farfetched. In fact, what it amounts to is a conception of truth as changing 'horizontally' with progressive 'vertical' refinement. Immediately, we need to alter both the meanings of 'horizontal' and 'vertical,' if we are to avoid palpable contradictions. What we should now begin to envision, instead, is a picture of truth as giving rise to itself. It is not the static 'goal' of the 'vertical' approach; nor is it the directionless fluctuation of the 'horizontal'. Rather, it is somewhat like a series of changes which 'decides'

at each moment where it must go. "I learn by going where I have to go" (Theodore Roethke).[39] Hegel's conception of logical argument involves progressive alteration, like the 'horizontal' approach; it involves a notion of 'The Truth,' like the 'vertical' approach. However, it assembles these components as an internally determined teleology--and this is what sets Hegel's meaning apart from the two others.

> In the course of its process the Idea creates [an] illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result (Logic, p. 274).[40]

In these statements we begin to broach Hegel's conception of Spirit. The logical argument, which is the 'vehicle' of truth, has been endowed by Hegel with a self-governing dynamism traditionally reserved for the characterization of self-conscious human thought.

> Hence the important thing for the student of science is to make himself undergo the strenuous toil of conceptual reflection, of thinking in the form of the notion. This demands concentrated attention on the notion as such, on simple and ultimate determinations like being-in-itself, being-for-itself, self-identity, and so on; for these are elemental, pure, self-determined functions of a kind we might call souls [italics mine], were it not that their conceptual nature denotes something higher than that term contains (Phenomenology, p. 116).[41]

The logical argument itself is self-critical; it is a learning-process. In this way, we begin to uncover the interdependence of the social and the logical models as they

determine Hegel's meaning of autonomy. The truth of a logical argument is the process through which it tests, doubts, and gradually affirms itself. Like the autonomy of men or nation-states, this truth must arise and maintain itself "by the sweat of its brow."

> Next comes the Curse, as it is called, which God pronounced upon man. The prominent point in the curse turns chiefly on the contrast between man and nature. Man must work in the sweat of his brow; and woman must bring forth in sorrow. As to work, if it is the result of the disunion, it is also the victory over it. The beasts have nothing more to do but to pick up the materials required to satisfy their wants: man on the contrary can only satisfy his wants by himself producing and transforming the necessary means. Thus even in these outside things man is dealing with himself (Logic, p. 44).[42]

Now, of course, it is one thing to use a social model in determining the 'vertical-horizontal' meaning of truth for logical arguments; it is entirely a different matter to describe what a logical argument actually 'does to itself.' Since a logical argument is not a thinking mind, what does Hegel mean here by his allusions to 'self-criticism'? A good way to answer this in preliminary fashion is to return to our previous discussion of Aufhebung, which can thus begin to be completed. In Section II, we saw what was meant by the passing-into-another of a physical object or a concept; since the thing-in-question depended upon others for its existence, its existence "veered round" into existence-as-otherness. To put it differently, its finitude or lack of self-completeness as a thing passed from a state of

implicitness (artificial staticity and isolation) into one of explicitness (clearly manifested relation-to-another). But this 'transition-into-otherness' is only half the picture: the other half is that, while the isolated rocks or concepts themselves 'disappeared,' something wider-embracing and truly permanent arose precisely through this 'disappearance.' This wider-embracing entity, whose presence is made explicit by the 'transition-into-otherness,' is a process. It is the process of repeated self-supersession through which its own 'weaknesses' are put to the test, confronted, 'suffered,' and grown beyond. Such a process, then, has its beginning in its moment of greatest weakness or dependence-upon-others; it has its middle in the moments of 'transition-into-another' which render explicit the implicit heteronomy of the beginning; it reaches its end when all the 'others' of its various moments have been passed into and passed through, and the process stands dependent-upon-no-other precisely because all its 'others' have been incorporated into itself. "This is the nature of the notion--this manifestation of itself in its process as a development of its own self" (Logic, p. 224).[43] Crucially, the mere end or final phase of such a process is not to be considered its perfection or its 'true identity.' Rather, the most important aspect of that final phase is how it came to be: its true stability only obtains through the fact that it made itself what it is. In the final phase, all that was

dependent upon another has passed into that other; the unity of the process lies in the fact that it over-arches the static identities of its isolated 'moments.' Its higher unity is the successively generated pattern in the breakdown of those partial identities.

I shall be devoting Chapter II to a better explication of the foregoing; at present, I have said enough about these processes to attempt an application of their schema within the context of 'logical argument.' The main import of what has just been set forth is that Hegel, by thinking of a whole process as the truly identifiable entity-at-hand, renders possible a shift from determination pure and simple to self-determination. Let us grant him for the time being the supposition that a process, qua process, is identifiable in its own terms, without depending on the characteristics of any primary object-in-process. That is, let us grant him the supposition that the identity of the process is determined through an over-arching pattern of changes which is strictly independent from the identity of any single 'moment,' taken in isolation from the whole. Suppose, in other words, that the criteria for identity and distinctness of a given process are not reducible to the criteria for identity and distinctness of any single 'moment' in that process. Then, the process is that which works on itself, since all that happens within it is its own developing nature, determined by its own implicit characteristics and the

way they work themselves out. Herein lies the key to understanding how mindless things, like a logical argument, can be self-determining. Their self-determination is not the same as that which we conventionally impute to conscious human subjects; it is not to be envisioned as one constant or 'substantial' personality interacting with a surrounding environment, 'choosing' for any variety of reasons to carry out this or that course of action. This latter form of self-determination, according to Hegel, is an inferior one. Rather, the true self-determination of an entity, be that entity a physical object or a person or a logical argument, stems from the fact that the emphasis, in considering the basic structure of the entity, has been switched, from the model of an unchanging substance with/of unchanging attributes, to that of a process. This move makes it necessary to derive the identity of a thing from patterns in the transiency of lower-order, 'temporary' things. When the final pattern is established, the transient 'moments' are of course integrally a part of it: shifting from the perspective of the isolated 'moments' to that of the process as a whole, we must then refer to 'moments' as 'gestures' of the whole. They constitute a whole; reciprocally, they belong to it. They are its own actions, its self-determination.

I shall try further to clarify this. A logical argument, for Hegel, is not merely 'vertical,' nor is it merely 'horizontal,' as we explained before. It is not to be

understood as a series of assumptions supporting a conjecture about what is the case--a process of observation, description, verification, theorizing, and renewed observation directed towards an ever-refined model of the True. Nor is it to be understood as a series of commentaries on commentaries, deliberately heading nowhere-in-particular because no particular Truth could be complete enough to preclude the articulation of a valid commentary in turn upon it (under this view, Truth is something growing, intrinsically without direction, for all direction is only a constriction of its sacred boundlessness). Hegel's idea of a valid logical argument, rather, stems from his principle that an inadequate position cannot help but show its inadequacy by falling apart. The way in which it falls apart, however, and what is left once the falling-apart has occurred, are not to be cast aside as unimportant, but should be added to our consideration of the whole process at hand.

> The element that disappears has rather to be looked at as itself essential, not in the sense of being something fixed, that has to be cut off from truth and allowed to lie outside it, heaven knows where; just as similarly the truth is not to be held to stand on the other side as an immovable lifeless positive element. Appearance is the process of arising into being and passing away again, a process that itself does not arise and does not pass away, but is per se, and constitutes reality and the life-movement of truth (Phenomenology, p. 105).[44]

According to the principle enunciated here, our method in conducting a logical argument should be simply to let the

given position, which constitutes a starting-point, develop of its own accord.

> We must abstain from interrupting the immanent rhythm of the movement of conceptual thought; we must refrain from arbitrarily interfering with it and introducing ideas and reflections that have been obtained elsewhere. Restraint of this sort is itself an essential condition of attending to and getting at the real nature of the notion (Phenomenology, p. 117).[45]

Now, apart from the question, "How is such restraint possible?" which we shall soon be confronting in Chapter II, a significant objection comes to mind in response to this admonition on Hegel's part. The objection is: "If we are to abstain from interrupting the rhythm of the self-determining process, yet wish to know this process in its systematic entirety, how can we do so except by catching it right from the start?--and how, then, in seeking to do so, will we be sure we've found the true beginning?" Hegel answers as follows:

> Pure Being makes the beginning: because it is on one hand pure thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined. All doubts and admonitions, which might be brought against beginning the science with abstract empty being, will disappear if we only perceive what a beginning naturally implies. It is possible to define being as "I=I," as "Absolute Indifference" or Identity, and so on. Where it is felt necessary to begin either with what is absolutely certain, i.e., the certainty of ones'elf, or with a definition or intuition of the absolute truth, these and other forms of the kind may be looked on as if they must be the first. But each of these forms contains a mediation, and hence cannot be the real first: for all mediation implies advance made from a first on to a second, and proceeding from something different (Logic, pp. 124-25).[46]

The beginning is an especially important moment in Hegel's philosophy because, according to his thought, it is the germ from which the whole organic structure is to develop, and within which that structure lies already pre-written. Here we come to a basic paradox in Hegel, which directly arises from his treading the middle road between the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' modes of argument. The paradox is that he simultaneously affirms and denies the existence of a One Truth. He denies its existence insofar as he states that Truth is forever determining itself; he affirms its existence insofar as he holds that all determination is the self-determination of One Absolute.

> All unsatisfied endeavor ceases, when we recognize that the final purpose of the world is accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself (Logic, p. 291).[47]

How are we to make sense of this? The answer lies in the complex nature of Hegelian self-determination, here reflected in the particular example of logical argument. Hegel gives us a clue, when he says:

> Thus e.g. the plant is developed from its germ. The germ virtually involves the whole plant, but does so only ideally or in thought: and it would therefore be a mistake to regard the development of the root, stem, leaves, and other different parts of the plant, as meaning that they were realiter present, but in a very minute form, in the germ. That is the so-called "box-within-box" hypothesis; a theory which commits the mistake of supposing an actual existence of what is at first found only as a postulate of the completed thought. The truth of the hypothesis, on the other hand, lies in its perceiving that in the process of development the notion keeps to itself and only gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition in

> point of content. . . . The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as play . . . (Logic, pp. 224-25).[48]

The "play," perhaps, lies in the relation between parts and whole in Hegel's teleologically structured processes. We say: "The truth creates itself"; in this statement, the play lies in the 'ideal' presence of an entire history within each of its component events or phases. This is, we should note, the specific meaning of Aufhebung. Thus, if we examine one of Hegel's process-entities, we find that:

(a) as regards form, one 'moment' and its 'other' are constantly being counterposed; but that

(b) as regards content, these 'moments' are one and the same, because their true content is the 'ideally' present process in its entirety.

The play, then, is a 'to-and-fro' between:

(a) local, formal, transition-into-otherness of static and isolated things; and,

(b) the higher unity of content which transfigures that transition-into-otherness, revealing its true nature as self-determination.

The final picture of the Hegelian logical argument, then, rests on his conception of autonomy. A logical argument is an over-arching unity in the breakdown of successive positions or stands:

(1) at first, each isolated position tries to stand dogmatically on its own, on the weight of mere assertion or tradition or prejudice;

(2) then, the first phase succumbs to the power of self-consciousness, of the negative; each mere assertion is met by a specific skeptical attack, which undermines it and forces it round into its opposite or 'other';

(3) finally, the positive import of the act of negation is recognized as such; skepticism has not <u>destroyed</u> the dogmatic positions, but critically <u>developed</u> them.

Here, in phase (3), the unity of progression becomes explicit. All along, what had seemed to be a senseless struggle between naively constructive and self-consciously destructive 'sides,' really was the intrinsic process through which order or Truth consolidates and tests itself. Each mere assertion in phase (1) contained its skeptical counterpart dormant within it; when the counterpart 'awoke,' the assertion fell apart. Falling apart, however, it was not obliterated, but strengthened: its weakness before skeptical attack, its propensity to fall apart, were brought to the surface and removed by the falling-apart itself. A <u>partial</u> analogy is that of a fragile porcelain vase sitting on the windowsill: it is apparently integral, but this integrity is weak. Not until someone knocks it off the

windowsill, in an 'accidental' gesture implicit within the nature of 'fragile vase on a windowsill,' does the weakness of the vase's integrity come to the surface: it crashes to the floor. Unlike the vase, however, which must at this point be thrown away, Truth is strengthened by such a falling-apart, because now it incorporates the 'lesson' involved in what has just been 'experienced.' In other words: having gone through the undermining of its naive stance, the logical argument is now in a position, not to discard that stance entirely and seek new naive assertions to make, but rather to 'regard' its original stance with critical or self-conscious distance. The progression has taken it from unfounded assertion to well-founded knowledge. Crucially, this progression has been its own; it has not been imposed by our minds from without, as a manipulation of representations within a conscious 'I.' Rather, the progression has been the inevitable, internally determined breakdown of specific positions on account of their inadequacy--and their resultant development into stronger positions which, in turn, broke down insofar as they were inadequate, and so on. Taking this process as a whole, from beginning to end, we have an autonomous logical argument. It is not self-conscious in the conventional sense, but embodies the formal principle of self-consciousness, which is negativity. When this negativity is regarded in the light of its positive import, our mere 'understanding' has been surpassed, and we

are thinking in terms of the entities of speculative reason: self-active processes.

> The dissimilarity which obtains in consciousness between the ego and the substance constituting its object, is their inner distinction, the factor of negativity in general. We may regard it as the defect of both opposites, but it is their very soul, their moving spirit. It was on this account that certain thinkers long ago took the void to be the principle of movement, when they conceived the moving principle to be the negative element, though they had not as yet thought of it as self. While this negative factor appears in the first instance as a dissimilarity, as an inequality, between ego and object, it is just as much the inequality of the substance with itself. What seems to take place outside it, to be an activity directed against it, is its own doing, its own activity . . . (Phenomenology, pp. 96-97).[49]

We can now further explore the meaning of these concepts, by seeing what shape they take in the context of the social model of autonomy. We shall find that the logical model influences the social model equally as much as the social has influenced the logical.

* * *

The first thing I should make clear is that I am considering the social model under the very narrow scope of the master-slave relation in the Phenomenology. In order adequately to articulate Hegel's conception of autonomy, it would be necessary to summarize the whole spiritual development of the Phenomenology, as well as the Philosophy of Right; since this full articulation is not crucial to the central theme of my thesis (and obviously involves a titanic expenditure of energy), I am focusing instead upon the

famous, and schematically clear, master-slave relation. Some essential aspects of autonomy arise in this context--aspects which we shall find quite useful and relevant in the following chapter.

The master-slave relation is Hegel's way of showing what happens to the rigid, isolated things of the world, and what, on the other hand, happens to those things which are flexible and open to experience. The interaction between master and slave is less interesting, in my opinion, when taken according to the narrow interpretation of 'enjoyer' vs. 'producer,' 'capitalist/feudalist' vs. 'employee/serf.' According to this latter interpretation, the outcome of the interaction between the two parties shows that they are <u>in fact</u> equal: the master has been dethroned, the slave has been raised to self-sufficiency, and in this reversal there is supposed to lie the message, "They are really equal."

> The selves conscious of self in another self are, of course, distinct and separate from each other. The difference is, in the first instance, a question of degree of self-assertion and self-maintenance: one is stronger, higher, more independent than another, and capable of asserting this at the expense of the other. Still, even this distinction of primary and secondary rests ultimately on their identity of constitution; and the course of the analysis here gradually brings out this essential identity as the true fact. The equality of the selves is the truth, or completer realization, of self in another self; the affinity is higher and more ultimate than the disparity. Still, the struggle and conflict of selves must be gone through in order to bring out this result (Baillie, Notes to the <u>Phenomenology</u>, p. 228).[50]

I shall now try to show why this 'socio-economical' interpretation only does partial justice to Hegel's intent in juxtaposing master and slave. As I see it, a fuller meaning arises when the outcome of the juxtaposition is "disparity," not "affinity."

Hegel's characterization of the master involves two closely related notions, staticity and isolation. The master's existence, qua master, is static, because he seeks indefinitely to perpetuate the relation in which he stands to the slave, by subordinating him and consuming the fruits of his labor. The master's existence is isolated, cut off from the rest of reality, because:

(a) He denies or cancels the fruits-of-labor presented to him by the slave; his enjoyment of them is their destruction.

> Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby unalloyed feeling of self. This satisfaction, however, just for that reason is itself only a state of evanescence, for it lacks objectivity or subsistence (Phenomenology, p. 238).[51]

(b) He denies the sovereign self-consciousness of the slave, scorning him as subordinate and inferior; thus, the slave will be unable to render the master that one truly valuable service: recognition as self-consciousness.

> But for recognition proper there is needed the moment that what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself, he should do to the other also. On that account a form

of recognition has arisen that is one sided and unequal (Phenomenology, p. 236).[52]

(c) He denies to himself the independent reality of the physical world, by receiving it only second-hand.

In the same way the master relates himself to the thing mediately through the bondsman (Phenomenology, p. 235).[53]

In sum:

The master exists only for himself, that is his essential nature; he is the negative power without qualification . . . (Phenomenology, p. 236).[54]

Hegel's characterization of the slave, on the other hand, involves the direct opposite: where the master's existence is only for himself, the slave's is only for another. The slave's existence is:

(1) relation-to-another as Fear:

(a) Fear of the master, fear of death at the master's hands. This fear is simultaneously a self-appreciation on the part of the slave, in that he fears for his own life; and an appreciation of the master as dominant power, which means that the slave, by granting the master sovereign reality, is actually putting the master in the position of recognizing, and thereby strengthening, the slave's identity.

(b) Fear of the independent external world, the 'objective negative element, the alien

external reality before which he trembles' (paraphrased, Phenomenology, p. 239).[55]

(2) relation-to-another as Service:

(a) The slave labors upon objective things, informs them through his own effort.

> Thus precisely in labor where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through this rediscovery of himself by himself, of having and being a "mind of his own" (Phenomenology, p. 239).[56]

(b) The slave, unlike the master, achieves through his direct labor upon things an independence from the world of physical nature.

> By serving he cancels in every particular aspect his dependence on and attachment to natural existence, and by his work removes this existence away (Phenomenology, p. 238).[57]

The sum of Hegel's characterization of the two positions, then, is the following:

> The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is the master, or lord, the latter the bondsman (Phenomenology, p. 234).[58]

Now, perhaps, my introductory sentence will begin to make clearer sense: the master-slave relation is Hegel's way of showing what happens to the rigid, isolated things of the world, and what, on the other hand, happens to those things which are flexible and open to experience. We are, then, interpreting Hegel's coinages 'to be for self' vs. 'to be for another' as carrying more content than just

'exploitation' vs. 'subjugation,' respectively. Master and slave are the schemata for (as well as the objectifications of) Hegel's fundamental metaphysical principle of self-governing dynamism.

How so? To answer this, we need only look at the interaction as a whole. The result of the master's interaction with the slave is that his merely apparent 'lordship' shows itself for what it inherently is, and accordingly goes out of existence. The master tries to maintain himself as he is, in a state of parasitic removal from the processes and exigencies of life. His position of staticity and self-isolation is just like a dogmatic stand in logical argument: it is mere self-assertion, the artificial attempt of an intrinsically one-sided, incomplete thing to stand on its own. Thus, because the master's position is in fact a state of dependence upon the slave to procure him his livelihood, his rigid stance breaks down, and his real subordination to the slave comes to the surface. In this way, the master has 'veered round' into his other; his false mastery will be aufgehoben in the larger process which determines true autonomy.

It is precisely this larger process, however, which is exemplified and lived through by the slave.

> But just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change round

> into real and true independence (Phenomenology, p. 237).[59]

There is an important and subtle difference to be brought out here: the master, in passing into his opposite, undergoes transition-into-another; the slave, on the other hand, undergoes development. The difference here is that, although both the master and the slave are determinately altered by their interaction, the master simply shows himself as his direct opposite, whereas the slave survives the change as himself, and finds realization through it. The master becomes something other than what he was; the slave is transformed, or, rather, grows into a state of greater sophistication. This is the "disparity" between them, which I mentioned earlier on. Let me try to make this "disparity" clearer--for a misunderstanding is possible here. Early in the master-slave section, Hegel discusses what would happen if, in their reciprocal contention, a would-be master and a would-be slave actually went so far as to kill each other. Such a situation, according to Hegel, would result in a general lack of constructiveness, principally because the benefit reaped from the process of contention would no longer have anyone to whom it could accrue. The process, in other words, would be self-defeating.

> But there vanishes from the play of change the essential moment, viz. that of breaking up into extremes with opposite characteristics; and the middle term collapses into a lifeless unity which is broken up into lifeless extremes, merely existent and not opposed. And the two do not mutually give and receive one another back from

> each other through consciousness; they let one another go quite indifferently, like things. Their act is abstract negation, not the negation characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated (Phenomenology, pp. 233-34).[60]

The idea here is that a spiritual process involves something akin to learning; the past is retained in the process which supersedes it. Now, in the "disparity" mentioned above, I am not aligning the master with 'abstract negation' and the slave with the 'negation characteristic of consciousness'--I am not, then, saying that the master goes out of existence in the same sense as he would if he were killed. Rather, the master and the slave both undergo the second form of negation, which is survival-through-change--but, within this common form, I am claiming, a "disparity" still obtains.

The reason for this "disparity" lies in the initial natures of master and slave, namely, 'to be for self' and 'to be for another.' Referring back to our discussion of logical argument, we can align the master's staticity and isolation with phase (1) of the typical Hegelian progression:

> (α) Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own (Logic, p. 113).[61]

Similarly, we can align the slave's existence as relation-to-otherness with phase (2) of the progression:

> (β) In the Dialectical stage these finite characterizations or formulae supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites (Logic, p. 115).[62]

In other words, the slave's fear of 'others' and service to 'others' is from the beginning a fully explicit supersession of fixity and isolation: his existence is from the start a radical example of 'dwelling with otherness,' of a process constantly involving the 'impinging of the opposite.' From this standpoint, the result of the interaction between master and slave is that:

(*) the master is driven from (α) to (β); whereas

(*) the slave develops from (β) to (γ) (where '(δ),' we recall, was characterized as follows:

> The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition--the affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition (Logic, p. 119).[63]

Thus, because master and slave began their interaction in basic disparity, they also end it in disparity. Both of them advance, or gain in truth, through their interaction--but the slave's final position is 'self-realized autonomy,' whereas the master's final position is 'unveiled heteronomy.'

This last distinction is important because, by interpreting the master-slave relation as a mere reversal of positions, culminating in symmetrical 'equality,' the essential nature of the dialectic is missed. Dialectic does not just 'throw things around' into their opposites--if it did, it would result in endless repetition, not in steady development. 'Symmetrical equality' would mean that the master becomes 'slave,' the slave becomes 'master,' and then the

cycle would simply renew itself, intimating to us that 'mastery' and 'slavery' are really interdependent positions equal in strength. This is not at all what Hegel seems to intend.

An interpretation more consistent with Hegel's general scheme, rather, would have to go as follows: the master-slave relation is an inquiry into the nature of self-determination. In this inquiry, Hegel rejects the model of self-determination as self-assertion of an unchanging or putatively substantial entity. Instead, he puts forward the model of self-determination as internally ordered process of radical self-transformation.

Let me further spell this out. I think the master's position ought to be sufficiently clear at this point: his process, through the interaction with the slave, is that of the first transition in Aufhebung ((α)---(β)), passage-into-the-other. We can correspondingly begin our characterization of the slave's position by saying that his is the second transition in Aufhebung ((β)---(γ)), or development. Why so?--because he endures 'absolute fear': 'his substance has been through and through infected thereby'; 'the entire content of his natural consciousness has tottered and shaken (paraphrased, Phenomenology, p. 240).[64] Just as the dogmatic argument had to endure the moment of skeptical attack, just as the rock had to endure being ground into dust, just as the 'one' had to endure becoming 'many,' just as the

master is now having to endure open submission and revilement, so the slave endured his fear and toil.

> For this reflexion of self into self the two moments, fear and service in general, as also that of formative activity, are necessary: and at the same time both must exist in a universal manner. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains formal and does not spread over the whole known reality of existence. Without the formative activity shaping the thing, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become objective for itself. Should consciousness shape and form the thing without the initial state of absolute fear, then it has a merely vain and futile "mind of its own"; for its form or negativity is not negativity per se, and hence its formative activity cannot furnish the consciousness of itself as essentially real (Phenomenology, pp. 239-40).[65]

Now, however, his fear and toil have carried him through: the process of the slave's transformation reaches its present culmination.

> In the master, the bondsman feels self-existence to be something external, an objective fact; in fear self-existence is present within himself; in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as his own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he himself exists in its own right and on its own account (an und für sich) (Phenomenology, p. 239).[66]

But the questions remain: what allows Hegel to call this process 'self-determination'? It may have been the slave's own work that transformed him, but surely we cannot hold that he intended to go through all these experiences in order to grow through them. And if he wasn't conscious of what he was actually doing, what sort of self-determination is this? That which happened to the slave, in other words, seems like mere external and accidental 'hard times,' which, if he is lucky, he will survive and

even benefit from. Where is the element of internal teleology here?

The answer lies in the German words at the end of the last quotation, "in its own right and on its own account (an und für sich)." The English equivalent appropriately provided by the translator (Baillie) represents a close rendition of the sense, not a literal translation of the meaning, of this special Hegelian coinage. Literally, the German expression means "in and for itself," which is, in the present context, singularly revealing. What it means is that we must not try to understand the 'self-determination' at hand as something happening to, or intended by, the slave; rather, we must understand the slave as being one 'moment' of a larger-scale entity in the process of determining itself. This is because 'in and for itself' is the adjective used by Hegel to designate a process-entity in its final stage.

> In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself; the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (On Art, Religion, Philosophy, p. 228).[67]

Thus, in other words, we must align the 'in-itself' with phase (∝) of the Hegelian progression, because, as has been pointed out, staticity and isolation are for Hegel nothing but the potential for fluidity and relation-to-another, which correspond to phase (β). Fluidity and

relation-to-another are the 'in-itself' become 'for-itself,' or explicit, or actual. The array of terms can be laid out in the following rough equivalency:

(∝)	*	(β)	*	(γ)
in-itself	*	for-itself	*	in-and-for-itself
implicit	*	explicit	*	autonomous/ 'objective'
transition-into-another	*	reflection-upon-another	*	development
Understanding	*	Dialectic	*	Speculative Reason
Being	*	Essence	*	Notion
reality potential	*	reality actual	*	reality self-determining

(These terms, of course, should be taken as parallel and compatible, but not as strictly interchangeable; although they all represent the same fundamental progression, Hegel uses specific combinations of them as exclusively appropriate to each of the many contexts, angles, and perspectives he takes up for discussion.)

The term 'in-and-for-itself,' then, is the clue which leads us to look at the whole history of the slave, and not just at the slave as such, to find out how he expresses a schema for true autonomy.

> For being-in-self and being-for-self are the moments present in action; but the act is the retention of these diverse moments within itself. The act thus is really one, and it is just this unity of differences which is the concrete (On Art, Religion, Philosophy, p. 231).[68]

The whole history of the slave is the process through which "he attains the consciousness that he himself exists." Thus, the first 'moment' of the determinate progression, its

being-in-itself, is the moment of the master--this is the stage of heteronomy concealed behind an appearance of autonomy. The mere self-assertion of the master involves no true self-consciousness--he is cut off from the world and hence from himself, and he strives to remain so. Then comes the second 'moment' of the progression: he who was master is now servant. This should not be interpreted literally, as meaning that all slaves must once have been masters--what it does mean is that all staticity and isolation is driven into fluidity and relation-to-another: all fluidity and relation-to-another is the dialectical negative of staticity and isolation. Thus, the being-for-itself of the progression is the fear and toil through which the slave gets to know who he is, in all the various senses pointed out above. The 'absolute terror' of this phase is that of isolated 'being-in-itself' getting shaken up and thrown into direct experience of the 'other'--this constitutes the 'moment' of for-itselfness. Finally, there is the third stage of progression: he who was once master and therefore had to endure servitude, finds himself realized at last precisely through his experiences. The 'absolute terror' of the negative 'moment' yields its positive content: the slave, in surviving his slavery, "becomes aware, through this rediscovery of himself by himself, of having and being a 'mind of his own.'" Because it is not mere pretension or self-assertion, as it was initially with the master, this

awareness has constituted itself valid "in its own right and on its own account." It is an awareness which results from its own history of necessarily sequential experiences: it is 'in-and-for-itself.'

CHAPTER II

(MASTER AND SLAVE)-- DUALISM AND PROCESS

Preliminary Sketch (I): Form of the Argument

Now we are ready to return to the impasse delineated at the end of Part I. I shall try to show how this impasse can only be aggravated by developing it according to one line of approach, and how, on the other hand, it can perhaps be resolved or surpassed by developing it in a different way. The discussion will run roughly like this:

1) first, I will return to the three 'attitudes to objectivity' described in Part I, and show how Hegel's 'structural' approach stands with regard to them. The mere description of a 'structural' domain, it will be argued, leads us no closer to a resolution of the impasse; what we need is to show how Hegel turns the 'attitudes to objectivity' around, making them into supporting-'moments' of his final position. This will be done in a general manner, for all three 'attitudes', in Section I;

2) in Section II, I shall focus in on Hegel's criticisms of the Kantian, or 'idealistic', 'attitude to objectivity'. These criticisms are well summed-up and coordinated by Jürgen Habermas, in the first chapter of Knowledge and Human Interests (entitled 'Hegel's Critique of Kant'), which I am accordingly relying upon to a certain extent;

3) then, in Section III, I will show how the Kantian 'attitude to objectivity' involves at its root a conception of knowledge which is ultimately derived from one basic schema: that of the relation between substance and attribute, or subject and predicate; it is this schema, I shall maintain, which leads Kant into his noumenon-phenomenon dualism;

4) finally, in Section IV, I will try to present a clearer picture of Hegel's response to Kant's 'subjective idealism'; my main focus will be upon Hegel's rejection of the substance/attribute framework, in favor of a meta-logic within whose framework entities are specified as processes. This section will conclude my thesis.

Preliminary Sketch (II): Content of the Argument

Confronted by Kant's radical separation of the phenomenal from the noumenal, Hegel responds with a paradoxical monism in which, he claims, all dualism must be contained. The key to understanding this 'containing'-gesture on Hegel's part lies in discerning how his monism involves two factors:

a) the positing of an 'eternal', unified domain of 'independent' entities, whose generality places them beyond the relative characteristics of epistemological 'subjectivity/objectivity'.

b) the establishment of a relation between epistemological 'subjectivity/objectivity', and the'eternal domain', by regarding 'subjectivity/objectivity' as one stepping--stone in the process through which the 'eternal domain'

is (eternally) creating itself.

What we have here, in other words, are two factors which echo the characteristics of a 'vertical-horizontal' logical argument (see Ch. 1, sec. III): Hegel is qualifying the Absolute in terms of all-encompassing unity which is essentially dynamic in nature. If we neglect either one of these factors, the unity or the dynamism, Hegel's proposed resolution of the epistemology--metaphysics impasse becomes unintelligible.

This impasse, we recall, had taken the form of a circle from which no exit seemed possible:



Of course, no exit from this circle is possible unless, like Hegel, we begin to raise objections-- especially as regards what is meant by 'knowledge', 'ours', and 'conditions'. Hegel's exit from the circle, then, is carried out from two aspects:

a) on the one hand, he criticizes the presuppositions involved in setting up a 'subjective idealist' epistemology;

b) on the other hand, he propounds a new metaphysics, which, being 'vertical-horizontal', does not discard the

so-called 'epistemological moment', but rather, sublates it as a necessary, but incomplete, phase of the Absolute whole.

This chapter, then, will be devoted to Hegel's 'exit from the circle'-- its attractiveness and plausibility, its opacity and weaknesses.

Section I: Hegel and the 'Beyond'

Hegel's Absolute, we said, involves two basic factors: unity and dynamism. These factors must be taken as inseparable; if we try to characterize them one at a time, we miss Hegel's basic point. In everyday conversation, it is common to find a notion of unity that arises quite indifferently to that of dynamism-- the two, it would seem, bear no analytical relation to each other. In Hegel's thought, however, it is only through dynamism that false unity breaks apart, thereby constituting true unity. False unity is staticity and isolation; through its intrinsic dynamism, this false unity becomes the true unity of a process. We may now begin to apply this schema specifically within the context of the epistemology-metaphysics impasse.

When he refers to the'unity' of the Absolute, Hegel means, in a very general way, that there is only one world, one Reality with specific and intelligible governing-principles. This conception of unity, therefore, is immediately at odds with the typical Kantian distinction between the world of 'things as we know them' and that of'things as they are'.

"From what has been said the principles of logic are to be

> sought in a system of thought-types or fundamental categories, in which the opposition between subjective and objective, in its usual sense, vanishes. The signification thus attached to thought and its characteristic forms may be illustrated by the ancient saying that 'nous governs the world', or by our own phrase that 'Reason is in the world'; which means that Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits, its immanent principle, its most proper and inward nature, its universal." (Logic, p. 37)[69]

In Part I, we came upon three 'attitudes to objectivity', each of which was in one way or another based upon an acceptance of the distinction between knower and known as philosophically primary. These three 'attitudes' were referred to, respectively, as the 'linguistic', the 'positivistic', and the 'idealistic'. We discovered while characterizing them that they all in some sense involved reference to a domain lying radically beyond human access, whether they did so self-consistently or not:

a) the 'idealistic' attitude held that such a 'beyond' was necessarily presupposed in, or tied up with, each appearance of 'something' to us as an 'objective' experience;

b) the 'positivistic' attitude held that our human cognitive endeavor is precisely to make that 'beyond' ours, through a gradual process of inquiry by which we extract from the 'beyond' its fundamental characteristics;

c) the 'linguistic' attitude was ambiguous with regard to the 'beyond': it held that (in all but the most straightforward contexts) the word 'beyond' is really no more than a self-contradictory intention of ours, to speak the 'unspeakable'. Simultaneously, however, the 'linguistic' attitude admits that we do paradoxically find some meaning in this attempted reference to a domain beyond human access. Thus, we find certain

'linguistic' thinkers, like the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus or Jacques Derrida, nostalgically talking about or gesturing toward "what is mystical" or the "Transcendental Signified", respectively. In this sense, then, despite its initial intention, the 'linguistic' attitude retains certain vestiges of the 'beyond', which serve to condition the 'boundless island' of the speakable.

Hegel's claim here is that a 'beyond' is always present, or negatively present, whenever we determine the world in terms of staticity and isolation. If you draw a circle on a piece of paper, and think of it as no more than the unchanging area enclosed, you have in the same act established a 'beyond'. Similarly, if you think of yourself, of your world, as an unchanging enclosure to which various things happen, upon which certain changes are predicable, once again you will have established a 'beyond'. This 'beyond' represents the 'dis-unity' to which Hegel devotes the greatest part of his thought (and vituperation).

> The absolute notion is the category; it is the principle that knowledge and the object of knowledge are the same. In consequence, what pure insight expresses as its other, what it pronounces to be an error or a lie, can be nothing else than its own self; it can only condemn what itself is. What is not rational has no truth, or what is not comprehended through a notion, conceptually determined, is not. When reason thus speaks of some other than itself is, it in fact speaks merely of itself; it does not therein go beyond itself (Phenomenology, p. 565-66).[70]

> This curtain [of appearance], therefore, hanging before the inner world is withdrawn, and we have here the inner being [the ego] gazing into the inner realm-- the vision of the undistinguished selfsame reality, which repels itself from itself, affirms itself as a divided and distinguished inner reality, but as one for which at the same

> time the two factors have immediately no distinction; what we have here is Self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen (Phenomenology, p. 212-13; Baillie's brackets).[71]

> The beyond that lies remote from this its actual reality, hovers over the corpse of the vanished independence of what is real or believed to be, and hovers there merely as an exhalation of stale gas, of the empty être suprême (Phenomenology, p. 602).[72]

How, then, is Hegel's 'beyond-less' Absolute to be described? Instead of proceeding right away with a positive description, I shall now try to show how any attempt to comprehend Hegel's Absolute in terms of the 'idealistic', 'positivistic', or 'linguistic' frameworks will immediately lead us astray. Let us work out, in a brief sketch, what happens to these frameworks if we consider them in the absence of their respective 'beyonds'.

a) To abolish the 'beyond' in the 'idealistic' framework would mean to lose the crucial distinction between a cognizing subject and the source of his 'object of knowledge'. Whereas Hegel wants to retain this distinction while further developing it, our simple abolition of the 'beyond' in the 'idealistic' context would result in a qualitatively uniform monism, under at least two (equally inadequate) interpretations. The first interpretation would be something like Berkeley's idealism, holding that all things are representations. The second interpretation is a form of extreme materialism, in which all things are taken to be of physical quality (concerning the inadequacy of these two reductionistic interpretations, see Appendix).

Extreme idealism and extreme materialism are not the only possible positions resulting from the abolition of the 'beyond' in 'idealism'; nevertheless, they are its most plausible and direct consequence. We can break down the barrier between 'things as we know them' and 'things as they are' in one of two ways: either we make 'things as they are' a special case of 'things as we know them', or vice-versa. Since an especially plausible way of interpreting 'things as they are' in the present context of 'breakdown' is to align them with physical or material being, we can see that such a 'breakdown' leads most directly into the two aforementioned extremes.

b) To abolish the 'beyond' in the 'positivistic' framework would mean that 'Truth' has been reached. The 'beyond', for 'positivism', is simply all that which remains to be determined by us, in our endeavor to understand the fundamental nature of the universe. To abolish the 'beyond' in this framework, therefore, would amount to a statement that "We have found it all out," "There is nothing more to know".

c) To abolish the 'beyond' in the 'linguistic' framework would be either superfluous or self-contradictory. In this framework, the 'beyond' is held to be an incoherent notion: therefore, since there is no such thing in the first place, you can't really abolish it. Why, then, isn't the 'linguistic' framework capable of expressing Hegel's 'beyond-less' Absolute? The answer lies in the way 'beyond-lessness' is understood in each of the two cases (see also Part I Section II, p. 21): for the 'linguistic' perspective, the all-encompassing logical domain

remains nevertheless ours at root, and only ours. For Hegel, on the other hand, the all-encompassing logical domain is self-sufficient, and contains things which are not exclusively ours in any sense. The 'linguistic' perspective, in other words, substitutes a 'logical subjectivism' for the Kantian experiential subjectivism. Whereas the latter necessarily involves the positing of a 'beyond', the former (at least apparently) does away with that requirement. Still, logical subjectivism, which holds that we cannot in any way refer to something 'beyond' or 'not-ours', is very different from Hegel's Absolute, which is held to exist on its own account, independently of our conditioning it or not-conditioning it.

As we can see, therefore, the 'beyond' is so crucial a factor in these 'attitudes to objectivity', that, if we try to abolish it, what remains in each case is a monism whose complete staticity or uniformity goes against common sense:

a) 'idealism' yields 'extreme idealism' or 'extreme materialism';

b) 'positivism' yields omniscience, the end of all inquiry;

c) the 'linguistic' perspective (remaining unchanged) yields 'logical subjectivism', a completely determinate grid-work or unchanging 'logical space', based upon the structure of our language.

The 'beyond', then, seems to be the element of tension in each of these positions; if we remove it, we are left with an artificial stasis. On the other hand, if we don't remove the 'beyond' from these positions, we are left with nothing but

tension, unrelieved by any stasis or unity. In other words, the defect in these 'attitudes to objectivity' seems to be that they can only settle upon one of these characteristics, tension or stasis, constant relation-to-a-beyond or fixed and boundless uniformity. This is the point at which Hegel's thought about dynamism becomes especially relevant.

> The idea itself is the dialectic which for ever divides and distinguishes the self-identical from the differentiated, the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite, soul from body. Only on these terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal spirit. But while it thus passes or rather translates itself into the abstract understanding, it for ever remains reason. The Idea is the dialectic which again makes this mass of understanding and diversity understand its finite nature and the pseudo-independence in its productions, and which brings the diversity back to unity. Since this double movement is not separate or distinct in time, nor indeed in any other way-- otherwise it would be only a repetition of the abstract understanding-- the Idea is the eternal vision of itself in the other, notion which in its objectivity has carried out itself, object which is inward design, essential subjectivity (Logic, p. 277-78)[73]

In the words, "eternal vision of itself in the other", we come to our most general criticism of the three 'attitudes to objectivity'. Fundamentally, their problem is that, like all 'sciences' of the finite Understanding, they are unable to give an adequate account of ordered Becoming. Or, to put it differently, these 'sciences' are unable to see that they themselves, like the world they attempt to characterize, are not either well-defined on their own account or dependent upon a 'beyond', either substantial and all-encompassing or equivocal and limited, but rather, in all these cases, both simultaneously. According to Hegel, it is only by attaining unity through the process of disruption into otherness, only by 'eternally seeing itself in the other',

that Truth has its stability of higher order.

> This is the problem which gradually shapes itself as religion reaches its higher phases in civilized communities. The most general formulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss (A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 401). [74]

I shall try to say this over again, differently. Let us call to mind the typical Hegelian progression delineated in chapter 1. We had:

(α) the 'moment' of isolation and fixity;

(β) the 'moment' of Dialectic, in which that which was isolated becomes openly related-to-another, and that which was fixed undergoes transition-into-another;

(γ) the 'moment' in which Dialectic shows its positive nature in constituting the whole process, (α-β-γ), a self-determining unity.

Now, let us try to apply this progression in interpreting the three 'attitudes to objectivity'. We find that the 'idealistic' and 'positivistic' attitudes are, essentially, dualisms: they both clearly involve a 'here' and a 'beyond'. Meanwhile, the 'linguistic' attitude is a borderline monism; it simultaneously does and does not admit that the 'beyond' has reality. Fitting these into the Hegelian scheme, it would seem natural to regard the 'idealistic' and 'positivistic' attitudes as philosophical positions in phase (β): their most essential being is relation--to-an-'other'. They are what they are only insofar as they are conditioned by the presence of a 'beyond'. In a similar way, the'linguistic' perspective can be regarded as falling in

between (α) and (β): it attempts to remain static and isolated, well-defined on its own account as the domain of the humanly 'speakable'; simultaneously, however, from within this domain, there arises a troublesome set of questions concerning the status of words like 'unspeakable', and their intended meanings which gesture 'beyond'.

The point here is that the three 'attitudes to objectivity' run into trouble <u>whether or not</u> they accept the conditioning--effect of a 'beyond'. If they <u>accept</u> the 'beyond', they open up a great rift in reality, setting Man on one side of it; such a rift (as we shall see in the following section) involves many presuppositions, and is quite vulnerable to criticism. But if, on the other hand, they <u>reject</u> the 'beyond', their position inevitably becomes static and deterministic (while the vestiges of a 'beyond' nevertheless make themselves insidiously felt from within). The main problem with these 'attitudes', then, from the Hegelian point of view, is that they are 'frozen' at one point or another of his basic progression, without ever being able to embody the whole.

<u>Either:</u> (1) they attempt to construe reality as an 'endless' physical or logical expanse in which certain specific characteristics reign sovereign;

<u>or:</u> (2) they attempt to construe reality as a state of unchanging <u>tension</u> between two radically opposed domains, the accessible 'here' and the inaccessible 'beyond'.

The closure of the former approach (1) precludes the openness

of the latter (2)-- the 'forever provisional' quality of the latter precludes the finality of the former: thus, they appear as rigid monisms and dualisms which are strictly alternative to each other.

The only way to get past this situation, according to Hegel, is to recognize precisely how the three 'attitudes to objectivity' depart from an essentially static view of the world, and therefore end up 'taking a stand' on positions that inevitably exclude the whole of what requires explanation. One aspect of reality must thus be singled out and regarded as primary vis à vis other aspects, even though all the aspects impinge equally upon our experience. The two principal aspects which we have so far been trying to include together, but which have repeatedly shown themselves to be incompatible, are unity (to be aligned with substantial, comprehensive, fully determinate order), and dynamism (to be aligned with the provisional quality of order, its intrinsic incompleteness, its openness to change or revision).

> Order is not sufficient. What is required, is something much more complex. It is order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness of order does not degenerate into mere repetition; and so that the novelty is always reflected upon a background of system (A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 400). [75]

Hegel's message, like Whitehead's, is that we can, indeed must, incorporate unity and dynamism together into our metaphysical cosmology, but that in order to do so, we must cease to think of them as we had when we assumed they were isolated and independent from each other.

The whole, according to Hegel, is a process. It is a process in which something (α) exists as determinate, (β) relates itself to its 'other', and, (γ) survives the 'moment' of the 'other' by integrating it into itself. The higher unity of this process, applied to the 'attitudes to objectivity', yields:

(α) the 'moment' of 'beyond-less' staticity and self-containment (the 'linguistic' approach);

(β) the 'moment' in which staticity and self-containment fall into open opposition with the 'beyond' that lay implicit within them ('idealism' and 'positivism'); and

(γ) the 'moment' in which the 'beyond' is once again removed--not, however, as in (α), by being simply denied sense or relevance, but by being included in the identity of the process which eternally confronts it and develops through it (Hegel's Absolute).

In sum: we have criticized the three 'attitudes to objectivity' in a very general manner, observing how they are unable to deal adequately with the notion of <u>limitation.</u> Limitation, for Hegel, is essentially a process of going-beyond-itself, whereas, in the 'attitudes' scrutinized, limitation meant either static self-isolation or static dependence-upon-another. The 'beyond' was either assertively repudiated or passively submitted to. For Hegel, on the other hand, philosophy, like the actual world, exists as such only by going beyond itself, by becoming other than what it is, and then returning, enriched, to itself. This higher form of limitation is like a pulsating

formal alternation: a determinate structure opens up to novelty, and then crystallizes anew into a structure which retains the original, developing it.

> As the idea is (a) a process, it follows that such an expression for the Absolute as unity of thought and being, of finite and infinite, etc., is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely quiescent identity. As the idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that the expression is equally false on another account. That unity of which it speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the genuine unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely neutralized by the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But in the negative unity of the idea, the infinite overlaps and includes the finite, thought overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity (Logic, p. 279). [76]

Hopefully, by delineating how the three 'attitudes' were incapable of expressing Hegel's Absolute, we have begun to characterize it positively as well. The main point here is that those 'attitudes' could not express Hegel's Absolute, precisely because they themselves were its own parts, or 'moments', regarded as 'frozen' and separate. It is necessary to Hegel's Absolute to involve a 'moment' of fixity, the establishment of a specific characteristic or structure; this 'moment', however, precisely insofar as it is fixed and qualitatively bounded, intrinsically refers beyond itself, towards what is different than itself, towards what is new. In other words: once we accept the fact that we have a determinate 'this', we must also accept the instantly resultant determinateness of an 'other-than-this'. Even when, as in the case of the 'linguistic' perspective, no 'other' can be named which is not immediately by definition part of the 'this', such an 'other', nevertheless, silently makes itself manifest (to use Wittgenstein's words). The relation

between 'this' and 'other', as Hegel is describing it, corresponds roughly to what we mean in everyday talk by open--mindedness. Open-mindedness does not mean that we accept <u>everything</u>, being careful never to stand firm upon anything for fear of precluding certain other possibilities. Neither, of course, is open-mindedness a cautious, but final, selection of one position as the most valid, after which we will hear nothing more from any side. These two attitudes coincide, respectively, with static indeterminateness and static determinateness; they are static because they assume that the Truth must be just so, one specific position or account or systematic vision which perfectly represents the One Nature of things.

* The attitude of indeterminateness says: "How can I be sure I've taken everything into consideration? I don't want to commit myself, and then discover I've left something out. Better to stand aside, and admit that I will <u>never</u> be sure of what is fundamentally the case."
* The attitude of determinateness says: "I mustn't push this circumspection too far. After all, it's pretty clear that things <u>are</u> such and such a way. So I'll assume that they definitely <u>are</u> that way, and, within that assumed framework, devote the rest of my time to working out the details."

Hegel's stand against these two attitudes, in keeping with the commonsense notion of open-mindedness, involves rather a process of determinateness which deliberately breaks itself down into indeterminateness, and then re-constitutes itself anew as deter-

minate in different form. It stands solidly upon what it believes at any given time, but precisely because of that, it follows this solid belief through into the revision which it always implies. This is the 'vertical-horizontal' open--mindedness of a self-critical process of inquiry. What is most crucial to such an attitude is a new notion of truth as essentially unified and dynamic. According to Hegel, the One Nature of things is not something that could be adequately represented in any systematic vision, however fully articulated it may be. We should not even be trying to approach The Truth; if we are, we have already lost hold of half the picture. What we may grasp of the Truth, instead, is its formal nature as a process of perpetual self-creation and self-remembrance. In this sense, the attitude of indeterminateness is vindicated insofar as the content of the Truth is forever developing itself. Simultaneously, the attitude of determinateness is vindicated insofar as the Truth has a specific, or real, history, and an over--arching formal unity. Whitehead gives this paradox the following expression:

> The four symbolic figures in the Medici chapel in Florence-- Michelangelo's masterpieces of statuary, Day and Night, Evening and Dawn-- exhibit the everlasting elements in the passage of fact. The figures stay there, reclining in their recurring sequence, forever showing the essences in the nature of things. The perfect realization is not merely the exemplification of what in abstraction is timeless. It does more: it implants timelessness on what in its essence is passing. The perfect moment is fadeless in the lapse of time. Time has then lost its character of 'perpetual perishing'; it becomes the 'moving image of eternity' (A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 398-99).[77]

These reflections upon open-mindedness are relevant in the present context, because they serve to schematize the manner in which Hegel's position paradoxically engulfs the rigid reciprocal opposition of the 'attitudes to objectivity'. Hegel's Absolute is neither monism nor dualism, in any conventional sense, but rather the process which eternally runs _through_ the former, _into_ the latter, and on to 'higher' unity. To put it differently, Hegel's Absolute is _neither_ mere determinateness or established structure, _nor_ mere indeterminateness or provisional structure, but rather the integration of these two into what he calls 'Spirit'.

At this point, then, we have before us the general picture of how the three 'attitudes' are _turned around_ by Hegel, into fragmentary existence as necessary supporting-'moments' of his Absolute whole. Now we can focus in on Hegel's relation to Kant, working out more fully the strengths and weaknesses of 'idealism', and of the 'provisional structure' we have aligned with it.

Section II: Hegel's Critique of Kant

In his _Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de L'Esprit de Hegel_, Jean Hyppolite brings out the following important point:

> In his introduction to the _Phenomenology_, Hegel resumes his criticisms of a philosophy which limits itself to being 'theory of knowledge'. And yet the _Phenomenology_, as has been noted by all its commentators, clearly constitutes under certain aspects a return to the point of view held by Kant and Fichte. In what sense must we then understand it?

Hyppolite's answer is this:

> Hegel returns to this knowledge of phenomena, to this common consciousness, and he intends to show how it necessarily leads to Absolute Knowledge, or rather, how this common knowledge is in fact an Absolute Knowledge which has not yet recognized itself as such (Jean Hyppolite, Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménologie de L'Esprit de Hegel, p. 11-12; my translations).[78]

The point implicit here is that there are two sorts of philosophical criticism. One sort, the 'external', typically brings to bear objections pertaining to explanatory inadequacy, incompatibility with existing models or commonsense facts, and the like; the positive counter-proposals of this sort of criticism usually take the form of 'alternative construals' or 'different conclusions about the given data'. The 'internal' sort of criticism, on the other hand, takes its object-of-criticism as is, and tries to show how, reasoning from within such a position, one is necessarily brought to a wholly different result; the original criticized position is thus transformed into the final critical position. In sum: the 'external' mode of criticism breaks down an existing model, and substitutes for it a different one; the 'internal' mode shows how an existing model intrinsically develops into a second, more fully articulated one-- it constructs the latter out of the former.

Hegel's critique of Kant is a good example of 'internal' criticism. It involves an initial phase of apparently 'external' attack, in which Kant's philosophy is shown to stand upon arbitrary and even non-commonsensical presuppositions; but this initial phase is merely the 'moment' of Dialectic, of restlessness. Hegel's main point, rather, is that Kant's philosophy

is unable to find a firm foundation, and thus intrinsically develops into a wider-embracing whole. The inevitable 'transition' of the Kantian position carries that position beyond itself, and reveals its higher identity as Spirit. In this section, we shall confine our discussion to the 'moment' of Dialectic, of negation or scepticism.

In the first chapter of Knowledge and Human Interests (entitled 'Hegel's Critique of Kant'), Jürgen Habermas very effectively summarizes and coordinates the whole scope of Hegel's objection to Kant's position. Although Habermas ultimately criticizes Hegel as well as Kant, he accepts many of Hegel's insights into the weakness of the Kantian philosophy. Later on, in Sections III and IV, we shall be confronting Habermas' criticisms of Hegel; in defending Hegel against these criticisms, I hope to make clearer the nature of his 'exit from the circle of the impasse'. Now, however, let us specifically review the main points brought out against Kant. Since Habermas' summary of these points is both clear and comprehensive, and since I can find no way to deflect these criticisms from a Kantian point of view, I shall not immediately be elaborating upon the quotations made. These quotations are especially necessary, however, because they provide a substantial background for my upcoming arguments against Habermas' standpoint.

1) The Epistemological Circle and the Problematic Method

> Unfortunately there soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before you know-- the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim. True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a

> scrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a cognition? (Logic, p. 66) [79]

> Every consistent epistemology is caught in this circle from the beginning. This cannot be avoided by beginning the critique with presuppositions that remain provisionally unproblematic but that in principle can be taken as potential problems for subsequent investigation. This 'problematic method,' originally adopted by Reinhold, is still recommended today by positivists for methodological investigations. It is argued that one cannot at the same time take all principles as problematic. The set of presuppositions that defines the frame of reference of a given investigation should be assumed as unproblematic for the course of the investigation. The manifold repetition of this procedure is supposed to provide an adequate guarantee that in principle all presuppositions can be called into question. However, the choice of the first frame of reference and the sequence of the additional stages of investigation remain arbitrary. Radical doubt is excluded, because the procedure rests on a conventionalism that precludes the logical foundation of its premises. But the theory of knowledge, according to its philosophical claim, is an enterprise directed at the whole. It is concerned with the critical justification of the conditions of possible knowledge in general. It cannot renounce radical, that is unconditional doubt. The methodical (methodisch) meaning of its approach would be inverted if it bound critique to conditions (that is if it allowed presuppositions) that are themselves the preconditions of the critique of knowledge without being subject to it. Because epistemology, in virtue of its claim to providing its own and the ultimate foundation, appears as the heir of First Philosophy (Ursprungsphilosophie), it cannot dispense with the strategy of beginning without presuppositions. This explains how Hegel can praise Reinhold, who clearly perceived the circular character of epistemology, while rejecting the problematic method that was to escape it. His 'correct insight does not alter the character of such a method, but immediately expresses its inadequacy' (Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 7-8). [80]

What we especially need to note, here, is how this weakening of the epistemological endeavor affects the balance of the metaphysics/epistemology impasse. We have certainly not proved the 'metaphysical' side correct, but we have begun to discredit the epistemological counter-objection as a whole.

2) The Presuppositions of an Organon Theory of Knowledge

> Hegel directs himself against the organon theory of knowledge. Those who conceive of the enterprise of the critique of knowledge as an examination of the means of knowledge start with a model of knowledge that emphasizes either the activity of the knowing subject or the receptivity of the cognitive process. Knowledge appears mediated either by an instrument with whose help we form objects or as a medium through which the light of the world enters the subject. Both versions accord in viewing knowledge as transcendentally determined by the means of possible knowledge (Habermas, op. cit., p. 10). [81]

> Unfolding the two cognitive models of the instrument and the medium brings to light a series of implicit presuppositions of a critique of knowledge that claims to be free of presuppositions. The latter must always already know more than it can know according to its own stated premises. The critique that knows knowledge to be mediated by an organon must include specific ideas both about the knowing subject and the category of correct knowledge (Habermas, op. cit., p. 12). [82]

Habermas arranges these 'specific ideas' in a telescopic sequence, where each 'idea' about knowledge shows itself to be dependent upon a deeper, and further, presupposition. The 'telescope' goes roughly like this:

(epistemological circle) ---> (organon theory of knowledge) ---> ---> Normative concept of science ---> Normative concept of the ego ---> Rigid distinction between Theoretical and Practical Reason.

a) Presupposition 1: The Normative Concept of Science

> The first presupposition with which epistemology begins is a normative concept of science. It takes a given, specific category of knowledge as prototypical knowledge. Characteristically, in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant resorts to the examples of mathematics and contemporary physics. ... It is true that Kant feels psychologically encouraged by the example of the natural scientists, who have understood that reason only comprehends what it itself produces according to its own plan, to transform metaphysics according to the same principle. But over

> and above this he depends systematically upon this example, because the critique of knowledge only seems to be free from presuppositions. In fact it must begin with a prior, undemonstrated criterion of the validity of scientific statements, which nevertheless is accepted as cogent. ... Hegel opposes this by insisting that knowledge which first presents itself as science is primarily a manifestation of knowledge (erscheinende Wissen)-- one barren assurance is just as valid as another (Habermas, op. cit., p. 13-14).[83]

b) Presupposition 2: The Normative Concept of the Ego

> ... the second presupposition with which the critique of knowledge begins also becomes problematic: namely the assumption of a complete, fixed knowing subject or, in other words a normative concept of the ego. In order that judgment be passed on the errors through which reason had become at odds with itself in its trans-empirical employment, Kant wants to institute a tribunal. He had no second thoughts about the genesis of the court. For nothing seemed more certain to him than the self-consciousness in which I am given to myself as the 'I think' that accompanies all of my representations. Even if the transcendental unity of self-consciousness can only be comprehended in the actual course of the investigation as arising from the activities of original apperception, the identity of the ego must already be taken account of at its beginning on the basis of the undoubted transcendental experience of self-reflection (Habermas, op. cit., p. 15-16).[84]

The full fixity of the Kantian conception of the ego becomes clearer when we bring out the final presupposition, upon which it depends (We shall also be discussing the Kantian and Hegelian concepts of 'ego' further on, in Section IV).

c) Presupposition 3: The Fixed Distinction Between Theoretical and Practical Reason

> The critique of pure reason assumes a different concept of the ego than does that of practical reason: the ego as the unity of self-consciousness versus the ego as free will. The separation of the critique of knowledge from a critique of rational action is considered self-evident. Yet this distinction becomes problematical if critical consciousness itself emerges only from the history of the development of consciousness. Then it is an element, even if the last one, in a self-formative process in which at every stage a new insight is confirmed in a new attitude. ... As shown by the prototypical area of experience in life history,

> the experiences from which one learns are negative. The reversal of consciousness means the dissolution of identifications, the breaking of fixations, and the destruction of projections. ... The relation described, however, secures continuity to a moral life context that is destroyed again at each new level of reflection. It makes possible a sustaining identity of the 'mind' (Geist) in the succession of abandoned identifications. This identity of the mind becomes conscious as a dialectical one. It contains within itself the distinction confidently presupposed by epistemology and cannot be defined in relation to this distinction between theoretical and practical reason (Habermas, op. cit., p. 17-19). [85]

We are now in a position to survey the Hegelian critique of Kant along general lines. What emerges from the picture sketched out by Habermas is one, basic, recurring, objection which Hegel brings to bear: Kant articulates a rigid relation between knowledge and the world; that is, he thinks of these related terms themselves, 'knowledge' and 'the world', as static factors primordially set over against each other, in a reciprocal isolation which cannot be overcome. Kant, in other words, is the philosopher of 'mere' Understanding par excellence.

Let us look at this more closely. What are the static elements in Kant's philosophy? And what is Kant's conception of dynamism? In order to answer these questions, we must try to work out the meaning which Kant gives to certain key philosophical notions; in this way, we can perhaps begin to pinpoint the source of the divergence between his view and Hegel's. The notions I have chosen as particularly characteristic are those of 'Truth', 'Judgment', 'Object of Knowledge', 'Reality', 'Thinking Self', and 'Free Will'. After briefly describing Kant's understanding of these terms, perhaps we can establish a common ground among them, a common perspective from which

they depart. By combining the content of this common perspective with the main points of Habermas' summary, we shall get a clearer idea of the focal point around which Hegel's objections to Kant revolve.

1) 'Truth': the correspondence between a given state-of-affairs and our representation of it.

> What is truth? The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object, is assumed as granted; the question asked is as to what is the general and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 97).[86]

> This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth-- enchanting name!-- surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion... (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 257)[87]

2) 'Judgment': a connective relation between subject and predicate.

> Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 105).[88]

(Kant's notion of a judgment relies heavily upon the notion of an 'object', which follows.)

3) 'Object of Knowledge': a substantial or unchanging unity to which all determinations, and alterations in determinations, necessarily belong.

> Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. Through it alone we can never determine whether this manifold, as object of experience, is coexistent or in sequence. For such determination we require an underlying ground which

exists at all times, that is, something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 213). [89]

... since it is unavoidable, owing to the conditions of the logical employment of our understanding, to separate off, as it were, that which in the existence of a substance can change while the substance still remains, and to view this variable element in relation to the truly permanent and radical, this category has to be assigned a place among the categories of relation, but rather as the condition of relations than as itself containing a relation (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 216). [90]

4) 'Reality': the givenness of something as an appearance to a cognizing subject.

Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore, the concept of which in itself points to being (in time)(Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 184). [91]

5) 'Thinking Self': the 'I am' which concentrates all diversity of experience into its unity, all chaos of the sensory manifold into its rule or regularity, all flux of appearances into its underlying stability.

Reason here represents all of these as conditions, which are themselves unconditioned, of the possibility of a thinking being. Thus the soul knows in itself--
(i) the unconditioned unity of relation, i.e. that it itself is not inherent [in something else] but self-subsistent.
(ii) the unconditioned unity of quality, that is, that it is not a real whole but simple.
(iii) the unconditioned unity in the plurality of time, i.e. that it is not numerically different at different times but one and the very same subject.
(iv) the unconditioned unity of existence in space, i.e. that it is not the consciousness of many things outside it, but the consciousness of the existence of itself only, and of other things merely as its representations. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 366) [92]

6) 'Free Will': the faculty in a rational individual which corresponds to his capacity for self-determination-- his capacity, that is, to cause a given course of events to

occur, in accordance with his recognition of a rational exigency that those events be brought about.

> The intelligible world is only a negative thought with respect to the world of sense, which does not give reason any laws for determining the will. It is positive only in the single point that freedom as negative determination is at the same time connected with a positive faculty and even a causality of reason. This causality we call a will to act so that the principle of actions will accord with the essential characteristics of a rational cause, i.e., with the condition of the universal validity of a maxim as a law (Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 77-78). [93]

What is the structure common to all of these definitions? What is the single perspective through which Kant informs each of these terms? A.N. Whitehead, aligning Kant with the so--called 'subjectivist principle', offers the following observation:

> The subjectivist principle follows from three premises: (i) The acceptance of the 'substance-quality' concept as expressing the ultimate ontological principle. (ii) The acceptance of Aristotle's definition of a primary substance, as always a subject and never a predicate. (iii) The assumption that the experient subject is a primary substance. The first premise states that the final metaphysical fact is always to be expressed as a quality inhering in a substance. The second premise divides qualities and primary substances into two mutually exclusive classes. The two premises together are the foundation of the traditional distinction between universals and particulars (A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 183). [94]

What begins to take shape here is a basic schema according to which all areas of the Kantian philosophy are arranged. This is the metaphysical schema of substance and attribute, where unity and permanence fall to the former, and multifarious alteration falls to the latter.

> All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists. In all appearances the permanent

> is the object itself, that is, substance as phenomenon; everything, on the other hand, which changes or can change belongs only to the way in which substance or substances exist, and therefore to their determinations (Kant, 'Critique of Pure Reason, p. 214).[95]

Kant's fundamental acceptance of this Aristotelian substance/attribute schema makes itself clearly manifest in all of the major issues he discusses, except one: the distinction between noumena and phenomena. As regards this latter distinction, we cannot rigorously say that the noumenal world is considered by Kant the unchanging substrate of all phenomenal show. My principal objective in the section immediately following, however, will be to show how this distinction too, like all the others made by Kant, ultimately rests upon the same substance/attribute schema.

For now, let me try to bring out a little more clearly the way in which this basic metaphysical schema in-forms the Kantian world-picture. We can begin with the two notions, 'Judgment' and 'Object of Knowledge'. Here, a 'thing' is immediately taken as a unified substrate in which certain characteristics inhere; correspondingly, a sentence or judgment is, in its subject, a reference to the intended substrate, and, in its predicate, a reference to some specific determination within the superstrate of characteristics. Then, 'Truth' is regarded as an accuracy in our 'judgment': either we correctly assign the appropriate characteristic to the substrate in which it actually does inhere, or we fail to do so. The 'Thinking Self' is similar in form to the unity and permanence of substances: however, it is also much more. It is the active center within

whose stability substances and their characteristics stand related for us in one cognition. Kant regards the unity of apperception as logically and operationally prior to the unity of substances:

> Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relations of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 156).[96]

This priority-relation, however, though controversial, is not particularly relevant to the present discussion; what is relevant is the fact that 'judgment' and 'knowledge' share the same formal schema. Thus, even accepting Kant's claim as to the order of priority in 'knowledge' and 'judgment', we are still left with the following meta-relation: a cognizing subject as unity of apperception stands in relation to his object, which is, in turn, a relation between a unity of substrate and its connected superstrate of characteristics. It looks something like this:



Relation 'A' in this diagram corresponds to 'knowledge', relation 'B' corresponds to 'judgment', and the whole ensemble is experience. The notion of 'reality' fits in with that of experience-- for it means that an act of knowledge is not just fancied, but corresponds to an input from the senses. Finally, the term 'Free Will' is given a place in the system, when the activity of the 'I' reverses, from the receptivity to and logical construction of a coherent phenomenal world, to the causal determination of events <u>within</u> that world, through the link of the phenomenal body. Thus, we have arrived at the end-point of Habermas' telescopic sequence: theory and practice are the two directions in which the unchanging radical unity of the 'I' may relate itself to the world. This 'I' either constructs the phenomenal framework (a vast network of relations between substance/attribute objects), or operates within that framework, an intelligent and focalized 'prime mover'. The normative concept of the ego lies implicit in this picture; the normative concept of science pertains to the relation between man--the-theorizer on the one hand, and, on the other, the phenomenal framework which he constantly builds up and adjusts. All of what has thus far been said sums up in a sketch the organon theory of knowledge and a few of its ramifications. The organon is "as it were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of sense and reduces it to unity."[97] What we should notice here is how a whole set of concept-pairs arises, and constitutes the following parallellism:

a)	unity	a)	multifariousness
b)	permanence	b)	flux
c)	substance	c)	attribute
d)	subject	d)	predicate
e)	cognizing subject	e)	object of cognition
f)	acting self	f)	phenomenal world

Although these pairs obviously represent very different relations, nevertheless, we can find certain properties common to all of them. On the first side, there recurs stability of focalized form, and on the second side, variety or alteration among mutually distinct elements. Even in the most seemingly incongruous pair of parallellism, 'acting self' and 'phenomenal world', what we have at root is a picture of higher order or unity being introduced into a realm of variegated objects which were previously indifferent to this new order: practical reason arranging phenomenal objects according to its higher design. Kant himself frequently makes use of the above parallellism in framing his arguments, showing how one of the pairs is intrinsically connected with others:

> If I leave out permanence (which is existence in all time), nothing remains in the concept of substance save only the logical representation of a subject-- a representation which I endeavor to realize by representing to myself something which can exist only as subject and never as predicate (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 261-2). [98]

> Permanence is thus a necessary condition under which alone appearances are determinable as things or objects in a possible experience (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 217). [99]

Perhaps it is acceptable, then, to characterize the Kantian philosophy in a preliminary fashion as being permeated throughout by the schema expressed in the Aristotelian substance/attribute

relation. If this is indeed so, then we have a tentative answer to our two previous questions, "What constitutes staticity, and what constitutes dynamism, in Kant's view?" The answer is that dynamism is related to the static, as flux-among-attributes is related to the unity and permanence of substance.

> The correct understanding of the concept of alteration is also grounded upon recognition of this permanence. Coming to be and ceasing to be are not alterations of that which comes to be or ceases to be. Alteration is a way of existing which follows upon another way of existing of the same object. All that alters persists, and only its state changes. Since this change thus concerns only the determinations, which can cease to be or begin to be, we can say, using what may seem a somewhat paradoxical expression, that only the permanent (substance) is altered, and that the transitory suffers no alteration but only a change, inasmuch as certain determinations cease to be and others begin to be (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 216-17). [100]

We shall see how Hegel criticizes this picture, in the second section following.

There remains, however, one issue to touch upon: the epistemological circle. Kant apparently did not realize that he was "refusing to enter the water until he had learnt to swim." This criticism which Hegel brought out against Kant seems extremely damaging to the Critical endeavor-- at least, as Kant understood it. But doesn't it, by the same token, undermine Hegel's own chances of 'reaching the Absolute'? Doesn't the apparent impossibility of successful radical doubt also throw into question any faith we might have in human access to an 'Absolute Knowledge'? Hegel's answer might have gone like this: "There is no such thing as radical doubt-- there is no 'right' method for eliminating subjectivity. Any attempt to do so would be self-defeating-- not, however, because such an enterprise

is impossible from the start, but because we need subjectivity in order to 'reach' the Absolute. Subjectivity and doubt and error constitute one necessary 'moment' in the eternal progression of Spirit-- this 'moment' is never eliminated, but only survived again and again. Subjectivity and doubt, which are pure negativity and openness-to-the-other, bring to the Absolute its fundamental characteristic of self-renewal."

How does this relate to our metaphysics/epistemology impasse? 'Epistemology'has been weakened by our discovery of a basic vicious circle in its logic. This should prompt 'metaphysics' to question the whole framework within which 'epistemology' was operating. And this, in fact, is what Hegel (representing 'metaphysics') did: having perceived the arbitrary and self-contradictory elements in the Kantian 'epistemological' structure, he sought a new framework in which to base his reflection. He found it necessary to abandon the Aristotelian substance/attribute schema: in the next sections, I will try to show why this was so, and how he worked up an alternative approach.

Section III: Substance and Attribute

In the preceding section, I gave a preliminary description of the general role which the substance/attribute metaphysical schema plays in the Kantian philosophy. I would now like to scrutinize this role more closely, trying to bring out the explicit correlation between a substance/attribute metaphysics and a phenomenon/noumenon epistemology, for Kant. Once we clearly understand what this correlation means, it will be much easier to see where Hegel's criticism of Kant is principally directed, and why Hegel's alternative line of thought is necessarily 'extravagant'.

I shall begin this discussion, however, not with Kant, but with Plato. By roughly sketching out certain thorny problems that Plato ran across, I think we can better understand the position which Kant was attempting 'critically' to consolidate. At a still further level, of course, the comparison between Plato and Kant, and the establishment of a common ground between them, will serve to clarify the sort of position which Hegel explicitly criticized, and strove to surpass.

The main points of the upcoming discussion can be summarized as follows:

1) Kant and Plato have in common an 'organon'-theory of knowledge, based upon the notion of mediation between an 'I' and a 'not- I' standing over against each other.

2) For Plato, the acquisition of Absolute knowledge requires an ambiguous supersession of the mediation between 'I' and 'not- I' through which common knowledge occurs.

3) For Kant, a supersession of the mediation between 'I' and 'not-I' is inconceivable by us, and impossible for us; because such a supersession is impossible for two basic reasons, Absolute knowledge is inaccessible to us in two distinct ways.

Plato

For Plato, the ascension into the Absolute involves a progressive self-critical purging of our knowledge, so that we use ever-clearer representations, and discover ever more independent principles.

> Understand, then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas (Plato, Republic VI 511b-c).[101]

Once we reach the 'starting point of all', however, how do we know it-- what distinguishes our knowledge of the Good from our lesser cognitions? In the Symposium, Plato gives the following description:

> Nor will his vision of the beautiful take the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that is of the flesh. It will be neither words, nor knowledge, nor a something that exists in something else, such as a living creature, or the earth, or the heavens, or anything that is-- but subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes of it in such sort that, however much the parts may wax and wane, it will be neither more nor less, but still the same inviolable whole (Plato, Symposium 211a-b).[102]

In this passage, Plato describes the vision of a man who has brought himself to the point of gazing 'on beauty's very self.' It is not clear from the text whether Plato is regarding what he here calls 'the beautiful' as identical with what he elsewhere calls 'the Good', 'the One', 'the perfectly Real', and so on. However, whether the beautiful is identical with the Good and Real, or is only a lesser 'form' subsisting on its own (though this latter is hardly a plausible interpretation in light of the quoted description), still, in either case, 'knowledge' of it requires an ambiguous break-down of the mediation typical of lower forms of cognition. Although Plato does use the metaphor of vision, which implies a clearcut distinction between 'seer' and 'seen object', and a mediation between these two in the act of perception-- nevertheless, he immediately contradicts this metaphor by stating that the vision of the beautiful will not take the form of words, or knowledge, or a 'something that exists in something else'. These, and many of his other references to the highest form of knowledge, reveal a need which Plato apparently felt, to regard that knowledge as somehow immediate, or more direct:

> ... when ... the universal beauty dawns upon his inward sight, he is almost within reach of the final revelation (Plato, Symposium 211b).[103]

> And remember, she said, that it is only when he discerns beauty itself through what makes it visible that a man will be quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue-- for it is virtue's self that quickens him, not virtue's semblance. And when he has brought forth and reared this perfect virtue, he shall be called the friend of god, and if it ever is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be given to him (Plato, Symposium 212a).[104]

In this last passage, the words, "through what makes it visible" perhaps refer in an oblique manner to a new medium in which knowledge may occur more directly; and the verbs, "brought forth and reared", are surprisingly intimate choices, for a philosopher who has relied, up to this point, upon the 'distancing' metaphor of sight alone. Then, in the Republic, we are offered yet another metaphorical angle:

> But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this (Plato, Republic VII 517b-c).[105]

Here, we have once again returned to the metaphor of vision; but now, Plato describes an unconventional sort of vision, which contemplates, not illuminated objects, but the 'author of light' itself.

Why should it repeatedly seem necessary to Plato, in his descriptions of Absolute knowledge, to push vision beyond its normal nature? We find the answer to this question brought out clearly in the Sophist:

> STRANGER: I see what you mean. They would have to say this. If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must be acted upon by it, and so, on this showing, reality when it is being known by the act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be changed owing to being so acted upon-- and that, we say, cannot happen to the changeless.
>
> THEAETETUS: Exactly.
>
> STRANGER: But tell me, in heaven's name, are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul,

> understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real-- that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence? (Plato, Sophist 248d-249a) [106]

Implicit in these statements, there lies the following picture: I am one thing, over here; the 'perfectly real' is another thing, over there; and my knowledge is a third thing, somehow connecting the first two. This picture involves at least two serious problems, which Plato clearly recognized, and which probably motivated his ambiguous treatment of vision, the metaphor for cognitive mediation. These two problems are:

a) first; that the 'perfectly real' is portrayed as something originally 'aloof', or indifferent to the existence of knowers and knowledge; and,

b) second; that, if I try to know the 'perfectly real' while nevertheless thinking of it as an object 'over there', I can never be sure that my knowing it hasn't had a distorting effect, causing me to mistake an altered version of the real for its 'true self'.

The only way for Plato to deal with these problems is to fall back upon a metaphor when it comes to describing cognition of the 'perfectly real'-- and, through the metaphor, to introduce ambiguities which allow the problems to be sidestepped. What is manifesting itself here is the uneasiness of a philosopher who is trying to reconcile a rudimentary mediation-theory of knowledge, based upon a fixed distinction between knower and known, with a doctrine of the accessibility of the Absolute. The straightforwardness of Kant's position, on the other hand,

lies precisely in his unequivocal perception of the fact that such a reconciliation is impossible to carry out. Let us see how his thought compares with, and clarifies, the position taken by Plato.

Kant

Kant's philosophy bases itself largely upon one initial notion, that of the 'focalized' nature of all knowledge. Hegel describes this Kantian notion as follows:

> Now in the 'Ego' there are a variety of contents, derived both from within and from without, and according to the nature of these contents our state may be described as perception, or conception, or reminiscence. But in all of them the 'I' is found: or in them all thought is present. Man, therefore, is always thinking, even in his perceptions: if he observes anything, he always observes it as a universal, fixes on a single point which he places in relief, thus withdrawing his attention from other points, and takes it as abstract and universal, even if the universality be only in form (Logic, p. 38).[107]

The main point here is that, because our knowledge involves a selection of certain specific elements at the expense of others which are discarded as irrelevant, we stand in an essentially focalized relation to the world-- even to that portion of the world to which we already have access. In other words, a second aspect of our removal from the Absolute begins to display itself in Kant's philosophy: not only is the Absolutely Real inaccessible to us because our knowledge involves a mediation between us and the world as it is in itself, but, furthermore, the Absolutely Real is inaccessible to us because of the way in which that mediation necessarily occurs (for us). Even if we had direct access to things-in-themselves (which is hard to imagine), we would still only be able to grasp them one at a

time, distinguishing one from the other, establishing this or that hierarchy of relevance among them-- in sum, we could only have access to Reality bit by bit, and never all at once. On the one hand, we could never travel far enough and fast enough to experience all Reality; on the other hand, and much more fundamentally, we could not grasp the manifold of facts, events, and objects open to our experiencing, without subsuming them under an act of unification which would be, ultimately, equivalent to a representation <u>of</u> them. We would then have lost them as they were in their initial multifariousness, and substituted for that primordial state a secondary unity which <u>we</u> have imposed. In this 'focalizing' requirement lies the key to the notion of our knowledge as intrinsically an act of mediation: even if the objects of our experience were accessible to us as they are in themselves, we would inevitably, through the very nature of our understanding, find ourselves substituting the unity of a representation <u>of</u> them, for their original, and literal, variety. This act of representation would of course be <u>ours</u>; it is a 'singling out' by us of the salient facets in our 'raw' experience, for the purpose of mental classification; without this classification, our experience could have none of the characteristics which we know it does in fact have-- such as division according to types, organization of isolated elements into complex structures which are nevertheless unified, and so on.

> Now to assert in this manner, that all these appearances, and consequently all objects with which we can occupy

> ourselves, are one and all in me, that is, are determinations of my identical self, is only another way of saying that there must be a complete unity of them in one and the same apperception. But this unity of possible consciousness also constitutes the form of all knowledge of objects; through it the manifold is thought as belonging to a single object (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 149-150).[108]

As an example of this 'focalized' nature of human knowledge, we can take the hypothetical instance of a person who is able to know things-in-themselves, walking up to a modern city for the first time. Let us further suppose that buildings, buses, persons, signs, and T.V. antennas, are things-in-themselves-- entities, that is, which exist as such independently of our cognizing them, and which are given as such directly into the 'intuitive understanding' of our tourist. Then, as this unusual fellow approaches the city, he will directly perceive buildings, buses, persons, signs, and T.V. antennas, as they are in themselves-- but could he, if his faculty of knowledge were not 'focalized', perceive a city? I don't think so-- it would be impossible for this person to grasp how all these single objects stood related to one another, without his adding a higher unity to them from the functioning of his own mind; but this, by our assumption, is not an option. The message here is that we humans are constantly assembling and re-assembling the manifold of 'raw' experience into novel unified forms-- this would be impossible if we did not have a single focus or perspective, from which to hold together these various disparate elements in one consciousness, thereby constituting a new 'object' out of all the isolated'things', or subsuming all these 'things'

under a single concept. Most importantly, this unification is the result of our action upon the manifold-- and, since it is we who contribute the unity, we cannot impute it to the disparate things as they were in themselves.

We are thus in a position more fully to appreciate the sophistication of Kant's key philosophical notions. His 'subjective idealism' follows coherently from his conception of what knowledge itself most basically is, namely, the unification of a manifold.

> If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 130). [109]

We start with the following basic requirement: when given any manifold, at any level of complexity, we humans are obliged to introduce a still higher unity into that manifold in order to experience it. The manifold reaches our receptive faculties in a state of primordial multifariousness; in order to know it, we have to alter that manifold by grouping it together. This conclusion, that the action upon the manifold is ours, and alters it, holds at any level of complexity-- be the given manifold of things-in-themselves a chaos of sense-data, a chaos of simple unified objects like circles or trees, or a chaos of complex unified objects like economical principles or social strata or cities. No matter which complexity-level of these manifold and variegated entities we assume to be the 'given' things-in-themselves, our knowing them requires a higher synthesis of them, and hence a mediation between their original

state of isolation from each other, and the final, unified state in which we come to know them as related to each other-- as compared, sorted, connected, or intentionally discarded. In this sense, the 'original' state-- as it is in itself-- is forever inaccessible to us.

If we work out the implications of this position, we find that it involves two distinct senses in which the 'Absolutely Real' is inaccessible to us. The first sense is the one just described, above: our necessary unification of the given manifold, whatever this manifold may be, places us at one constant remove from its originary nature. The second sense in which the 'Absolutely Real' is inaccessible to us, then, arises as an indirect consequence of this necessary unification: because the unification is <u>ours,</u> it is provisional. In other words, all our acts of unification of manifolds (i.e.,acts of knowledge) are subject to revision-- they are never final or definitive. Since it is I who, through judgment, bring unity into the given manifold, this unity cannot be thought of as a characteristic intrinsic to that manifold. The unity of my objects of knowledge, then, is only as stable and dependable as my faculty of judgment. Although, for Kant, this faculty <u>is</u> capable of great rigor and constancy, nevertheless, we cannot ever regard any of our cognitions as 'the final word'.

In sum: the inaccessibility of the 'Absolutely Real' has, for Kant, these two aspects:

a) inaccessibility of <u>originary</u> data; and

b) impossibility of a definitive act of knowledge.

These two limitations are the results of the particular manner in which Kant understood 'focalized' knowledge: 'focalized' knowledge meant, for Kant, the subsumption of what is variegated and changing under a single designation. How difficult is it for us to make a connection between this definition of 'focalized' knowledge, and the standard conception of the relation obtaining between attributes and a substance? To answer this, let's try to see how Kant himself goes about making this connection.

> The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 136-7).[110]

In this statement, Kant is once again establishing a parallel relation between, on the one hand, the cognitive function of judgment, whereby an object is constituted as the manifold subsumed under one rule; and, on the other hand, the cognitive function in general, whereby the newly constituted object is placed into relation with the 'I', or unity of apperception. What we confront here, in other words, is a close parallellism between the unity of a logical subject (of a judgment) and the unity of apperception (of a cognition).

> Thus we think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can always be represented. This unity of rule determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of

> apperception possible. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object = X, which I think through the predicates, above mentioned, of a triangle (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 135). [111]

> For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 136). [112]

Once again, as in the preceding section, Kant's order of priority between logical subject and cognizing subject, in determining the unity of consciousness, is unclear. Perhaps all that we really need to say is something like this: an act of knowledge is clearly not the same thing as a proposition-- cognizing subject and logical subject are two different things. However, they are both extensions of one and the same schema, namely, that of substance and attributes.

If this is true, then what we have before us are three general relations of the same formal structure-- substance and attributes, subject and predicates, cognizing subject and cognized objects. Their common structure is their 'focalizing' action; the unity of the 'point of focus' in each case represents a stable substrate or receptacle or medium in which many subordinate determinations can coherently inhere or fluctuate. This general structure was briefly described in the preceding section; the purpose of the present section has been to make clear how the application of the 'focalizing' relation between cognizing subject and cognized objects led, for Kant, into epistemological dualism.

Now, if we try to compare the 'focalizing' relation, as

it is understood by Plato on the one hand and by Kant on the other, we run into certain 'translation-problems'. For Plato, it is the 'Form' or 'Idea' which is unified and unchanging, and the phenomenal objects which are multifarious and transitory; this seems to reverse the typical roles I have so far assigned to 'substance' and 'attributes'. Perhaps, this translation-problem can be surmounted, however, by providing a sufficiently general statement of the 'focalizing' relation, with a built-in ambiguity, as follows:

> Some things in our experience are unified and permanent. Other things are mere <u>modes of</u> the unified and permanent things; these modes are, specifically, 'attributes' for Aristotle and Kant-- they are, more generally, multifarious and fleeting determinations, for Plato as well as for Aristotle and Kant. (In these sentences, I am playing upon the ambiguity of the words, 'mode' and 'determination': in the Kantian/Aristotelian context, they should be interpreted as meaning 'attribute'; in the Platonic context, as meaning 'instantiation'.)

What can we conclude from this generalized rendition of the 'focalizing' relation? I think we can say that, for all the differences between them, the philosophies of Kant and of Plato have one important common characteristic: the 'focalizing' separation of unity-and-permanence from multifariousness-and--flux.

> But if the opposites, static and fluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverse actualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and

> the things which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation. Such philosophies must include the notion of 'illusion' as a fundamental principle-- the notion of mere appearance. This is the final platonic problem (A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 408-9). 113

Whitehead is apparently referring in this passage to the correlation between a 'focalizing' knowledge on the one hand, and the resulting problems of inaccessible originary data and impossible definitive cognition, on the other. I think these latter problems were quite relevant for Plato; it is almost superfluous to say that they quite relevant for Kant.

There seem to be at least three ways of dealing with the conception of a 'focalizing' knowledge and its correlated problems:

1) The first way is Plato's: we discover that 'focalization' cleaves the world into 'Reality' and 'mere appearance'. Therefore, the ascension out of the latter, into the former, involves at its final stage a breakdown in, or extreme radicalization of, 'focalization'. In the Absolute cognition, all Reality is definitively present: there is only the "same inviolable whole," "subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness." In the Absolute cognition, all Reality is immediately present: nothing can be present that "exists in something else." (See note #114, concerning 'breakdown' and 'extreme radicalization')

2) The second way is Kant's: we discover that 'focalization' cleaves the world into 'Reality' and 'mere appearance'. Convinced that this cleavage is final, we strive to ennoble our

'mere appearance' as much as possible, and inhabit it with Stoic good humor:

> And so we do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; yet we do comprehend its incomprehensibility, which is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which in its principles strives to reach the limit of human reason (Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 83). [115]

3) The third way is Hegel's: we discover that 'focalization' cleaves the world into 'Reality' and 'mere appearance'. Having perceived, with Kant, that 'focalization' is crucial to knowledge, we reject the Platonic conception of the Absolute as a definitive and immediate presence. Simultaneously, however, we reject the Kantian conception of 'Reality' and 'mere appearance' as two self-subsistent realms standing rigidly over against each other. Instead, we switch over to a new conception of 'focalization' as a continuing process, rather than regarding it as a static relation. This compels us to give a new account of the notion of Becoming-- all the 'polar opposites' which we previously held apart must then somehow be integrated.

In the following section, I shall discuss this Hegelian approach at greater length.

Section IV: Infinity

> What has been said can be expressed in a formal manner by saying that the nature of judgment or the proposition in general, which involves the distinction of subject and predicate, is subverted and destroyed by the speculative judgment; and the identical proposition, which the former becomes [by uniting subject and predicate], implies the rejection and repudiation of the above relation between subject and predicate (Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 120; Baillie's brackets). [116]

* * * * *

In the present section, I would like to synthesize the main points about Hegel which have been brought out in the course of this thesis as a whole. Hopefully, as this synthesis progresses, certain important questions which I have left behind me unanswered will be broached; perhaps I can give some indication of what a plausible line of response to those questions would entail.

Let us begin our discussion with the fundamental schema for a Hegelian process: infinity. In Chapter 1, I described Hegelian processes as being 'self-determining' or'autonomous'; now, we can see how that meaning applies to the Hegelian notion of infinity.

> If we let somewhat and another, the elements of determinate being, fall asunder, the result is that some becomes other, and this other is itself a somewhat, which then as such changes likewise, and so on ad infinitum. This result seems to superficial reflection something very grand, the grandest possible. But such a progression to infinity is not the real infinite. That consists in being at home with itself in its other, or, if enunciated as a process, in coming to itself in its other (Logic, p. 137).[117]

Hegel generally distinguishes between a 'good' and a 'bad' infinity. It is all too easy to understand what the latter represents-- imagine a certain act being repeated without cease, or a certain kind of determination occurring again and again, either through space or through time, and you have got the 'bad' infinity in its essence. The 'good' infinity has a much more problematic definition-- when taken as static, it means something like "presence of something which is 'other', but which is simultaneously understood as being only illusorily so;" when taken as a process, the 'good' infinity refers to "something

which remains self-identical even when it has become other than what it is." This will obviously require further explication.

We can begin by returning for a moment to the notion of limitation, of determination pure and simple.

> If we take a closer look at what a limit implies, we see it involving a contradiction in itself, and thus evincing its dialectical nature. On the one side the limit makes the reality of a thing; on the other it is negation. But, again, the limit, as the negation of something, is not an abstract nothing but a nothing which <u>is</u>-- what we call an 'other'. Given something, and up starts an other to us: we know that there is not something only, but an other as well. Nor, again, is the other of such a nature that we can think something apart from it; a something is implicitly the other of itself, and the somewhat sees its limit become objective to it in the other (<u>Logic</u>, p. 136).[118]

What is expressed here is the simple notion, already touched upon in Ch. 1, Sec. II, that the establishment of a boundary works two ways, simultaneously determining both an enclosed 'this' and an excluded 'other'. The 'other' is implicitly present whenever we bring up 'this'. With this clearly in mind, we can proceed to an analysis of the long description of infinity which Hegel provides in the section on 'Understanding' of the <u>Phenomenology</u>.

> This bare and simple infinity, or the absolute notion, may be called the ultimate nature of life, the soul of the world, the universal life-blood, which courses everywhere, and whose flow is neither disturbed nor checked by any obstructing distinction, but is itself every distinction that arises, as well as that into which all distinctions are dissolved; pulsating within itself, but ever motionless, shaken to its depths, but still at rest. It is self-identical, for the distinctions are tautological; they are distinctions that are none. This self-identical reality stands, therefore, in relation solely to itself (p. 208).[119]

In these last words, "solely to itself", we have constituted a determinate 'this'. According to what was just said above,

therefore, this 'this' must have established itself in contra-distinction to an 'other'.

> To itself; which means this is an other, to which the relation points; and relation to itself is, more strictly, breaking asunder; in other words, that very self-identity is internal distinction. These sundered factors have, hence, each a separate being of their own; each is an opposite-- of an other; and thus with each the other is therein ipso facto expressly given... (Phenomenology, p. 208)[120]

The idea here seems to be something like this: suppose you determine a certain structure-- say, a circle. Immediately, you have also determined the 'other' of this circle, the 'not-circle'. Now, take this 'not- circle': immediately, you have determined its 'other', the circle. Vaguely described, what we are doing is moving back and forth over the boundary we have determined.

> ...and thus with each the other is therein ipso facto expressly given; or it is not the opposite of an other, but only the pure opposite; and thus each is, therefore, in itself the opposite of itself. Or, again, each is not an opposite at all, but exists purely for itself, a pure self-identical reality, with no distinction in it (Phenomenology, p. 208).[121]

To understand this passage, we have to recall our implicit/explicit distinction (Ch. 1, Sec. III). The circle is explicitly itself, a circle, and simultaneously implicitly its other, the 'not- circle'. Of course, the converse holds from the frame-of-reference of the 'not- circle'. If, like Hegel, we take the transition from implicit to explicit determination as two 'moments' in one identity, like acorn and oak, then the higher identity which constitutes 'good' infinity will become clearer. 'Circle' and 'not- circle' together constitute "a pure self-identical reality, with no distinction in it." But let us follow

Hegel's description a little further.

> The unity which people usually have in mind when they say distinction cannot come out of unity, is, in point of fact, itself merely one moment of the process of disruption; it is the abstraction of simplicity, which stands in contrast with distinction (Phenomenology, p. 209). [122]

This 'abstraction of simplicity' means, in the context of our example, the circle taken as existing on its own, as if it did not intrinsically, by being a circle, determine an 'other' from which and by which it is distinguished:

> But in that it is abstraction, is merely one of the two opposed elements, the statement thus already implies that the unity is the process of breaking asunder; for if the unity is a negative element, an opposite, then it is put forward precisely as that which contains opposition within it(Phenomenology, p. 209). [123]

At this point, however, we run across a more difficult part of Hegel's description:

> The different aspects of diremption and of becoming self-identical are therefore likewise merely this process of self-cancelling. For since the self-identical element, which should first divide itself asunder or pass into its opposite, is an abstraction, i.e., is already itself a sundered element, its diremption is eo ipso a cancelling of what it is, and thus the cancelling of its being sundered. The process of becoming self-identical is likewise a process of diremption; what becomes identical with itself thereby opposes itself to disruption, that is, itself thereby puts itself on one side; in other words, it becomes really something sundered (Phenomenology, p. 209). [124]

Here, I think, the key to understanding Hegel's account lies in carefully distinguishing beforehand between the isolated identity of a 'moment' in a process on the one hand, and, on the other, the over-arching identity of the process as a whole. In this way we can see how 'the diremption of the self-identical element, which is an abstraction and hence already sundered,

cancels the fact of its being sundered.' One's first reaction to this statement is: "How can the diremption of something already sundered yield unity? Either Hegel is playing with word-associations (viz., diremption = cancelling), or he means something more by 'unity' than I am accustomed to." This latter alternative is, of course, the fruitful one: the diremption of the (already sundered) self-identical element yields the higher unity of 'good' infinity-- the identity of the process of 'transition-into-the-other'. In other words, the diremption of the self-identical element constitutes its necessary 'transition-into-the-other,' thereby cancelling its lower-order identity as mere self-relation (i.e. the lower-order identity which is like the circle taken in isolation from its 'other'); however, it is precisely this breakdown of lower-order identities which constitutes the higher identity of the whole process. In this way, the diremption of the already sundered element does yield unity-- but not the unity which is "abstraction of simplicity... <u>in contrast with</u> distinction." Rather, it yields <u>infinite</u> unity.

> What we now in point of fact have before us, is that somewhat comes to be another, and that the other generally comes to be an other. Thus essentially relative to another, somewhat is virtually an other against it: and since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the other, is the genuine Infinity (<u>Logic</u>, p. 139).[125]

Hopefully, this highly 'intangible' account of Hegelian infinity will find further exemplification as our discussion continues. For the moment, I shall only try to clarify it a little

more, by briefly scrutinizing a passage in J.N. Findlay's Hegel: A Re-Examination.

> True Infinity is, in short, simply finitude essentially associated with free variability. A mathematical or logical formula is 'infinite' in the Hegelian sense since it admits of an indefinite number of valid substitutions. I, the subject, am likewise truly infinite, since I can, without prejudice to my identity, imagine myself in anyone and everyone's shoes, and conceive myself as having any and every sort of experience (J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 164).[126]

I am not sure I agree with Prof. Findlay's description of Hegelian infinity. For a mathematical or logical formula is not infinite, in the sense Hegel seems to intend, simply because "it admits of an indefinite number of valid substitutions." To remain self-same, while undergoing merely superficial substitutions which do not in any way supersede the original determinateness, is to retain "abstraction of simplicity" while never really confronting the genuine diremption into radical 'otherness'. A mere 'substitution' is not an 'opposite'-- but it is precisely opposition which Hegel requires of the infinite. This becomes even clearer when we look at Findlay's second example of infinity, namely, the fact that "I can, without prejudice to my identity, imagine myself in anyone and everyone's shoes..." Isn't it Hegel's main point that the impinging of 'otherness' must not just be "imaginary", but radically and terrifyingly real?

> But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder (Phenomenology, p. 93).[127]

> If it has endured not absolute fear, but merely some slight anxiety, the negative reality has remained external

> to it, its substance has not been through and through infected thereby. Since the entire content of its natural consciousness has not tottered and shaken, it is still inherently a determinate mode of being; having a 'mind of its own' (der eigene Sinn) is simply stubbornness (Eigensinn), a type of freedom which does not get beyond the attitude of bondage (Phenomenology, p. 240). [128]

In other words, it is only when my present identity actually undergoes total "prejudice," by being destroyed, that negation has in fact occurred. The point here, of course, is that this negation is determinate negation, and carries a positive content: what I was has been destroyed; meanwhile, the true 'I' is becoming. In other words, it is only by shifting to the schema of a process that we can really make sense of Hegelian infinity: the higher self-sameness of a 'becoming'-entity, obtaining through the successive breakdown of 'momentary' identities, allows us to speak coherently of unity-in-difference.

The first question we might want to ask with regard to these Hegelian 'becoming'-entities, is, "How do we identify them, and distinguish them from one another?" We can begin to answer this in a negative way, by explicitly denying any equivalence between the Hegelian 'becoming'-entity and the 'space-time worm' of Twentieth Century metaphysics. A 'space-time worm', I think, is ultimately the same thing as a normal substance-with-attributes, represented all at once from the moment of its coming into being to the moment of its destruction. For such a 'worm', taken as a whole, there can be no alteration (all alteration is already part of the 'worm' itself, determining its shape and characteristics at any given 'time slice'); rather, it can only undergo existence-changes: from time t_α to t_β the 'worm' exists;

at time t_7 , the 'worm' does not exist. This characteristic of 'space-time worms' reveals their basic dependency upon the substance/attribute framework; the "worm's" length is determined by the duration of a specific substance's existence. 'Worms', in other words, are in an important sense nothing but notational extensions of the criteria for identity and distinctness of a common substance-with-attributes. The basic principle of Hegelian infinity, however, runs in precisely the opposite direction. A Hegelian process can only undergo alterations, but not existence-changes.

> The notion is not something which is originated at all. No doubt the notion is not mere Being, or the immediate; it involves mediation, but the mediation lies in itself. In other words, the notion is what is mediated through itself and with itself (Logic, p. 228). [129]

Thus, we will not be finding the framework for identity and distinctness criteria of substances-with-attributes or 'space-time worms' very useful in dealing with Hegelian processes. This could plausibly be regarded as a point against Hegel; it remains to be clarified what sort of alternative framework he offers us.

* * * * *

> The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistake and has never succeeded in any of its applications. But it has had one success: it has entrenched itself in language, in Aristotelian logic, and in metaphysics. For its employment in language and in logic, there is ... a sound pragmatic defense. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error. This error does not consist in the employment of the word 'substance'; but in the employment of the notion of an actual entity which is character-

> ized by essential qualities, and remains numerically one amidst the changes of accidental relations and of accidental qualities. The contrary doctrine is that an actual entity never changes, and that it is the outcome of whatever can be ascribed to it in the way of quality or relationship. There then remain two alternatives for philosophy: (i) a monistic universe with the illusion of change; and (ii) a pluralistic universe in which 'change' means the diversities among the actual entities which belong to some one society of a definite type (A.N.Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 96).[130]

In this quotation, Whitehead delineates two alternatives for philosophy, which remain after one has rejected the substance/attribute framework for the structuring of entities in general. The second alternative (ii) is Whitehead's; I think the first alternative was mentioned with reference to Hegel. I am not in a position to discuss alternative '(ii)'-- but, as regards alternative '(i)', much can be said. To what extent is Hegel's system a description of 'a monistic universe with the illusion of change'? The answer to this question lies implicit in the following passage from the Logic:

> This is the illusion under which we live. It alone supplies at the same time the actualizing force on which the interest in the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result (p. 274).[131]

In these statements of Hegel's, we encounter an ambiguous notion of illusion, error, or 'other-being'-- they are both eternally necessary, and something perpetually to be superseded. We can understand this better if we call to mind the analogy of a man

walking along a path of stepping stones-- there is always the need for a 'next' stepping stone, if any forward progress is to be made; yet, for the same reason, that 'next' stepping stone must in all cases be surpassed. Of course, this analogy would be considered incomplete by Hegel-- for the 'path', the 'stepping stones', and the 'walker' are, according to Hegel, ultimately one and the same entity. Perhaps, we get closer to Hegel's meaning if, as in the contemplation of a pointilliste painting, we seek to grasp each separate element as part of a higher-order scenario. By themselves, the individual elements carry no meaning; taken all together, at once, they make sense. In the present case, these words, 'taken all together, at once', require interpretation as meaning 'one process': for the separate elements in the unified scenario of Spirit are logical or physical 'moments'. In one sense, there is only one entity all along: the process; from another angle, the process is of such a kind as continually to push beyond what it is.

This brings us closer to an evaluation of Whitehead's description, 'monistic universe with the illusion of change.' Gradually, we see that it is impossible to settle upon one side in any either - or conclusion: Hegel's universe both is and is not monistic; the occurrence of radical change in this universe both is and is not illusory. We are unfair to Hegel if we try to fit him exclusively into one side or the other of these conjoined alternatives. But now the question is: How much sense can we make of the resulting paradox?

This last question seems to constitute the crux of Jürgen Habermas' criticism of Hegel in the first chapter of Knowledge and Human Interests (see Section II); a brief look at Habermas' essential position will hence be useful in the present context.

> By urging itself on to its true existence [in the course of phenomenological experience], it [consciousness] will attain a point at which it casts off its appearance of being affected with what is different from it, with what is only for it and as something other than itself, or where appearance becomes identical with essence, so that the description of consciousness coincides with this very point of the authentic scientific knowledge of mind; and finally, by apprehending this its own essence, it will express absolute knowledge itself (from the Introduction to the Phenomenology, quoted by Habermas).
>
> But already here a contradiction appears that is masked only rhetorically. If it is phenomenology that first produces the standpoint of absolute knowledge, and this standpoint coincides with the position of authentic scientific knowledge, then the construction of knowledge in its manifestations cannot itself claim the status of scientific knowledge. The apparent dilemma (Aporie) of knowing before knowledge, with which Hegel reproached epistemology, now returns in Hegel's thought as an actual dilemma: namely, that phenomenology must in fact be valid prior to every possible mode of scientific knowledge (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 21).[132]

The best way to approach this criticism is to ask ourselves, "How does Habermas interpret Hegel's conception of the Absolute?" Habermas is reproaching Hegel with attempting to 'know before knowledge', with claiming validity for phenomenology in advance, whereas, by Hegel's own definition, validity is something which can only be conferred in retrospect. Perhaps, however, Habermas is able to discover nothing but contradiction here, because his conception of the Hegelian object-of-knowledge is not in consonance with his conception of the Hegelian method

of knowing. What is Habermas' understanding of Hegelian Absolute knowledge?

> ... This would not bring about an absolute unity of subject and object. Only such a unity, however, would confer upon critical consciousness, in which phenomenological reflection culminates, the status of absolute knowledge (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 21).[133]

> On the other hand, when phenomenology truly attains its declared goal, absolute knowledge, it makes itself superfluous. Indeed, it refutes the perspective of inquiry held by the critique of knowledge as such, although this perspective is its only legitimation. At best, then, we may regard phenomenology as a ladder which we must throw away after climbing it to the standpoint of the Logic (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 23).[134]

The words, 'absolute unity of subject and object,' in the first quotation here, are clarified by the general sense of the second quotation. In both passages, Habermas is thinking of Absolute knowledge as static, and as a goal toward which we climb, only to repudiate the process of climbing once the goal has been reached. This does not, I think, correspond with Hegel's own characterizations of Absolute knowledge, as being itself essentially dynamic. Not only is knowledge a process-- the object--of-knowledge is also a process: Absolute knowledge, I think, is Hegel's name for the evolving cognition which is aware of itself as infinite. What does this mean? I shall try gradually to spell it out, as the discussion continues. Let us return to Habermas' criticisms, and review them in the light of certain specific Hegelian statements:

> The power of spirit lies rather in remaining one with itself when giving up itself, and, because it is self--contained and self-subsistent, in establishing as mere moments its explicit self-existence as well as its implicit inherent nature. Nor again is Ego a tertium quid which

> casts distinctions back into the abyss of the Absolute, and declares them all to mean the same there. On the contrary, true knowledge lies rather in the seeming inactivity which merely watches how what is distinguished is self-moved by its very nature and returns again into its own unity (Phenomenology, p. 804). [135]

What we have here is a form of consciousness which lives and re-lives certain specific 'moments', certain modes of formal determination. These modes are: (α) staticity and isolation; (β) disruption and subjection to otherness; (γ) incorporation of (α) and (β) into the over-arching unity of the process which relates them. How does this contradict Habermas' conception of Hegelian Absolute knowledge? According to Habermas, the goal, stage (γ), is a standpoint indifferent to the process of attainment which led up to it; whereas, for Hegel, the goal is merely the standpoint from which the process of attainment grasps its own nature as a process, 'sees its own history', all at once. Now, it is strange that Habermas should take such a strongly non- Hegelian position in interpreting Hegelian Absolute knowledge, especially since he (Habermas) gives an extremely lucid rendition of the Hegelian conception of phenomenological experience. Habermas, that is, seems willing to go along with the Hegelian schema for common experience as a process of perpetual self-supersession:

> Unlike empirical experience, phenomenological experience does not keep within the bounds of transcendentally grounded schemata. Rather, the construction of consciousness in its manifestations incorporates the fundamental experiences in which transformations of such schemata of apprehending the world and of action themselves have been deposited. The experience of reflection preserves those outstanding moments in which the subject looks back over its own shoulder, so to speak, and perceives how the transcendental

> relation between subject and object alters itself behind its back. It recollects the emancipation thresholds of mankind (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 20).[136]

However, when it comes to Absolute knowledge, Habermas apparently abandons the dynamical schema; the result is that consciousness is portrayed by him as precisely that 'tertium quid' to which Hegel makes reference. Such a 'tertium quid', in seeking to know an Absolute which is conceived as static "unity of subject and object," runs into all the difficulties that confronted Plato, in his version of Absolute knowledge (see Section III):

> If the progressive phenomenological movement of consciousness, like "all natural and mental life," were based on the logical structure of essences existing in and for themselves, then precisely the special relation that enables phenomenology to be an introduction to philosophy would be neglected: namely that the phenomenological observer, who cannot yet have attained the standpoint of logic, is himself incorporated in the self-formative process of consciousness (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 22).[137]

In this last passage, Habermas' position becomes quite clear: he is interpreting the words, "in and for themselves," as qualifying logical essences which are held to exist independently of our knowing them, 'out there somewhere', in the indefinite future. Phenomenological experience, in this case, is portrayed as an introductory journey toward that future, to search for a comprehension of those essences, which will yield to us the 'standpoint of logic'. A contradiction arises, for Habermas, when these two requirements are set side by side:

a) that phenomenology introduce us to the logical essences;

b) that phenomenology necessarily constitute the very stuff of those same logical essences.

Hegel incorporated introduction to the 'logical essences' within the structural nature of those 'logical essences' themselves. This struck Habermas as self-contradictory, like an attempt to 'know before knowledge'. Habermas understands the notion of introduction as involving three things: a goal (the 'standpoint of logic'); a seeker (the human subject); and a process connecting the first two terms, bringing 'seeker' to 'goal' (phenomenological experience). Habermas finds it impossible to reconcile this notion of introduction with the assertion that the 'goal' is the same thing as the 'connecting process'-- that phenomenological experience is itself already Absolute knowledge. He would be right, of course, if his interpretation accurately represented Hegel's position-- but I don't think that it does.

The point which apparently eludes Habermas, here, is this: introduction to the Absolute is, for Hegel, intrinsic to the nature of the Absolute itself. 'Introduction' corresponds to the 'logical essence' of phase (β), 'disruption and subjection to otherness'-- it is the 'moment' of subjectivity, of doubt, disorientation, openness, and fear. 'Introductoriness' is never left behind, for Hegel-- even in Absolute knowledge; it constitutes the 'moment' of negativity, in which novelty and transition are brought to the staticity and isolation of a given determinate structure.

I shall try further to clarify this. By using the words, "in and for themselves," to qualify his'logical essences', Hegel is bringing together into a unified process two specific

'moments'. These 'moments' are, on the one hand, that of Spirit as 'substance' (i.e.,in itself), and on the other, that of Spirit as 'subject' (i.e.,for itself). In the first 'moment', Spirit is a bounded area, a determinate thing, static and easily identifiable even according to a substance/attribute metaphysical framework. In the second 'moment', Spirit involves the breaking apart of its first 'moment'; the former determinateness is superseded, the boundary is crossed, the 'substance' goes out of existence: a static structure has opened up to radical novelty. In this way, we have in the first 'moment' a consolidation of order, and in the second 'moment' a disruption of what previously had been consolidated. The first 'moment' is aligned by Hegel with substance, because it is unself-conscious, determinate, unchanging, and isolated. The second 'moment' is aligned by Hegel with subject, because it is essentially negativity or self-consciousness: the 'substance' undergoes negation; it falls into explicit relation-to-another; it is open to the 'other', and, through this openness to what is alien, becomes able to 'see itself' for the first time. In this way, the first 'moment', which is in-itself, by undergoing the negativity of the second 'moment', is forced out of its static isolation, and becomes for-itself. Together, they constitute a process which is perpetually establishing itself in specific forms, and perpetually introducing novelty into those forms, thereby specifying itself once again, only differently...

How does this relate to Habermas' criticism of Hegel? The picture I have just given, of Spirit as 'in-and-for-itself',

is totally different from Habermas' picture of Absolute knowledge. For Hegel, Absolute knowledge is not definitive, as Habermas explicitly asserts; nor is it an immediate unity, as Habermas implies. Rather, it is constant mediation, or transition between substance and subject; furthermore, it takes on through this constant mediation a form of 'infinite' unity which remains simultaneously fluent. I think it is Habermas' repudiation of the dynamical schema, at the moment of representing Absolute knowledge, which places him at odds with Hegel. If we think of Absolute knowledge as itself becoming, and not as a static goal, we come closer to Hegel. If we then add to our conception of Absolute knowledge the intuition that its unified becoming is the very underlying formal structure of the world's unified becoming, we return once again to the paradox which complicated Whitehead's coinage, 'a monistic universe with the illusion of change'. Finally, to follow through with Hegel's thought, we need to perceive the sense in which the world's becoming, and the formal aspect of the Absolute's becoming, are themselves merely the designations of 'moments' in one process, which is the Absolute itself.

Now, there has simultaneously arisen in this discussion both the need, and the opportunity, for greater precision. With the use, in the last paragraph, of the words, "definitive", and "immediate", we hark back to the discussion of 'focalization' which was made in Section III. I think the topic of 'focalization', brought into Hegelian terms, will perhaps allow me to clarify the largely metaphorical picture with which I have so far been

struggling.

* * * * *

In the preceding section, two principal characterizations of Kant's philosophy emerged. They were:

a) a conception of knowledge according to the following meta-relation: a cognizing subject as unity of apperception stands in relation to his object, which is, in turn, a relation between a unity of substrate and its connected superstrate of characteristics;

b) the fact that <u>both</u> these sub-relations within the cognitive meta-relation are in-formed by the schema of 'focalization'. In other words, the relation between cognizing subject and cognized objects, <u>as well as</u> the relation between logical subject and predicates, are both expressions of one general schema: the 'point of focus' in each case represents a stable substrate or receptacle or medium in which many subordinate determinations can coherently inhere or fluctuate.

As we recall, it was Kant's basic conception of knowledge as a 'focalizing' action which led him into epistemological dualism, putting all definitive and immediate cognition beyond human reach. Now, in order to understand Hegel's repudiation of the Kantian dualism, we must not follow Habermas' interpretation; we must not, that is, go against Kant by returning to Plato, in search of a definitively and immediately present Absolute. I don't think Hegel designed his supersession of Kant along these lines. Rather, we must follow out Hegel's emphasis on <u>process</u>. I think the clearest way of expressing

Hegel's supersession of Kant, is to say that he switched from a notion of 'focalization' as the rigid relatedness of two 'sides' (unified permanence and multifarious flux), to a new notion of 'focalization' as one process in which those two 'sides' are subordinate 'moments'. Let us try to work out what this means.

> Yet at the same time this acceptance of the Absolute as Subject is merely anticipated, not really affirmed. The subject is taken to be a fixed point, and to it as their support the predicates are attached, by a process falling within the individual knowing about it, but not looked upon as belonging to the point of attachment itself; only by such a process, however, could the content be presented as subject. Constituted as it is, this process cannot belong to the subject; but when that point of support is fixed to start with, this process cannot be otherwise constituted, it can only be external. The anticipation that the Absolute is subject is therefore not merely not the realization of this conception; it even makes realization impossible. For it makes out the notion to be a static point, while its actual reality is self-movement, self-activity (Phenomenology, p. 84-5).[138]

For Hegel, there are two types of unity, the static, and the dynamic or 'infinite'. The unity of common substances, like this piece of paper, is static: any change in the piece of paper occurs at the level of attributes-- unless, of course, the change in attributes is so extreme as to un-do the unity of the substance itself, in which case we suddenly have before us a radically new substance or static unity, with attributes of its own. Hegel's principal point about all static unities, is that they are bound to undergo not just alteration (of attributes), but also existence-changes, in the manner just described. It is this existence-change of static unities, according to Hegel, which determines dynamic unities-- processes. Roughly

speaking, the constitution of a static unity, for Hegel, corresponds to the aspect of unified permanence in Kantian 'focalization'; when the static unity breaks apart, we have, for Hegel, what corresponds to the aspect of multifarious flux in Kantian 'focalization'. Then, a new static unity is consolidated out of the confusion and flux which had befallen the old static unity: gradually, a meaningful and coherent pattern of such existence-changes is established. In other words, it is central to Hegel's point of view to regard this-substance-here-and-now, and that-other-substance-there-and-then, not just as two metaphysically independent and unrelated entities, but as the 'moments' of one entity, a history. 'Focalization', for Hegel, is the process which consolidates substance A at time t_{α} , breaks substance A into scattered pieces at time t_{β} , and consolidates out of A's remnants a new substance, B, at time t_{γ} (I give an example <u>in time</u>, here-- of course, the analogue occurs, for Hegel, logically or outside time, in non-physical'processes'). We can find, in Hegel's concept of 'focalization', all the logical elements germane to the Kantian 'focalization': <u>both</u> philosophers regard 'focalization' as the subsumption of what is variegated and changing under a single designation. The difference between them is that, whereas, for Kant, the single designation is static, for Hegel, the single designation is a process. To put it differently, Kant's 'focalization' unifies alteration of characteristics, whereas Hegel's 'focalization' (at least apparently) unifies existence-changes <u>of</u> Kantian 'focalized' objects. Immediately the question arises: "Is

Hegel's notion of process logically dependent upon the identity and distinctness criteria of Kantian 'substances', since it apparently unifies their existence-changes at a 'higher' level?" I think Hegel would have answered, "no, not exactly"-- he offers, instead, the following alternative identification-and-distinction framework:

> For just as ratiocinative thinking in its negative reference, ... is nothing but the self into which the content returns; in the same way, on the other hand, in its positive cognitive process the self is an ideally presented subject to which the content is related as an accident and predicate. This subject constitutes the basis to which the content is attached and on which the process moves to and fro. Conceptual thinking goes on in quite a different way. Since the concept or notion is the very self of the object, manifesting itself as the development of the object, it is not a quiescent subject, passively supporting accidents: it is a self-determining active concept which takes up its determinations and makes them its own. In the course of this process that inert passive subject really disappears; it enters into the different constituents and pervades the content; instead of remaining in inert antithesis to determinateness of content, it constitutes, in fact, that very specificity, i.e. the content as differentiated along with the process of bringing this about. Thus the solid basis, which ratiocination found in an inert subject, is shaken to its foundations, and the only object is this very movement of the subject. The subject supplying the concrete filling to its own content ceases to be something transcending this content, and cannot have further predicates or accidents. Conversely, again, the scattered diversity of the content is brought under the control of the self, and so bound together; the content is not a universal that can be detached from the subject, and adapted to several indifferently. Consequently the content is in truth no longer the predicate of the subject; it is the very substance, is the inmost reality, and the very principle of what is being considered (Phenomenology, p. 118-119).[139]

I think what Hegel is getting at here is the need, if one is to remain self-consistent in speaking about 'infinite' processes, thoroughly to abandon the Kantian notion of 'focalization' as a relation obtaining between two fixed 'sides'. If each of these 'sides' is regarded as independent of the other, and as

being a coherent or meaningful thing on its own, then, according to Hegel, the whole emphasis on process instantly becomes self--contradictory as well as unmotivated. Hegel's basic point is that there really is no such thing, metaphysically speaking, as a static unity, except insofar as it is a 'moment' of a dynamical unity. Quā 'moment', it is artificially 'frozen', and cut off from the whole-- it has no metaphysically valid identity and distinctness criteria of its own. Here, Hegel is coming quite close to Whitehead's position (see p. 152-3), in that two alternative systems are being put forth, the one as pragmatically useful but metaphysically incomplete, the other as pragmatically cumbersome but metaphysically coherent: the first is the substance/attribute 'focalization' framework (corresponding in Hegel to Understanding); the second is the framework of 'focalization' as 'becoming' (corresponding in Hegel to Speculative Reason). At this point, then, we are confronted with the task of explicating just how, for Hegel, 'focalization' is comprehensible as self-propelled 'becoming'. In the context of the present discussion I can only graze this difficult explication, postponing the rigorous treatment of it until better analytical tools are available to me.

The question which here becomes especially relevant stems from Hegel's assertion that "the only object is this very movement of the subject." We must ask: "What is it, more specifically, that is moving?" The best way to approach this question is to leave behind the Phenomenology, and shift to the appropriate sections of the Logic, where Hegel is less obscure.

A general statement of what we are trying to get at is contained in the following passage:

> Last of all comes the discovery that the whole evolution is what constitutes the content and the interest. It is indeed the prerogative of the philosopher to see that everything, which, taken apart, is narrow and restricted, receives its value by its connection with the whole, and by forming an organic element of the idea. Thus it is that we have had the content already, and what we have now is the knowledge that the content is the living development of the idea. This simple retrospect is contained in the form of the idea. Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image of the absolute, but at first in a limited mode, and thus it is forced onwards to the whole, the evolution of which is what we termed Method (Logic, p. 293).[140]

I think this 'living development of the idea' corresponds to what I have been calling 'Hegelian focalization'-- in Hegel's own vocabulary, the appropriate technical term for it is 'judgment'.

> One's first impression about the Judgment is the independence of the two extremes, the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be a thing or term per se, and the predicate a general term outside the said subject and somewhere in our heads. The next point is for us to bring the latter into combination with the former, and in this way frame a Judgment. The copula 'is', however, enunciates the predicate of the subject, and so that external subjective subsumption is again put in abeyance, and the Judgment taken as a determination of the object itself (Logic, p. 231).[141]

The first step Hegel takes in describing 'judgment', is to repudiate the substance/attribute framework, and the common conception of a 'thing'. Both aspects of the Kantian conception of knowledge, the cognitive meta-relation and its schema of static 'focalization', are therefore set aside. Here is what Hegel says about the 'things' specified according to a Kantian framework:

> Everything else which is concrete, however rich it be, is not so intensely identical with itself and therefore not so concrete on its own part-- least of all what is commonly supposed to be concrete, but is only a congeries held together by external influence. What are called notions, and in fact specific notions, such as man, house, animal, etc., are simply denotations and abstract representations. These abstractions retain out of all the functions of the notion only that of universality; they leave particularity and individuality out of account and have no development in these directions (Logic, p. 229).[142]

The 'congeries held together by external influence' is, in fact, a Kantian phenomenal object-- the 'congeries' is the manifold of sense-representations coming from intuition; the 'external influence' is the act by which the 'congeries' obtains a unity which is not intrinsic to it, through being subsumed under a rule in one human apperception.

The new conception of 'judgment' that Hegel introduces involves a fusion of those characteristics which, in the Kantian conception of judgment, were only brought together as independent opposites standing in relation to each other.

> The judgment is an expression of finitude. Things from its point of view are said to be finite, because they are a judgment, because their definite being and their universal nature (their body and their soul), though united indeed (otherwise the things would be nothing), are still elements in the constitution which are already different and also in any case separable (Logic, p. 233).[143]

Hegel explains what he means by this a little further on:

> The abstract terms of the judgment, 'The individual is the universal', present the subject (as negatively self-relating) as what is immediately concrete, while the predicate is what is abstract, indeterminate, in short, the universal. But the two elements are connected together by an 'is': and thus the predicate (in its universality) must also contain the speciality of the subject, must, in short, have particularity: and so is realized the identity between subject and predicate; which, being thus unaffected by this difference in form, is the content. ... It is the predicate which first gives the subject, which till then

> was on its own account a bare mental representation or an empty name, its specific character and content (Logic, p. 233-4).[144]

> We now go closer into the speciality of subject and predicate. The subject as negative self-relation is the stable substratum in which the predicate has its subsistence and where it is ideally present. The predicate, as the phrase is, inheres in the subject. Further, as the subject is in general and immediately concrete, the specific connotation of the predicate is only one of the numerous characters of the subject. Thus the subject is ampler and wider than the predicate. ... Conversely, the predicate as universal is self-subsistent, and indifferent whether this subject is or not. The predicate outflanks the subject, subsuming it under itself: and hence on its side is wider than the subject. The specific content of the predicate alone constitutes the identity of the two (Logic, p. 234).[145]

> At first, subject, predicate, and the specific content or the identity are, even in their relation, still put in the judgment as different and divergent. By implication, however, that is, in their notion, they are identical. For the subject is a concrete totality, which means not any indefinite multiplicity, but individuality alone, the particular and the universal in an identity: and the predicate too in the very same unity. The copula again, even while stating the identity of subject and predicate, does so at first only by an abstract 'is'. Conformably to such an identity the subject has to be put also in the characteristic of the predicate. By this means the latter also receives the characteristic of the former: so that the copula receives its full complement and full force. Such is the continuous specification by which the judgment, through a copula charged with content, comes to be a syllogism (Logic, p. 235).[146]

The best account I can give of what Hegel has here set forth, runs like this: from a strictly formal standpoint, there is a distinction between subject and predicate. However, this formal distinction, like the distinction between 'circle' and 'not-circle' mentioned earlier on, is in fact a formally 'infinite' process. A subject is the aspect of consolidation pertaining to a 'specific content'; a predicate is the universal aspect of that content: but what is metaphysically primary is the single process in which these aspects coexist. We are able analytically

to dissect the process of 'specific content' according to subject-predicate expressions, putting unity or stability on one side and multifariousness or flux on the other. But, in so doing, we destroy the 'living development'.

> The conflict between the form of a proposition in general and the unity of the notion which destroys that form, is similar to what we find between metre and accent in the case of rhythm. Rhythm is the result of what hovers between and unites both. So in the case of the speculative or philosophical judgment; the identity of subject and predicate is not intended to destroy their distinction, as expressed in propositional form; their unity is to arise as a harmony of the elements. The form of the judgment is the way the specific sense appears, or is made manifest, the accent which differentiates the meaning it contains: that the predicate expresses the substance, and the subject itself falls within the universal, is however the unity wherein that accent dies away (Phenomenology, p. 120-21).[147]

Unfortunately, this doesn't get us much closer to a clear representation of what that 'specific content', that 'self-focalizing' entity, actually is. We have before us a relatively plausible notion of 'higher unity', derived from the models of historical development, of self-conscious thought progression, of natural organic growth. How are we to apply these models without using the substance/attribute framework as a basis? How, in other words, are we to construct a framework for the identity and distinctness of higher-order entities through time, without also relying upon the conditions for identity and distinctness of lower-order entities at one time? Intuitively, what this question means is this: a process involves the permanence and flux of certain determinate things: how much sense can we be making if we attempt to characterize those determinate things exclusively in terms of the whole process which they are

continually constituting? What we seem to be coming up with is a metaphysics of the future anterior tense: "Those events/things will have acquired this or that ultimate unified status; therefore, they are not what they seem to be, here and now."

I cannot help but notice a certain similarity between these objections which I have just raised, and the objection which Habermas brought up against the dual claims of Hegel's phenomenological endeavor. In both cases, we have difficulty in understanding how 'the whole' can be identical with the process of its own coming to be. More specifically, a problem arises when we ask for a clearcut explanation of what the 'moments' of the process actually are. Hegel typically responds to such a question with a reference back to the whole:

> In this ideality of its dynamic elements, the syllogistic process may be described as essentially involving the negation of the characters through which its course runs, as as being a mediative process through the suspension of mediation-- as coupling the subject not with another, but with a suspended other, in one word, with itself (Logic, p. 255).[148]

In reading such passages as this one, we find ourselves thrown back and forth between two levels: Hegel identifies the process as "the negation of the characters through which its course runs." There is more involved here than a mere parts-and-whole relationship: for a part can have the same metaphysical structure as the whole in which it exists (take, for example, 'heart' and 'human being'). Hegel's process-'moment' relationship, rather, involves a genuine 'to-and-fro' between distinct metaphysical frameworks. The only way I can make sense of this 'to-and-fro' is as follows:

a) on the one hand, we have static unities, persisting through time, undergoing alterations and/or existence-changes. These static unities are only comprehensible as such in terms of the substance/attribute framework;

b) on the other hand, we have dynamical unities, which exist as the transfigurations of static unities. A dynamical unity comes about gradually, continually, as the various static unities show what they really are. The static unities become, both through alterations and existence-changes: how they become determines, and is determined by, their dynamical unity. (Once again: for clarity, I have been using the schema of physical and temporal, not logical, becoming.)

Immediately the question arises: Have I, in this picture, distorted and compromised Hegel's position out of existence? I'm not sure. The whole issue turns on the amount of emphasis one places on 'transfiguration':

> It is indeed the prerogative of the philosopher to see that everything, which, taken apart, is narrow and restricted, receives its value by its connection with the whole, and by forming an organic element of the idea. Thus it is that we have had the content already, and what we have now is the knowledge that the content is the living development of the idea. This simple retrospect is contained in the form of the idea.

The words, "we have had the content already," seem to strengthen the model of the 'to-and-fro' which I just presented. We begin with the stance of Understanding, with the substance/attribute framework, with belief in the existence of a radical 'other' or 'Beyond'. In this initial phase, we regard the world as a complex of substances-with-attributes; each of those substances themselves, as well as the systematic order we discover obtaining

among all those substances, are regarded as ultimately subjective in nature. Both at the microcosmic and at the macrocosmic levels, the order of things is conceived as a static 'focalizing' relation which must be traced back to the necessary constitution of all human knowledge. This picture, according to Hegel, provides the content; then it is time for the formal 'retrospect'. All that appeared to be statically 'focalized', really wasn't; the substance/attribute framework is transfigured, when we perceive that its static unity has given rise to a pattern of becoming at the meta-level. Thus, the beginning leads on into its necessary culmination: the stance of Speculative Reason, of the process-logic framework, of 'infinite' identity.

> It may also be said in this strain that the absolute idea is the universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which the particular content is a stranger, but as the absolute form, into which all the categories, the whole fullness of the content it has given being to, have retired. The absolute idea may in this respect be compared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child, but for whom it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime (Logic, p. 293).[149]

We never discard the substance/attribute framework: rather, we learn to see it, and the entities which it in-forms, from an ampler perspective-- that of organic 'historical' progression.

Now, is this 'historical' perspective really different from what the Kantian philosophy had begun to provide, albeit regulatively or provisionally, through the Critique of Judgment? How innovative is Hegel's metaphysics, as I have interpreted it? Two factors have to be taken into consideration in answering this question:

1) The first factor is the large extent to which Hegel's 'formal

retrospect' alters and re-arranges the 'contents' which it embraces. Thus, for example, whereas Kant thought of subject and predicate as two separate logical terms which could be related in various ways, Hegel thought of them as being ultimately one and the same process. Taking an example at a wider level, we can see that Hegel's 'formal retrospect' basically re-arranges the systematic coordination of all the 'scientific' disciplines, into a very original organic hierarchy.

2) However, it is the second factor in Hegel's metaphysics which makes it especially innovative and unusual. This factor is the 'neutralization' of human subjectivity through its incorporation, as a logical 'moment', into the Absolute Idea.

I shall conclude my thesis with a brief discussion of this topic.

* * * * *

> For thinking does not mean being an abstract ego, but an ego which has at the same time the significance of inherently existing in itself; it means being object to itself or relating itself to objective reality in such a way that this connotes the self-existence of that consciousness for which it is an object. The object does not for thinking proceed by way of presentations or figures, but of notions, conceptions, i.e. of a differentiated reality or essence, which, being an immediate content of consciousness, is nothing distinct from it (Phenomenology, p. 242-3).[150]

In these statements, Hegel presents the line of thought through which his 'exit from the circle' of the epistemology-metaphysics impasse was carried out (see Part I). Kant's epistemological circumscription of all human knowledge is aligned by Hegel with one specific 'moment' of a more general metaphysical process:

the 'moment' of negativity, as it fits into the wider-embracing process of 'infinite' self-identity. Kant's philosophy, in other words, is an expression of the logical schema for self-consciousness: what was once an undifferentiated unity, immediate, 'natural', and dumb, has undergone its intrinsic negation or self-repulsion. Now, from 'outside' its own self, consciousness scrutinizes itself-- it is for itself both one and another:

> Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 472).[151]

Self-consciousness, as Kant understood it, could go no further than this dualism; Man has arisen out of his 'natural' being and perceived his 'moral' being. Nature is too low for Man fully to be satisfied with; Freedom is too high for Man fully to grasp.

The finality of this 'sundered' situation frustrates Hegel, who intends to show how Man's condition is self-sundered, and, for that very reason, self-healing.

> The spiritual is distinguished from the natural, and more especially from the animal, life, in the circumstance that it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but sunders itself to self-realization. But this position of severed life has in its turn to be suppressed, and the spirit has by its own act to win its way to concord again. The final concord then is spiritual; that is, the principle of restoration is found in thought, and thought only. The hand that inflicts the wound is also the hand which heals it (Logic, p. 43).[152]

The key to the 'principle of restoration' mentioned here lies

in Hegel's basic notion of reflexive activity: it is not Man who works upon himself, but a larger process, through which Man lives, that brings about the succession of its own 'moments'; negativity or pure self-consciousness is only one such 'moment'. Of its own accord, the process surpasses its 'sundered' condition.

A different way of saying all this is to set up the following distinction:

a) Kant regards subjectivity as an aspect of 'What-is-the--case'-- it is the specific aspect from which we humans operate.

b) Hegel regards subjectivity as a phase of 'What-is-the-case'; along with everything else that is the case, we humans perpetually go through this phase, and through other phases, too.

Now, the crucial question here is: "What is subjectivity, for these two philosophers?" To answer this question, we need only look back to our discussion of 'focalization'.

a) Kant's conception of subjectivity follows directly from his conception of 'focalization'. A fluent manifold is subsumed under a specific unity: this unity is the logical and/or cognizing subject. For Kant, the relation between a subject and its fluent manifold is like the relation between a faucet and the water running through it. The subject provides a fixed focal point, through which the fluent manifold is coordinated and controlled. Most importantly, the relation itself between subject and fluent manifold essentially partakes of the stabi-

lity which the subject confers; in other words, the role of the subject with regard to the fluent manifold is unchanging. It is this stability of relation, for Kant, which primordially makes knowledge possible, and which renders subjectivity a correspondingly stable aspect of 'What is the case'.

b) Hegel's conception of subjectivity follows directly from his conception of 'focalization'. First, (α), we have the 'moment' of isolation and fixity; a structure is consolidated as unified, determinate, and stable. Then, (β), we have the 'moment' of negativity, of fluent Dialectic, of self-repulsion and self-consciousness; the determinate structure breaks apart into novel multifariousness, or enters into relation with something beyond its boundaries. Finally, (γ), the positive content of the negative 'moment' is realized; a new determinate structure is consolidated out of the original one; a wider-embracing unity results from the establishment of a specific relation between the original structure and what lay 'beyond' its confines. Here, we do not have any stability of relation between focal point and fluent manifold; rather, the focal point itself is fluent. In other words, there is no one focal point which is always there to unify the various manifolds as they are presented. Rather, the stability of Hegelian 'focalization' stems from the fact that unity and disjunction, 'one' and 'many', determinateness and diffusion, perpetually alternate with one another, in a process which never virtually repeats but is always formally the same. In this context, the word 'subjectivity' refers to the relation between determinate or unified structure,

and the negation of that structure, which occurs when radical openness and novelty impinge. As with Kant, then, subjectivity is here construed as a relation between, on the one hand, unity or determinate structure, and, on the other, multifariousness, flux, and indeterminacy: 'subjectivity' is the requirement that the 'many' be brought into 'one'. Unlike Kant, however, Hegel regards this required relation as one of logical or temporal succession; in this sense, the relation itself is continually superseded and continually re-established, as the alternating progression goes on. For Hegel, then, the most accurate way to regard subjectivity is as a phase in the creative process of the world.

What has just been said may be rendered more tangible by comparing the Kantian and Hegelian conceptions of human experience, in a general manner. For Kant, the accumulation of experience in a given individual does lead to certain basic changes in his view of the world; nevertheless, for all his education, there is a qualitative limit beyond which his knowledge may not extend. What is accessible to humans, according to Kant, is a sound grasp of the regularities in the field of appearance; these regularities are ascertained according to a scientific method of inquiry, which primarily acknowledges 'truth' or 'validity' in those phenomena that can be controlled and reproduced at will. Thus, for Kant, I can become educated; but the fundamental nature of my knowledge circumscribes this education. In the same sense in which 'I' am essentially a qualitatively stable unity of apperception, so must my knowledge remain

qualitatively stable, as provisional and mediated appearance.

For Hegel, on the other hand, experience is constantly undergoing radical qualitative revision-- or, rather, self--revision. Looking back to the quotation with which I began this discussion (Phenomenology, p. 242-3), we find the statement:

> The object does not for thinking proceed by way of presentations or figures, but of notions, conceptions, i.e. of a differentiated reality or essence, which, being an immediate content of consciousness, is nothing distinct from it.

What does Hegel mean, here? I think he is saying that genuine 'conceptually constituted contents' partake of the same formal self-development as the human ego does in knowing those contents. There is a three-way homology between 'knower' and 'known', here: the dialectic between them is the same as the dialectic within each of them. Knower, known, and the experience which 'connects' them, are all essentially dynamical, and 'infinite', 'focalizations'. For this reason, my experience is a growing-process which must follow certain patterns; the stages which I go through, in living and learning, follow the form and the content of Spirit, with which I am ultimately identical. Thus, the Phenomenology constitutes a record of the process by which sense-certainty transmutes itself into Absolute knowledge. The possibility of such a process rests upon the metaphysical shift, through which Hegel takes 'focalization', not as a static relation, but as 'infinite' self-identity.

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In conclusion, I should mention that I still have misgivings about Hegel's process-logic. I am not sure how Hegel's 'alter-

native framework' would stand up under fire from modern analytical philosophy; I am not even sure whether his logic is sufficiently coherent to withstand an in-depth scrutiny from within his own system. These are just two of the critical approaches to Hegel which offer material for future thought.

But Hegel is much more easy to criticize than he is to forget. This is why Michel Foucault, near the end of The Discourse on Language, wryly cautions:

> ... truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us (Foucault, The Discourse on Language, p. 235).[153]

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31) Ibid., p. 142.
32) Ibid., p. 232.
33) Ibid., p. 226.
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107) Hegel, Logic, p.38.
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109) Ibid., p. 130.
110) Ibid., p. 136-7.
111) Ibid., p. 135.
112) Ibid., p. 136.
113) Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 408-9.
114) I hesitate to decide between 'breakdown' and 'extreme radicalization', here: 'focalization' intrinsically means 'unification of the multifarious and fluent'. On the one hand, Plato's 'One' is a focal point for the phenomenal and lesser ideal worlds. On the other hand, Plato's 'One' is described as a self-subsistent and independent totality. The ambiguity depends upon which perspective is taken--the 'inner' or the 'outer'. From 'within' the 'One', 'focalization' has broken down: there is nothing multifarious and fluent to be unified. From 'outside' the 'One', 'focalization' has been radicalized: the 'One' is the ultimate unity of all that is multifarious and fluent in the world.
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Appendix: REDUCTIONISM
(A few cursory considerations)

The reduction of all things to one of the two poles, 'mental' vs. 'physical', is a tempting way to circumvent the dualism implicitly involved in any philosophy based upon the distinction between knower and known. However, as I see it, such a reduction only exasperates, and does not surpass, the dualism from which it starts; the notion itself of 'reduction' involves, and throughout presupposes, the existence of two fundamental types of things, one of which is being 'reduced' to the other.

Now, it may be very difficult to 'prove' that all things are not, in some sense, ultimately tied to or expressed within the physical world. Conversely, it may be equally difficult to 'prove' satisfactorily that all things are not, in some sense, entirely 'in our heads' or existent only insofar as they are represented either by us or by 'God'. Both these extreme positions, the exasperated idealism as well as the exasperated materialism, are difficult to confute in any final or clearcut manner.

They do, however, show their inadequacy in one fundamental way. Although both of them intend to dissolve the knower/known dualism into a uni-qualitative monism, all that either of them is able to do, in the final analysis, is retain the initial dualism while placing special emphasis on one side or the other. In other words: within their putatively uni-qualitative 'expanse

of the world', there immediately arises once again the need for two kinds of entities.

Thus, in exteme idealism, we find it necessary to give an account of the apparent subsistence of rocks, houses, and cities while we are nevertheless sleeping, or thinking about something other than those things, specifically. In this way, 'God' is brought into the picture, and we have a new sub-distinction within the supposedly 'reduced' domain: things represented by God (corresponding to physical objects), and things represented by us (corresponding to mental representations). It is not so much the arbitrary involvement of 'God' in this philosophical position, as the return in novel form of the distinction we had supposedly removed, that shows it to be contrived and self-defeating.

Similarly, in extreme materialism, we ourselves, as well as our knowledge, are held ultimately to be aspects of an all-embracing physical world. All intentionality, according to this view, is the emergent property of certain relations between physical things, explained in the descending hierarchy of neurophysiology, biology, chemistry, and at the bottom, physics. But here again, the basic dualism has returned. In explaining that intentionality is not really what we think it is, but is in fact a higher-order expression of the same relations that occur in inorganic matter, we have instated a sub-distinction within the supposedly 'reduced' domain: basic physical relations (corresponding to physical objects), and properties emergent from basic physical relations (corresponding to mental repre-

sentations).

Now, it may at first seem to constitute a scientific advance, when disparate phenomena are explained in terms of one substrate. The problem in the case of the two present 'reductionisms' is that, contrary to appearance, the disparateness of the initial phenomena has <u>not</u> been broken down, but retained as a 'sub-disparateness' within a single domain defined so as to embrace them. In extreme idealism, the God-representations obey rules different from those obeyed by the man--representations-- they are as different from each other as God and man. In the extreme materialism, relations between 'objects' at the higher-order, 'emergent' level, are inexplicable exclusively in terms of the relations between basic physical objects-- the 'emergent objects' obey meta-rules of their own. In this crucial sense, something remains disturbingly un-reduced in both 'reductionisms'. The monisms they have set up are only superficial; beneath the surface, age-old distinctions remain.